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International students in the U.S. have consistently been treated in public 
policy as educational, diplomatic and economic assets. In the year before 9/11, a 
national policy endorsing international education, including support for 
international student flows to the U.S., received presidential and Congressional 
support. After 9/11, however, the system by which international students obtain 
visas, enter and stay in the U.S. was identified as a national security problem. 
Within two months, legislative action mandated tracking of international students 
though the new Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). This 
was followed in the next 18 months by a cascade of other legislation, regulations 
and rules. These buffeted international students, the advocacy community which 
serves the international education exchange arena, and the administrators who 
work on a daily basis with international students on U.S. campuses. This case 
study describes the impact in three arenas:  1) The flow of policy and regulation 
was rapid, dense with procedures and deadlines, and mandated implementation of 
largely unpiloted programs and events. 2) The advocacy community responded by 
accepting SEVIS and some visa reforms in the name of national security, despite 
previous opposition. They continued to work to shape legislation, SEVIS features 
and visa policies; to provide extensive support for practitioners struggling to 
implement the new policies and regulations; and to collect data on the impact of 
the new policies on international students and scholars. 3) During this chaotic 
period, administrators in the field, as reported in in-person interviews, experienced 
deep changes in the work of their offices, with implementation of SEVIS the most 
demanding event; they also worked to protect and support their students and to 
x
represent this population positively to their campuses and the media. They reported 
a variety of positive outcomes as well as difficulties. Several policy process 
constructs inform the results of the descriptive data, particularly those related to 
agenda shift following a focusing event. Other policy constructs which deepen 
understanding of the case include the characteristics of punctuated equilibrium, 
shifts in the tone of a policy's image, and use of causal stories to affect an issue's 




On April 19, 2000 President Bill Clinton issued an Presidential Memorandum 
directing actions that the U.S. international education policy community had been 
working toward for many years. The memorandum, addressed to the heads of the 
federal government's executive departments and agencies, carried "International 
Education Policy" on the subject line and opened with a persuasive and overarching 
statement of the value of international education to the U.S.:
To continue to compete successfully in the global economy and to maintain 
our role as a world leader, the United States needs to ensure that its citizens 
develop a broad understanding of the world, proficiency in other languages, 
and knowledge of other cultures. America's leadership also depends on 
building ties with those who will guide the political, cultural, and economic 
development of their countries in the future. A coherent and coordinated 
international education strategy will help us meet the twin challenges of 
preparing our citizens for a global environment while continuing to attract and 
educate future leaders from abroad.  (Presidential Memorandum, 2000)
Then plainly stating, "It is the policy of the Federal Government to support 
international education," the memorandum charged the Secretaries of State and 
Education with ten tasks to "increase and broaden our commitment" and to undertake 
activities to define a U.S. international education policy. The goals of the directive 
addressed the broad range of international education, including study abroad by U.S. 
students, K-12 curriculum, workforce development, and of particular interest to the 
international education policy community, it included a focus on in-bound 
international students and scholars, specifically "encouraging students from other 
countries to study in the United States" and "supporting the exchange of teachers, 
scholars, and citizens at all levels of society."  
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Embracing this commitment to developing a national international education 
policy, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright praised Clinton's action, saying:
U.S. international leadership, competitiveness, and national security are 
increasingly dependent on international and cross-cultural awareness on the 
part of U.S. citizens. Our foreign policy goals are enhanced immeasurably by 
international education - both American scholarship abroad and international 
leaders who have studied in the U.S. and consequently better understand our 
culture and system of government. I have a deep commitment to international 
education from my time as a professor. I have seen these programs work. They 
are pure gold and precious assets for America.  (U.S. Department of State, 
2000)
In additional comments in the press release, Secretary of Education Richard Riley 
echoed these sentiments. The Departments of State and Education established a joint 
partnership on international education policy to carry out the directive. Federal 
agencies and departments began to work on developing infrastructure to support the 
policy activities (Department of State, 2002).
The international education policy community was vitalized and gratified. At 
least 200 public and private organizations are involved in some aspect of international 
education exchange, and within this community over 60 organizations have public 
policy objectives of some sort as part of their missions, some with well-organized 
public policy departments and some entirely committed to policy development. Many 
are membership organizations serving and comprising public, non-profit and private 
sector administrators, practitioners, sponsors, advocates, and others involved in 
making international educational exchange work in the U.S. (Alliance for 
International Educational and Cultural Exchange, 2000). Several of these 
organizations in particular had been striving for years to shape public policy so that it 
supported, in part by eliminating obstacles to, international student and scholar 
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exchanges and other forms of internationalization on campuses. A top-level goal of 
this policy community was to establish a national international education policy as a 
framework within which specific policy and regulatory issues could be built or 
influenced. So it was particularly gratifying, and a sign of significant success on the 
part of the advocacy community, that the Presidential Memorandum and the charges it 
assigned to heads of agencies contained nearly point-by-point the action steps 
recommended in a position paper prepared in 1999 by NAFSA: Association of 
International Educators (known by the acronym "NAFSA" from its formative years as 
the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs) and the Alliance for 
International Educational and Cultural Exchange (known as the Alliance) (NAFSA, 
February 2000).  NAFSA and the Alliance had worked to maneuver through the 
political and public policy system not only the points within the position paper but the 
concept that the U.S. needed such a national policy at all (Advancing, 1999).
While the establishment of the final policy would have to await the outcomes 
of the ten information-gathering and policy-design tasks assigned in the 
memorandum, the presidential action marked a turning point for this policy 
community. This was useful because among the ten charges, two focused on in-bound 
international students:
The Secretaries of State and Education, in partnership with other governmental 
and nongovernmental organizations, shall identify steps to attract qualified 
post-secondary students from overseas to the United States . . . The heads of 
agencies, including the Secretaries of State and Education, and others as 
appropriate, shall review the effect of U.S. Government actions on the 
international flow of students and scholars as well as on citizen and 
professional exchanges, and take steps to address unnecessary obstacles, 
including those involving visa and tax regulations, procedures, and policies. 
(Presidential Memorandum, 2000)
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Having governmental support, as a matter of public policy, to attract international 
students provided essential foundational strength for future recruitment and advocacy 
efforts, and reducing obstacles provided practical progress on policy matters, 
particularly those related to visa regulations. Also, among the issues the international 
education policy community had been working to influence were regulations being 
promulgated to implement a foreign student tracking provision which had been 
mandated in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA) (Pub. L. 104-208). Having a presidential-level mandate for national 
policy, directing study of and support for improved access to the U.S. by international 
students and scholars, strengthened the hand of international educators in influencing 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officers who were developing the 
regulations which would implement the tracking system mandated in IIRIRA.  
With extensive participation of the international education policy community, 
a year of energetic public policy activity began as required by the presidential 
directive. Through 2000, the momentum continued on public policy initiatives 
supporting international education. Meetings were held. Mandated reports began 
accumulating. A Presidential Proclamation established an International Education 
Week. In a November 2000 discussion paper intended to "stimulate discussion among 
senior federal policy makers and interested organizations about how the federal 
government and other organizations in the field of international education can best 
raise awareness on the importance of international education, encourage increased 
investments in international education, and identify and disseminate best practices in 
international education," the Departments of State and Education joint partnership 
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outlined progress since the April 2000 Presidential Memorandum (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2000). The paper listed 15 actions already taken toward the goal 
statements, and then delved further into the core areas identified in the directive as 
components in building the integrated policy. Again, significant attention was devoted 
to the goals of attracting foreign students and scholars to the U.S. and addressing 
obstacles to exchange, including visa regulations.
As directed by the April 2000 memorandum, non-governmental organizations 
and other actors from the international educational community were invited to 
propose actions for implementing the directive’s goals, and they complied. In addition 
to NAFSA and the Alliance, the American Council on Education (ACE) and the 
American Association of Intensive English Programs (AAIEP), for example, prepared 
and submitted action lists. The advocacy community felt growing influence and new 
empowerment. The Coalition for International Education, an ad hoc group of 28 
national higher education associations and organizations, for example, submitted a 
proposal of four concrete actions and emphasized robust use of the Higher Education 
Act - Title VI and the Fulbright-Hays programs, saying in a letter to Secretary of 
Education Richard Riley, "We would be pleased to collaborate with the Department of 
Education in reviewing existing programs and determining any need for new 
initiatives to further advance the nation's international education policy" (Coalition for 
International Education, 2000).
Individual international education advisers, program directors, and practitioner 
advocates were also personally involved in shaping the policy outcomes and helping 
the advocacy organizations maintain momentum on public policy to support 
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international education, as indicated by responses from interviews I conducted. "I was 
also appointed to the public affairs committee working with [public policy staff] in 
Washington that had to do a lot. The whole focus was working on advocacy and how 
we could have an impact as an interest group," said Administrator A, for example, and 
Administrator B reported "I have participated in advocacy efforts on the Hill . . . I've 
probably participated in a half dozen of those initiatives. I have engaged in letter 
writing campaigns, again, both for policy and regulations as well as in individual 
cases . . . " 
With the 2000 elections and the change of presidential administrations in 
2001, the international education policy community feared a slowing of the policy 
advances, and the Bush administration did display less interest than the Clinton 
administration in the policy niche of international education, understandably given the 
disputed election and many pressing issues any new administration must deal with. 
Still, policy-shaping work continued, with advocacy organizations working 
established relationships with Congress and staffers while identifying ways to develop 
working connections within the new administration, stressing the value of 
international education to the U.S. national interests, emphasizing the need to 
complete a national policy statement that would provide a coherent policy 
infrastructure around which to organize and maximize international education efforts. 
"We call upon President Bush to reaffirm that it is the policy of the federal 
government to support international education; to take steps to ensure effective 
leadership and interagency coordination on the part of his administration; and to seek 
broad participation by educators and others in the formulation and implementation of 
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the policy," stated a white paper for the President-elect's transition team, prepared by 
the Alliance and NAFSA (Alliance, 2000).
During this period, one regulatory matter particularly was drawing attention in 
the policy community. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) (Pub. L. 104-208), a law addressing a range of immigration 
concerns, included a section devoted to establishing an automated database tracking 
system for international students in the U.S. This tracking program was known in the 
advocacy community by the acronym CIPRIS, for the agency partnership group that 
was carrying out development and implementation of the IIRIRA provision, the 
Coordinated Inter Agency Partnership Regulating International Students (Krouse & 
Perl, 2001). International student advocates debated and formed coalitions in efforts to 
shape the regulations being promulgated to implement this provision as well as the 
operational features of the actual tracking system itself (Hebel, 2000). The tracking 
system had been mandated in IIRIRA in response to the fact that one of the terrorists 
involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing had entered the U.S. on a student 
visa, had subsequently fallen out of status and remained in the U.S. illegally, 
undetected by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The legislation 
reflected the perception of policy makers that entry of international students and their 
visa compliance should be carefully monitored while in the U.S. The policy 
community debate and advocacy effort focused on the tracking system as an obstacle 
to access by legitimate international students and scholars. If the momentum toward a 
national international education policy could be invigorated, with its specific attention 
to improving access and reducing obstacles, the favorable context would mitigate 
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obstructive aspects of the CIPRIS program (Johnson, V, 2001b; SEVP/CIPRIS Plan, 
2001; Southwick, 2001b; Thomas, 2001). Through the spring and summer of 2001, 
CIPRIS negotiations were continuing and other practical advocacy work was 
occurring. For example, the international education policy community developed 
systems to report on consular posts which seemed to hold unnecessarily obstructive 
visa practices, impeding access to study by legitimate international students. Progress 
toward a national international education policy continued, including encouraging 
support for increasing international student flows to the U.S. (Johnson, V., 2001a).
In April, 2001, Senator John Kerry (D-MA), on behalf of a bi-partisan group 
of 12 senators, introduced a concurrent resolution "expressing the sense of Congress 
that the United States should establish an international education policy to further 
national security, foreign policy, and economic competitiveness, promote mutual 
understanding and cooperation among nations, and for other purposes." The resolution 
was unanimously approved (S. Con. Res. 7, 2001). This was followed in July 2001 by 
a similar House concurrent resolution, again introduced by a bi-partisan group led by 
Reps. Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) and Jim Oberstar (D-MN) (H. Con. Res. 201, 2001). These 
resolutions were overwhelmingly favorable to the international education community 
and reflected years of methodical policy work by public policy advocates in the field. 
(The text of S. Con. Res. 7 is included in Appendix A.) As with the Clinton 
Presidential Memorandum from a year earlier, the concurrent resolutions displayed 
language and objectives drawn wholesale from policy papers and position statements 
generated by NAFSA, the Alliance, and other international education organizations. 
On August 7, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell in a statement proclaiming 
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International Education Week 2001 stated "the Department of State recognizes the 
role that international education and exchange play in strengthening our nation and 
our relations with other countries" (Powell, 2001).
Also that August, Rep. Betty McCollum (D-MN.) introduced legislation to 
repeal the IIRIRA automated database provision (H.R. 2779; Curry, 2001).  In an 
early September NAFSA Newsletter, V. Johnson (2001, p. 15), associate executive 
director of public policy at NAFSA, conveyed optimism, writing "we are hopeful of 
putting this problem behind us by the end of the 107th Congress next year." Perhaps 
presciently, however, Mr. Johnson concluded by stating, "There will no doubt be 
many changes to [our] strategy as we proceed, because the policy process never works 
the way you plan it." 
In general, and consistently in the months leading to September 2001, 
international students and the various university and English language programs 
where they attended classes were viewed favorably by the public, as reflected through 
articles in the national press. As a policy niche, the fine points of policy debate among 
government actors, advocates, practitioners and their associations seldom made 
interesting press except within the academic community, where the Chronicle of 
Higher Education followed CIPRIS negotiations and implications and other 
international student policy issues regularly. In national newspapers such as the New 
York Times and USA Today, a steady stream of articles on international students as 
cultural ambassadors, homestay students, and athletes flowed on a predictable annual 
cycle. Feature articles on individual international students illustrating a scholarship 
program or a summer employment trend were typical, such as The Washington Post
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article "Lifesaving with an Accent:  Pool Management Firm Goes Overseas to Find 
Summer Help" (Hedgpeth, 2001). The size and spread of the international student and 
scholar population in the U.S. made the news once a year when the Institute of 
International Education's annual Open Doors report on international student mobility, 
including U.S. study abroad statistics, came out. The business pages of The Wall 
Street Journal devoted occasional discussion of international students and scholars in 
science and technology working in high tech jobs in the U.S. Among the handful of 
other policy-oriented topics receiving occasional national news coverage were 
CIPRIS developments and visa obstacles faced by intending students coming from 
some countries. On September 10, 2001, for example, The New York Times carried an 
article which discussed the difficulty Chinese students were having getting visas to 
study in the U.S.: "Tough U.S. Visa Policy Riles Shut-Out Scholars in China" 
(Rosenthal,  2001).
On 9/11, the nation was transformed. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 deeply 
changed many public and public policy perspectives in the U.S. In many policy areas, 
a seismic shift occurred. Rapidly, many areas of public policy debates shifted fully to 
the highly visible crisis problem of national security, and diverse policy issues were 
redefined in light of it. This was true for the arena of international education and 
international students, with the size of the shift made more dramatic given the 
momentum and achievement of the prior 18 months. The impact on the international 
education community, including students, scholars, campus international officers, 
policy community leaders, and advocacy organizations was huge. Within a week, the 
international student visa system was implicated in the attacks, when information was 
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reported (erroneously, as it turned out) that at least one of the terrorist pilots may have 
trained at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and shortly after that, news that at 
least one other terrorist had entered the U.S. on a student visa to attend an English 
language program in Oakland but had never appeared at the school. A spotlight fell on 
international students and international student access to U.S. schools and universities 
which would not dim for some time (Goldstein & Morse, 2001; Yardley, 2001). As 
part of the unfolding story of the attacks, major national news outlets reported these 
emerging pieces of information, and amid each day’s breaking news and government 
investigation, speculation about causal links to policy failures became part of the 
public discourse. The relatively closed policy arena of international education, 
heretofore dominated by policy elites, advocacy organizations and policy 
entrepreneurs, was opened to public scrutiny. The American public now followed 
developments in this policy arena in daily papers - the failure of the U.S. visa 
application and entry system to screen out terrorists, the failure of the U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to adequately monitor students who do 
enter, the failure of the U.S. international education policy community to support 
previous legislation to track international students once they entered the U.S. (e.g. 
Bravin, 2001; Goldstein & Morse, 2001; Schemo, 2001). 
In the 20 months following 9/11 a flood of hearings, major and minor 
legislation, rules and regulations, and directives were focused on or significantly 
affected the U.S. international education domain. Within months, a cascade of policy 
events overtook incremental policy strategies years in the making. Processes and 
strategies which had been playing out prior to the 9/11 attacks were ruptured; 
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established relationships between policy actors shifted or were truncated. In the 
scramble to take action, legislators grasped the student visa issue as one area where 
visible action could be taken and certain categories of students themselves could 
personify the problem and solution. A new landscape emerged, one requiring policy 
actors, including international education organizations and practitioners, to react to a
changed and unfavorable agenda beyond their control, to cope with the redefinition of 
issues linked to international student policies, and to subsequently implement rapidly 
made policies.
International education policy momentum was derailed. With public 
awareness already turning to international students and visa access, legislative 
activities quickly began to occur. On September 27, 2001 Senator Diane Feinstein (D-
CA) announced that she would introduce legislation to reform the U.S. student visa 
program.  
Today, there is little scrutiny given to those who claim to be foreign students 
seeking to study in the United States. . . . In fact, the foreign student visa 
program is one of the most unregulated and exploited visa categories. . . . I
believe that we need a temporary 6-month moratorium on the student visa 
program to give the INS time to remedy the many problems in the system. . . . 
This may be controversial, but there had to be recognition that this is an 
unprecedented time in the country and our national security depends on our 
system functioning to ensure that terrorists do not take advantage of the 
vulnerabilities in the student visa program. (Feinstein, 2001)
Feinstein's statement went on to specify the failure of the INS to fully implement 
Sections 110 and 641 of IIRIRA – the CIPRIS tracking system – linking the provision 
to the World Trade Center bombing of 1993, and charging schools with responsibility 
for implementation as well. Although the threatened 6-month moratorium never 
occurred, Feinstein's announcement presaged the cascade of policy activity which 
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would buffet the international education policy and practitioner community as well as 
international students themselves. The onslaught of legislative and regulatory activity, 
accompanied by attention in the media, presented the international education policy 
community with decisions about how to respond. And practitioners, international 
student office directors on campuses and other counselors and administrators working 
with international students, faced not only the regulatory changes but soul-searching 
as well. Were international students, and international student regulatory policy, a 
source of terrorism? How now to respond to the changed environment? And how to 
manage the flow of new policies?
The flow of legislation and regulation impacting international students, 
advocates and practitioners continued through 2001 and 2002. Advocacy groups 
shifted to defense and careful realpolitik. International student practitioners 
experienced a redefinition of their roles. Federal policy makers struggled to identify 
perpetrators and act decisively to prevent other terrorist attacks and thus reassure the 
American public. Occasional high-profile developments renewed nationwide attention 
to the particular problem of student visas and repeated the image of international 
students as terrorists. When, on March 11, 2002 – the six-month anniversary of the 
9/11 attacks – INS letters and forms were issued approving INS status changes for two 
of the terrorists, even President George W. Bush commented during a national press 
conference to information about the letters:  "I was stunned and not happy.  I could 
barely get my coffee down" (Confessore, 2002). Images of the INS forms appeared on 
national television and made the front page of national newspapers (K. Johnson, 
2002). By this time, the issue of INS dysfunction and concerns about an overall 
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porous visa system was commingled with any discussion of student visas (Ellinwood, 
2001; Ziglar, 2001; Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, 2000).
Studies of policy making describe the power of a crisis or high-profile event to 
trigger sudden change in the policy agenda (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, 2002; 
Birkland, 1997; Cobb & Elder, 1983; Kingdon, 1995; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994). A 
focusing event results in a rapid shift, changes in which issues crystallize and are 
moved onto the institutional or governmental agenda, typically driven by 
identification of a policy failure and leading to sharp limitation of policy alternatives. 
The media plays a role, presenting and repeating images, symbols, and perceptions 
which shape the policy process. The policy community must cope with the sudden 
government action as well as diminished power in shaping that action. This 
dissertation tells the story of what happened to international student visa policy and 
the related policy community following the 9/11 attacks; it is a richly descriptive case 
study of a unique focusing event that details what has happened to international 
education policy, specifically reflected in U.S. student visa policy and the reactions of 
the policy community, including international education administrators, in the critical 
20 months following 9/11.
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Chapter 2
Background to the Case and the Study
Introduction
The story of what happened to international student visa policy in the 20 
months following the 9/11 attacks requires background and context in four areas, each 
provided in this chapter. First, this chapter provides a short historical overview of the 
presence and value of international students in the U.S., including a profile of current 
enrollment, and how this presence has been and is linked to various public policy 
goals. Second, this chapter provides an overview of the rise of the international 
education advocacy and policy community. Third, this chapter reviews the status of 
student visa policy shortly before 9/11, including a discussion of the intersection of 
international students and national security in visa policy. Then, in order to facilitate 
description of the impact of 9/11 on student visa policy, I present an overview of the 
public policy dynamics related to focusing events.
This presentation of the context of the case is followed by limited discussion 
of how this descriptive case study was framed, presented in three parts:  the purpose 
of the study, an overview of methodological considerations, and the background of the 
writer. A complete presentation of the methodological choices I made in studying this 
case is presented in Appendix B.
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Historical Overview of International Students in the U.S.
and Links to Public Policy
The Passenger Act of 1855 established a temporary immigrant category for 
visitors, and by 1882 students are specifically mentioned in an exempted category 
within the Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882, the provisions of which permitted 
the entry of Chinese students, teachers, merchants, or those “proceeding to the United 
States from curiosity.” These students were among the first in what has become a long 
history of students sent to the U.S. from other countries seeking specific knowledge in 
support of the sending country’s development. By 1913, U.S. Bureau of Education 
records indicate that 4,222 international students had been enrolled in 275 U.S. 
universities, colleges, and technological schools; most were sent by foreign 
governments for education and training which would be useful to the home country 
when the students returned home (Burks, 1984; Capen, 1915; Fryer, 1909). Advocacy 
for students facing adverse immigration policies also began early. In 1921, with 
leadership from the newly formed Institution of International Education (IIE), 
students were designated as non-immigrants, freeing them from the risk of being 
detained along with immigrants at Ellis Island, an unintended consequence of 
restrictive immigrant quotas imposed in 1917 (Goodman, 2003).
International student and scholar enrollments continued through each decade, 
including students in non-degree programs such as English language training, with a 
significant spike in the 1950’s, when the number of international students in the U.S. 
doubled (Institution of International Education, 2005). By the 2001/2002 school year, 
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nearly 750,000 students (F-1 visa status) and scholars (J-1 visa status) entered the U.S. 
to study (Davis 2000, Chin 2002). In the 2002/2003 academic year, the number of 
associate, undergraduate, and graduate level students in degree programs, 586,323, 
constituted 4.6% of the total U.S. enrollments (Chin, 2003, p. 3).  
Table 1.  International Student and Scholar Totals
 2001/2002 and 2002/2003.
Category 2001/2 Enrollments 2002/3 Enrollments
Students     582,996      586,323
Scholars       86,015 84,281
English lang. students       78,521        51,179
Total     747,532      721,783
Note. From Chin, 2002, pp. 2, 20, 22; Chin, 2003, pp. 2, 20, 22
Students come from nearly all countries in the world, as illustrated in Tables 2 
and 3, and while heavily represented in business, math, sciences and engineering, 
have major interests in a wide variety of academic subjects, as illustrated in Table 4.
Table 2.  Students - Top Fifteen Sending Countries 2001/2002. 
Country Number of 
Students
% of U.S. 
Intl. Students 
1.  India 66,836 11.5
2.  China 63,211 10.8
3.  So. Korea 49,046 8.4
4.  Japan 46,810 8.0
5.  Taiwan 28,930 5.0
6.  Canada 26,514 4.5
7.  Mexico 12,518 2.1
8.  Turkey 12,091 2.1
9.  Indonesia 11,614 2.0
10.  Thailand 11,606 2.0
11.  Germany 9,613 1.6
12.  Brazil 8,972 1.5
13.  Pakistan 8,644 1.5
14.  U.K. 8,414 1.4
15.  Colombia 8,068 1.4
Note. From Chin, 2002, p. 8 - 9
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Table 3.  Students - Top Fifteen Sending Countries 2002/2003.





% of U.S. 
International 
Student Total
1.  India 74,603 11.6 12.7
2.  China 64,757 2.4 11.0
3.  So. Korea 51,519 5.0 8.8
4.  Japan 45,960 -1.8 7.8
5.  Taiwan 28,017 -3.2 4.8
6.  Canada 26,513 0.0 4.5
7.  Mexico 12,801 2.3 2.2
8.  Turkey 11,601 -4.1 2.0
9.  Indonesia 10,432 -10.2 1.8
10. Thailand 9,982 -14.0 1.7
11. Germany 9,302 -3.2 1.6
12.  Brazil 8,388 -6.5 1.4
13.  U.K. 8,326 -1.0 1.4
14.  Pakistan 8,123 -6.0 1.4
15.  Hong Kong 8,076 4.1 1.4
Note: From Chin, 2003, p.8
Table 4. Students' Major Areas of Study 2001/2002 and 2002/2003.
Subject Undergraduate Graduate Other
01/02 02/03 01/02 02/03 01/02 02/03
Business and Management 23.3 23.7 17.4 16.4 11.5 12.5
Math & Computer 
Sciences
13.5 12.5 14.1 13.0 6.0 5.5
Engineering 10.9 10.2 21.4 23.9 4.9 4.0
Fine & Applied Arts 7.5 6.7 4.9 4.3 2.6 3.2
Social Sciences 7.3 7.8 9.0 8.7 3.3 3.8
Physical & Life Sciences 4.3 4.7 10.6 10.7 2.5 2.5
Health Professions 3.2 4.0 5.2 5.5 2.8 4.0
Humanities 2.1 2.4 4.4 4.5 2.0 1.6
Education 1.7 1.6 3.5 3.9 3.7 2.5
Agriculture 0.7 0.5 2.1 1.9 1.4 0.3
Note. From Chin, 2002, p.55; Chin, 2003, p. 55
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Educational Value of International Education and Related Policy
U.S. governmental encouragement of international students coming to the U.S. 
has been relatively consistent in governmental policy. The value of the educational 
exchange is emphasized in early governmental commentary. In a letter of transmittal 
accompanying Fryer’s (1909) report on opportunities for Chinese students in the U.S., 
Elmer Ellsworth Brown, commissioner for the Department of the Interior, Bureau of 
Education, writes:
the time is undoubtedly near at hand when similar publications [to Fryer’s] 
will be needed to set before the people of other nations the opportunities for 
advanced study which this country affords. American students have long 
enjoyed the hospitality of various European universities and schools of the 
several arts. Already the return wave of student attendance has set in, and a 
considerable number of students from foreign countries are enrolled in 
American institutions of learning. (p. x)
Jenkins (1983) notes that in 1911 the Committee on Friendly Relations Among 
Foreign Students to support international students in the U.S. was created. Capen’s 
Opportunities for Foreign Students at Colleges and Universities in the United States 
(1915) was solicited by the U.S. Bureau of Education, prefaced with a statement of 
the importance of providing information to prospective international students. 
Development of programs continued, with the educational exchange value of 
international students predominating in the minds of the education and non-profit 
community, as illustrated by Hubbard’s statement:  “We [university administrators] 
see the presence of foreign nationals as an opportunity to expand the vistas of our 
domestic students, and as a means of enriching most of our curricular and research 
activities” (1978, p. 7). Du Bois (1956), Hariri (1964), and others document and 
emphasize this view of educational value as the population grew. 
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Sending countries often valued the liberal educational and cultural products of 
international educational exchange, but as a matter of state policy were more often 
motivated by the goals of economic and workforce development. Economic 
development, modernization, and development of human capacity have been foremost 
among motives of sending countries and as the frequent destination for these efforts, 
the U.S. has welcomed recognition of its leading role in technology and education. 
Sending selected students abroad, including to the U.S., has been a matter of state 
policy since the 1800’s. China and Japan provide two early examples. China initiated 
a program for sending students abroad in 1872 so that “they would be adequately and 
thoroughly educated for the public services of China” (Yieh, 1934, p. 3). Chinese 
plans for modernizing schools through development of a national school system in 
1903, and the practice of provincial administrators selecting students for technological 
courses of study in the U.S. in the early 1900’s, for example, illustrate the Chinese 
motivation for engaging in international education (Capen, 1915; Fryer, 1909; Yieh, 
1934). Japan’s carefully orchestrated modernization initiative, carried out in the 
context of the Meiji Restoration, had international education as a centerpiece (Burks, 
1984). The first students were registered to go abroad in 1864; in 1871 Proclamation 
958 “formally adopted despatch of students as a matter of state policy.” In a 
methodical search for knowledge in support of the national development interest, 
students were earmarked for countries with perceived specialities:  "England –
mechanics, commerce, iron manufacturing, ship-building, animal husbandry and 
charitable activities;  France – law , international law, zoology, and botany; Germany 
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– political science and medicine;  United States – postal communications, technology, 
agriculture, animal husbandry, commerce, and mining" (p. 151).
This pattern of international education in the interest of economic 
development, as a formal matter of state policy and in the national interest, has been a 
consistent theme. The sending country typically is carrying out a national 
development plan with specific goals, targeting knowledge sets and students, and 
setting quotas and time lines for completion of studies. Nigeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan, and Turkey, for 
example, have at various times had or still have large educational missions in the U.S. 
charged with carrying out placement and oversight of international students through 
governmental education and training programs (Kaplan, 1983; Kondonassis, 1991; 
Riddell, 1996; Roukis & Montana, 1986; Viola, 1986; Woo, 1991). Clusters of 
students in specific areas of study have followed waves of national economic needs 
and job markets in other countries even when the home country has not developed a 
formal state policy or education and training mission. Medical trainees and 
physicians, scientists and engineers, for example, have attended U.S. institutions in 
sufficiently significant numbers at times to have warranted governmental or 
institutional response (Hariri, 1964; Huang, 1988; J. M. Johnson, 1998; Margulies & 
Bloch, 1969; Suskind, & Schell, 1968; Young & Bae, 1997). As Chandler (1998) 
sums up: “ . . . the globally intertwined economy also places heavy demands on 
international education as an instrument for economic development” and workforce 
interdependency as well as commerce in goods and services is now fundamental to 
international educational motives (p. 3).
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Economic/Commercial Value and Related Policy
As mentioned in Chapter 1, international education represents a surprisingly 
large services export to the U.S. economy (Moll, 2002). As a condition of the issuance 
of a student visa, the applicant must provide evidence that he or she can afford to 
attend school without working; 80% of undergraduates and 51% of graduate students 
are self financed, and at community colleges the number reaches 91%. On average, 
75% of all international students rely on non-U.S. sources as the primary source of 
funding for their studies. Additionally, approximately 85% of students bring, and pay 
expenses for, spouses or family members (Chin, 2002, pp. 4 - 5). International 
students on campuses pay non-resident tuition rates. This foreign source of income 
makes international education the 5th largest export industry in the U.S.  The U. S. 
Department of Commerce recognizes this economic contribution in its estimate of the 
international education and training services sector at $11 - $12 billion (Chin, 2002; 
Davis, 2000; U. S. Department of Commerce Industry Analysis Trade Report, 1996).  
In the state of Oklahoma, for example, the total economic contribution of F (student) 
visaholders and their dependents, excluding any U. S.-sourced funding, is $143 
million dollars (NAFSA, 2003a). This economic contribution in Oklahoma is so 
significant that the Oklahoma Department of Commerce includes “increasing 
international student enrollments” as a major trade initiative in the Oklahoma 
International Strategic Plan (Oklahoma Department of Commerce, 2000).
Recruitment and retention of foreign students has become an international 
policy issue. Because international students represent such a large services industry 
worldwide, competition for students among U.S. states and regions, as well as among 
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countries, can be sharp. In concert with their higher education communities, 
governments have established national policies designed to encourage international 
student enrollments (Desruisseaux, 1998, McBride, 1998; McMurtrie, 2001). For 
example, in 2001, Germany provided an incentive to science and high tech graduates 
to come to Germany by altering student visa policies to permit well-qualified 
international students educated in Germany to stay in the country after graduation to 
work (Bollag, 2001). Competition among English-speaking countries is especially 
pronounced. For example, in a direct recruiting bid in 1999, British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair announced a national recruitment plan for international students for the 
U.K., supported by $8 million in funding and including student scholarships and 
easier visa procedures, alarming U.S. policy makers. In 1998/1999, international 
students were 3.7% of the total student enrollments in the U.S., but were 8.4% in the 
United Kingdom, and indicating the growing power of its attraction, 11.8% in 
Australia. Between 1994 and 2000, due to proactive government policies promoting 
Australian education, the number of international students in Australia rose 73%, 
while the number at U.S. universities rose only 12% during the same period. The 
number of international students in both countries grew at a faster percentage than in 
the U.S. every year since 1996 (Davis, 2000, p. 24; McMurtrie, 2001). Relative to 
advocacy, pre-9/11 this commercial value increased the leverage of advocates seeking 
a reduction of obstacles to exchange, such as circuitous visa processing and fees. 
Public Diplomacy Value and International Education in the National Interest
Both before and after 9/11 the theme of international education serving as a 
form of public diplomacy has been durable. The U. S. government has housed 
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international exchange agencies and information functions in the State Department, 
viewing international education as essentially a diplomatic initiative. This framing of 
the issue was shaped by the long history of international education being perceived as 
serving U.S. public diplomacy interests by disseminating U.S. values and developing 
a positive image of the U.S. abroad. As part of the U.S. development of “information 
services” beginning with President Woodrow Wilson’s creation of the Committee on 
Public Information during World War I, the U.S. government has worked to actively 
shape the view of foreigners and their governments of the U.S. and its values. While 
much of the history of these information services relate to disseminating wartime 
propaganda and to developing capacity and content for radio transmissions (which 
would eventually lead to the Voice of America program), the component of cultural 
and educational exchange has been a consistent thread. In 1938, for example, the 
Department of State signed an agreement to establish cultural and educational 
exchange programs, primarily with Latin America and China (United States 
Information Agency, 2005).
A steady flow of legislation began which supported international education 
and the mobility of students between the U.S. and other countries, affirming the value 
of international education and students to U.S. public diplomacy objectives. President 
Franklin Roosevelt identified international education and training programs as having 
political as well as social and educational goals (Dudden, 1987; Jenkins, 1983). In 
1941 the Department of State established the International Visitor Program, designed 
to bring foreign leaders to the U.S. to meet directly with their U.S. counterparts. 
During World War II, information agencies were established to counter Axis 
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propaganda, and again, within these agencies, a component supporting commercial 
and cultural affairs existed to carry out the exchange of people and materials; after the 
war, these services were absorbed into the Department of State, primarily into a newly 
created Office of International Cultural Affairs (United States Information Agency, 
2005). Two watershed acts follow shortly which have shaped and solidified the 
perspective that international educational exchange, including international students’ 
presence in the U.S., is a cornerstone in U.S. public diplomacy. In 1946 President 
Harry Truman signed the Fulbright Act (Pub. L. 79-584) to create a peacetime 
international educational exchange program. This was followed in 1948 by the Smith-
Mundt Act (the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act, Pub. L. 80-402), 
which mandated U.S. overseas information and cultural exchange programs and set 
the charter for the United States Information Agency (USIA). Among the policy goals 
cited by the Committee on Educational Interchange Policy in its 1955 report was the 
importance of sharing American values with other countries through exchange (1955). 
In 1961 the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act, popularly known as 
Fulbright-Hays (Pub. L. 87-256), consolidated the U.S. international educational and 
cultural exchange initiatives and established the government operation of culture and 
education offices worldwide; this Act also brought about the Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs. From the mid 1980’s, an abundance of information is available 
casting international education in this context and linking the educational value and 
the economic/commercial value of international education and international students 
to the cultivation of U.S. values abroad as a matter of state policy, as emphasized by 
Semmel (1999), “One of the remarkable features about U.S. government-sponsored 
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exchange programs is that they have enjoyed consistent and widespread official 
support” (p. 60). Following the 1999 abolition of the USIA, the Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs stayed in the Department of State (Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, 2002). The success of these initiatives is symbolized by the Fulbright 
Program which, for example, has provided a U.S. educational experience to over 
220,000 students and scholars in the 50+ years of its existence.
The April 2000 presidential memorandum and S. Con. Res. 7 clearly present 
international education in a larger conceptual frame of national interest, and 
recognizing the roles of a full range of actors – state, non-state, public, private, profit 
and non-profit – in meeting the needs and goals of international education in the 
national interest. Bowen (2000), Chandler (1998), Davis (2000), Lenn & Moll (2000), 
M. Johnson (2000a, 2000b), and Semmel (1999) provide the components of the 
consistently presented pre-9/11 framework of international education in the national 
interest, each arguing that the post-Cold War era has introduced a deeper need for a 
cosmopolitan foreign policy, a globally literate workforce, and a centrality of 
globalization to meaningful education. International education helps meet these needs 
by training potential leaders of foreign countries in the U.S., with multiple benefits. 
The presence of international students on U.S. campuses is especially necessary 
because too few American students go abroad relative to the number of international 
students entering the U.S. for Americans to learn about the rest of the world, to live 
and prosper as global citizens.
On August 7, 2001, Secretary Powell’s office released a “Statement on 
International Education Week 2001” emphasizing that the "Department of State 
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recognizes the role that international education and exchange play in strengthening 
our nation and our relations with other countries. . . . I can think of no more valuable 
asset to our country than the friendship of future world leaders who have been 
educated here" (Powell, 2001).
Foreign nationals who attended school in the U. S. would gain experience with 
the U.S. way of thinking, would develop networks of U. S.-friendly colleagues, and 
would ultimately enhance U.S. security through their service in foreign governments, 
a theme which has been reinforced by recent Bush (2002), Ridge (2003), and Powell 
(2001, 2002) statements. Nye (2002, p. 552), in analyzing global U.S. influence, 
makes a distinction between hard power such as military strength and commercial 
dominance, and soft power such as expressing U.S. values abroad; he notes that one 
way in which this dissemination of soft power occurs is through students from other 
countries coming to the U.S. to study.  
The International Education Practitioner and Advocacy Community
As the flow of international students increased, universities welcomed 
international students, recognizing them as an educational resource on American 
campuses as well as to the home countries to which students would return, carrying a 
positive experience in the U.S. along with their education (DuBois, 1956; Hariri, 
1964; Hubbard, 1978). As the number and variety of international students grew, the 
services provided by colleges and universities expanded, developing international 
student offices and advisers, cultural organizations, and English language programs. 
By the mid-1970’s, a for-profit services community had also emerged. In 2002, nearly 
2,500 U.S. universities and community colleges reported international student and 
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scholar enrollees (Chin, 2002, p. 13) and over 400 intensive English programs 
enrolled post-secondary students (American Association of Intensive English 
Programs, 2003).
As international student enrollments increased, practitioner support groups 
formed. Universities, government agencies, and private organizations began to 
recognize that special knowledge and competencies were required to meet the 
academic and cultural needs of this diverse and growing group of international 
students. Any institution authorized by INS to admit international students will have 
immigration compliance practices, admissions requirements, language proficiency 
requirements, and a wide range of student services needs which are beyond those 
needed for admitting and serving domestic students (Dalton, 1999). Membership 
organizations formed to provide training and networking support for international 
student advisers, international admissions officers, cultural orientation directors, and 
other practitioners. For example, in 1948, the National Association for Foreign 
Student Advisers (NAFSA) was formed; it had 40 members serving a nationwide 
enrollment of 25,000. In 2003, now named NAFSA:  Association of International 
Educators, has a membership of 9000+ serving the nationwide enrollment of nearly 
750,000 students (NAFSA, 2003b). The American Association of Collegiate 
Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO) has 2300 member institutions in 35 
countries and actively addresses international student admissions (American 
Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, 2003). The Association 
of International Education Administrators (AIEA) was founded in 1982 and now has 
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320+ members; AIEA is composed of principal international education administrators 
on college and university campuses in the U.S. and abroad. 
While serving particular sets of practitioners or institutions, these 
organizations also emerged as an international education policy community. In 1919 
the Institute of International Education was established, the first national organization 
concerned with student migration to and from the U.S., and organizations such as the 
American Council on Education (ACE) and the Association of American Colleges 
were addressing the increasing number of international students and exchange 
programs at their member institutions (Jenkins, 1983). Graduate students, exchange 
visitors, scholars, and researchers flow through admissions and academic policy 
matrices which are a combination of government regulation and university 
administrative practice. Controversial issues can emerge from this arena of 
government regulation and/or administrative policy. When they do, the practitioner 
communities and their professional organizations (admissions officers, language 
program administrators, school officials responsible for immigration regulations, 
international student/scholar advisors, etc.) have helped shape the definition of the 
problem and then called for selected remedies from appropriate policy makers. The 
2000 International Exchange Locator, for example, a resource directory of non-profit 
and governmental educational and cultural exchange programs prepared by the U.S. 
Information Agency and the Alliance for International Educational and Cultural 
Exchange, lists 200 programs, associations, and governmental agencies comprising 
thousands of member universities and other constituent groups. The Alliance for 
International Educational and Cultural Exchange has over 70 member institutions and 
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associations. NAFSA: Association of International Educators developed policy 
subgroups and eventually a public affairs division. This large range of policy 
practitioner/advocacy organizations now also include policy elites and many of these 
organizations work to define issues and further national policy in support of 
international educational exchange.
In policy interest group terms, international education advocates in the U.S. 
have evolved in the last decade from a cluster of professional associations and 
lobbying coalitions which interacted on issues (“issue networks”) to a fully developed 
policy community (Wirt & Kirst, 1997). With this evolution has come the advantage 
of numbers to influence public policy issues, some interest groups finding common 
ground among coalition partners with overlapping, but not precisely correlated, 
agendas and membership bases. For example, NAFSA:  Association of International 
Educators, the American Council on Education (ACE), the Alliance for International 
Educational Exchange, the Association of American Universities (AAU), and the 
National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC), as 
well as other organizations, have collaborated both before, and particularly after, 9/11, 
producing surveys, developing policy proposals, making public statements, and 
providing Congressional testimony. The development of a national international 
education policy is a good example of how this community functioned. With NAFSA 
leading, the advocacy campaign on behalf of international educational exchange was 
launched in 1998. The centerpiece of the campaign was the call for a national 
international education policy and an advocacy strategy focused on the objective of 
having the policy endorsed and action authorized at the highest level – by the 
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president and Congress. In April, 2000, President Clinton signed the presidential
memorandum endorsing the policy and adding directives to several governmental 
departments to take action in support of it, several of which took place. The Clinton 
administration also endorsed the first U.S. International Education Week, held in 
November 2000. International organizations made plans to carry momentum on the 
national policy despite changing administrations after the 2000 elections. The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, the subcommittee which has jurisdiction over the U.S. 
State Department exchange programs, held a hearing on “Exchange Programs and the 
National Interest” in September, 2000, during which the chief executive officer of 
NAFSA testified; she asked for “Congress to hold the next administration accountable 
for promoting our national interest with and international education policy” (M. 
Johnson, 2000b, p. 5). When presidential administrations changed, the policy, with an 
introductory white paper on international education, was submitted to the Bush 
administration. Congressional support continued to develop, culminating in the April 
2001 unanimous passage of S. Con. Res. 7, “expressing the sense of Congress that the 
United States should establish an international education policy,” outlining the need 
for a policy and listing seven objectives.
The strategy for securing endorsement of a national international education 
policy is prototype political and public policy advocacy practice (Weimer and Vining, 
1999). The policy community collected data and compared objectives, negotiated the 
agenda, then developed a strategy and endorsed a public statement. Influential 
Congressmen and women were identified and cultivated, often through their staffers, 
and were kept fully informed. Constituents made regular contact with their senators 
32
and representatives to support the policy, or referred to the policy as a rationale in 
calling for reform of obstructive provisions, for example, calling for revision of INS 
procedures.
As late as September 10, 2001, the concerns of the international education 
policy community focused on isolating specific problems and obstacles to exchange, 
working to shape the definition of the problem and move it onto the public policy 
agenda. When national media such as The New York Times began to take up the issue 
of denial of student visas to Chinese visitors, for example, the policy process was 
moving along predictably:  "From the Chinese perspective, the issue is simple:  on the 
basis of interviews lasting less than five minutes, thousands of Chinese this year have 
found longstanding plans for study, travel or work jettisoned. Those denied visas 
include students with full scholarships to Ivy League schools and grandparents 
wanting to see a first grandchild" (Rosenthal, 2001). When the media identified 
situations which highlighted the obstacles, they often were boosted to public attention, 
shaped by media’s presentation.  
Student Visa Policy prior to 9/11
From the 1911 creation of the Committee on Friendly Relations among Foreign 
Students, through the 1946 creation of the Fulbright scholarship program, to the 
implementation of the National Security Education Program in 1993, the exchange 
value of students and scholars crossing borders has been recognized in national policy 
and generally treated in ways to encourage and support exchange. Prior to 9/11 
international students as objects of policy were mainly regulated in ways linking their 
presence in the U.S. to the values of education, economic impact, global workforce 
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development and public diplomacy. Since 1921 students had entered as non-
immigrants and visa controls had varied in intensity at times but generally 
unexceptional; the INS provided both “welcome to the U.S.” services and border 
control enforcement functions. The Department of State (DOS) issued visas through 
consular offices abroad, and in the recent years prior to 9/11 had focused on 
improving services and welcoming students. The DOS housed the U.S. Information 
Agency (USIA), which in 1999 became the Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs (ECA); the mission of this bureau is to “foster mutual understanding between 
the United States and other countries through international educational and training 
programs.” Among other programs, the ECA supports a network of 450 overseas 
educational advising offices, where intending students receive information about the 
U.S. higher education system and schools in the U.S. (Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, 2002). Clearly, it has historically been U.S. policy to cultivate 
students from abroad, even though less aggressively and in a less coordinated fashion 
than some in the international education community may have desired.
The late 1990’s brought consolidation of the international education policy 
community behind a call for an national international education policy, and as noted 
earlier, by the time of the 9/11 attacks, the value of international education and 
international students was widely recognized as the policy community had 
successfully moved its issues into the government agenda. Components of the view of 
international education in the national interest included education and cultural factors, 
economic impact, globalization and workforce preparation, national security, and 
public diplomacy, brought together in the S. Con. Res. 7 commitment to supporting 
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further development of this sector. Public policy attention to international students 
during this period was generally devoted to removing obstacles to full development of 
the potential of these values.
Occasionally a particular issue has emerged on the public, education, and/or 
legislative agenda which involved or impacted international education or students, 
provoking a specific scrutiny and perhaps policy. For example, training and 
employment in the U.S. of foreign medical doctors has been reviewed at times and 
reached the government agenda (Committee on Educational Interchange Policy, 1957; 
Margulies & Bloch, 1969; Office of International Health Manpower Studies, 1974). 
Training foreign military students drew congressional attention as a financial issue in 
the 1970’s and occasionally since (Comptroller, 1976, 1977; Taw, 1993). Following 
the Chinese government’s crack down on dissident students following Tiananmen 
Square in1992, the Congress passed the Chinese Student Protection Act (1992) which 
allowed Chinese non-immigrant students in the U.S. to stay in the U.S. until they 
could safely return to China.
Another area which has brought international student to the media’s and public’s 
attention and to the government’s policy agenda is the role of science and technology 
in various situations related to foreign students. This issue has come to the systemic 
and institutional agendas in various guises, from the perspectives of “brain drain” as 
the U.S. attracts highly educated and skilled foreign scientists; of foreign students, 
particularly the Chinese and Indians, seeking to stay in the U.S. after studying; and of 
the role that foreign graduate students play in filling university seats and teaching 
courses (V. Johnson, 2003; National Science Foundation, 1981, 1985; Rao, 1979; 
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Wessel, 2001). Following hearings on high tech worker shortages, the American 
Competitiveness and Workforce Act of 1998 addressed the need for high tech workers 
with more liberal provisions for American companies to hire non-immigrants in the 
H1b skilled labor category (J. M. Johnson, 1998).  
The Student Visa Process at the Time of 9/11
The process for issuing student visas was controlled by the U.S. INS Student 
and School Regulations and their accompanying Operations Instructions (United 
States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1997, 2000). The basic process was 
this. Schools were authorized or approved following a petition process to issue the 
Certificate of Eligibility Form I-20 and enroll non-immigrant students. Prospective 
students applied to approved schools, demonstrating that they had the appropriate 
admissions qualifications and sufficient funds (or sponsorship) to attend school. When 
accepted, the student was issued the Form I-20 by the school, signed by the designated 
school official (DSO), documenting acceptance, dates of the program, and expenses. 
The student went to the embassy in the home country, or in some cases a third-party 
country, and presented the I-20, evidence of financial support to attend school full-
time without working, evidence of the appropriateness of the course of study, and 
evidence of ties to the home country (such as a job, family, or property) sufficient to 
ensure return after study. Consular officers were charged with reviewing these 
materials and checking the applicant against several security-related databases; some 
consulates required a face-to-face interview with some students. If the student's 
application for the visa was approved, the student then received an F-1 status visa as 
indicated by a visa stamp in the passport, which, along with a copy of the approved I-
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20, he/she used to document legal entry at the U.S. port of entry. There, an INS officer
would collect a page from the Certificate of Eligibility Form I-20, stamp the student’s 
passport, an entry card called an I-94, and the student copy of the I-20 with a dated 
mark and designation of the period of time the student could legally be in the country. 
For students, this period of time was typically “D/S” or “duration of status” – as long 
as the student stayed in compliance with regulations and stayed in status, he/she could 
continue to be in the U.S. legally. Requirements for staying in status included 
maintaining a full course of study (12 or more credit hours for credit-bearing school 
enrollment, or 18 or more contact hours for intensive English program enrollment) 
(AACRAO International Guide, 2001; Becraft, 2001). This process was primarily 
paper-based.
Security Checks in Place at the Time of 9/11
The kinds of security checks which applied to students when applying for the 
student visa prior to 9/11is pertinent to this study, since within weeks following the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, early reports indicated that one of the 19 hijackers had entered 
the U.S. on an F-1 (student category) visa, and it later became known that two others 
had become students at a Florida flight school after entering the U.S. as tourists and 
then filing the necessary INS forms for change to student status. As this information 
was uncovered and the national media reported developments, among the many 
questions was how international students were screened, particularly whether 
applicants' links to terroristic activities or countries was probed as part of the process.
There were several layers of prohibited categories of non-immigrants, several 
kinds of security checks, mandated under several laws, to be carried out at both visa 
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issuance and admission to the U.S. For example, during both visa and admissions 
processes, non-immigrants had to satisfy consular officers and immigration officers 
that they are not inadmissible under any of the ten grounds outlined in Section 212(a) 
on the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA). The INA also makes any alien 
inadmissible if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien seeks entry to the 
U.S. to engage in espionage or sabotage or to engage in any other unlawful activity. In 
particular, Section 212(a)(3)(B)(i) of the INA makes any alien inadmissible if there is 
reasonable ground to believe, among other provisions, he/she has engaged in or is 
likely to engage in terrorist activity; incite terrorist activity; is a representative or 
member of a foreign terrorist organization as designated by the Secretary of State 
(Krouse and Perl, 2001).
At least three security checks were required by law for categories of non-
immigrant visa applicants, including international students. Consular officials were 
required by law to certify in writing that they had checked the Department of State's 
security database CLASS (Consular Lookout and Support System) containing 
approximately 4 million records including limited biographical information on 
terrorists, narco-traffickers, and international criminals, and to confirm that no basis 
existed to exclude the applicant before issuing a visa. The Department of State's 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research also maintained a database called TIPOFF, which 
included files on persons who may be considered terrorists and who would be 
excluded. Finally, INS immigration inspectors were to check the name of every 
person 14 years of age or older, except in some limited cases, in the Interagency 
Border Inspection System (IBIS), a database maintained by INS and the U.S. Customs 
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Service to provide lookout information to the federal inspection services (Becraft, 
2001; Krouse and Perl, 2001). Before 9/11, but particularly after, the quality and 
content of these security databases was scrutinized, and issues related to their lack of 
integration and consistent use were raised (see The 9/11 Commission Report, for 
example).
International Student Visa Policy and the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing
Relative to the topic of the 9/11 attacks and student visa policy, the bombing of 
the World Trade Center in 1993 has direct bearing on student visa policy prior to 9/11 
and to  policy events following the 9/11 attacks. At the time it brought international 
students to limited public and media attention in uncharacteristically unfavorable light 
when it was learned that driver of the truck in the bombing had entered the U.S. 
legally on a student visa but had then fallen out of status by failing to comply with 
enrollment requirements. Policy makers gave this possibility somewhat more attention 
by embedding a tracking system requirement (CIPRIS) in a large immigration bill in 
1996 (IIRIRA), which are discussed more thoroughly below. Regarding security 
checks, various legislation followed the 1993 bombing requiring additional layers of 
checks on visa applicants, including international students, as indicated in a 2001 
Congressional Research Service report:
The State Department and the federal inspectional services have taken a number of 
steps to improve and computerize their lookout systems. Although efforts were 
already underway in early 1990s to improve these systems, the bombing of the 
World Trade Center in February 1993 prompted federal officials to accelerate 
these efforts, since many of those involved in the conspiracy were visaed foreign 
nationals. . . . Following the World Trade Center bombing, State directed consular 
offices to form "Visa Viper" committees to ensure that the names of possible 
terrorists are forwarded by consular officials to the State Department. (Krouse and 
Perl, pp. 4 - 5)
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Beyond improved security checks, The Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorism (2000), also known as the "Bremer report" in reference to the commission's 
chairman, Paul Bremer, recapitulates the top-level rationale for instituting more 
careful visa screening and tracking upon entry of international students following the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing:
Thousands of people from countries officially designated as state sponsors of 
terrorism currently study in the United States. This is not objectionable in itself as 
the vast majority of these students contribute to America's diversity while here and 
return home with no adverse impact on U.S. national security.  However, 
experience has shown the importance of monitoring the status of foreign students. 
Seven years ago, investigators discovered that one of the terrorists involved in 
bombing the World Trade Center had entered the United States on a student visa, 
dropped out, and remained illegally. Today, there is still no mechanism for 
ensuring the same thing won't happen again. One program holds promise as a 
means of addressing the issue. . . . [CIPRIS] collects and makes readily available 
useful and current information about foreign student visa holders in the United 
States. For example, CIPRIS would record a foreign student's change in major 
from English literature to nuclear physics. . . . The Commission believes that 
CIPRIS could become a model for a nationwide program monitoring the status of 
foreign students. (pp. 30 - 31)
This section of the report ends with this recommendation:  "The President and 
Congress should work together to create an effective system for monitoring the status 
of foreign students nationwide" (p. 31).
Policies related to IIRIRA and CIPRIS
The absence of a system to report when students depart a program and then depart 
the U.S. coupled with increasing government concerns about terrorism within the U.S. 
led to provisions for a national tracking system for international students being 
included in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, known by its acronym IIRIRA (Pub. L. 104-208). Section 110 of IIRIRA 
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required the Attorney General to develop an automated entry/exit control system that 
would create a record for every alien arriving in the United States and match it with 
the record for the alien departing the United States. Prior to CIPRIS, schools would 
not have been not required to record the incidence of non-immigrant students who 
enter the U.S. to attend school but who later fail to meet requirements for maintaining 
the status. CIPRIS, an acronym for Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating
International Students, was later transitioned into the Student and Exchange Visitor 
Program (SEVP). The CIPRIS/SEVP program was to be funded by user fees, not to 
exceed $100, paid by international student visa applicants though a to-be-determined 
payment mechanism.
When passed, IIRIRA was widely critiqued for a variety of provisions, only a few 
of which related to or impacted international students. Among the education-related 
provisions of the new law were restrictions on adult education programs' enrollment 
of non-immigrant students and requirements that exchange students in public schools 
pay a full tuition fee (Pub. L. 104-208; Fragomen, 1997). Four impacts from IIRIRA 
on international students processes included changes in rules and consequences of 
unlawful presence, visa overstay, F-1 study in secondary schools, and the CIPRIS 
tracking system (AACRAO International Guide, 2001; House subcommittee, 1997). 
International students were impacted by a number of the provisions that were not 
focused on international students but regulated their activities as non-immigrants, 
such as stringent rules governing being on the public charge and paying taxes, and 
applying penalties for failing to maintain status.
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The international education policy community handled the CIPRIS tracking 
provision, which did focus on international students, by trying to redefine the issue, 
pointing out that it was based on a single case of overreaction to a tenuous connection 
of one of several perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing to the student 
visa system, unfairly and ineffectively targeting international students, commingled 
“illegal immigration” with non-immigrant students who may be out of status due to 
technicalities, INS inefficiencies, or consular officers' failure to adequately check the 
lookout databases. Government reports assessing the status of CIPRIS often 
referenced the higher education community's objections and resistance, as reported by 
Krouse and Perl, 2001, 
Provisions to require increased entry/exit control included in the Illegal 
Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility [sic] Act of 1996 (IIRIRA; P. L. 
104-208) have proved controversial and were amended by the 106th Congress. 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) encountered significant difficulty in 
implementing Section 110, because INS had not previously tracked arrivals 
and departures of immigrants and only had limited success in tracking arrivals 
and departures of non-immigrants. . . . Although enjoying strong support in the 
national security and counter-terrorism community, this program has drawn 
strong criticism from civil liberty groups and higher education administrators 
as a costly administrative requirement that represents an overreach of 
government authority. (pp. 6, 11-12)
As noted in the Bremer report, CIPRIS was, despite being piloted and drawing 
a great deal of attention and action in the advocacy community, not operable in 2000.
It was still not in place at the time of 9/11; the CIPRIS implementation date was then 
projected to be January, 2003. In June 1997, INS had implemented the program on a 
pilot basis at 21 educational institutions in Georgia, Alabama, North Carolina, and 
South Carolina, and at Atlanta's Hartsfield Airport. The pilot program's automated 
system was designed to monitor foreign students, to improve screening of foreign 
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students at consular posts upon application for the visa, and link to the processing of 
students at INS inspections at U.S. ports-of-entry. Although the pilot phase of the 
program officially ended in October 1999, the INS reports that the program's 
automated system is still a prototype (Krouse and Perl, 2001).
The international education community's general belief and response to this 
policy linkage between the terrorism of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing 
international students can be summed up by these remarks contained in a letter sent to 
President Clinton by NAFSA's CEO M. Johnson, responding to the June 2000 release 
of the Bremer report:  
For the record, I wish to make three points about this recommendation. First, to 
state that "a small minority" of foreign students may abuse their status to support 
terrorist activity vastly overstates the case. To my knowledge, of the millions of 
foreign students who have studied in the United States, the number that is alleged 
to have remained illegally and to have been involved in a terrorist act is precisely 
one, and that is the case cited in the report. Second, hundreds of millions of 
foreigners enter the United States every year, most of them legally. The tiny 
minority of these that are students are already among the most closely monitored 
of all non-immigrants. Third, the commission fails to explicitly acknowledge that 
the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act already 
mandates what the commission recommends. Under this law, a nationwide foreign 
student monitoring system is to be in place by 2003. . . . There is no evidence that 
foreign students are a terrorism threat. To leap from a single allegation to a 
proposal for increased monitoring of all foreign students is akin to suggesting that 
because Timothy McVeigh was a private in the U.S. Army, all privates should be 
monitored. (M. Johnson, 2000a)
Of the provisions in IIRIRA relating to higher education matters and international
students, the CIPRIS provision drew the most attention and action from the 
international education community and is the one with the most implications to 
student visa policy after 9/11. The CIPRIS provisions, which focused on a subset of 
non-immigrants, drew power by being included in a large conservative immigration 
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enforcement bill which contained multiple restrictions on illegal immigrants. The 
provisions were presented as the no-nonsense, technology-driven remedy for the 
public’s newly perceived vulnerability to terrorism. The international education policy 
community mobilized behind a strategy to emphasize that the legislation had multiple 
implementation problems and predictable unintended consequences, and argued that it 
focused on an already over-regulated population of valuable non-immigrants which as 
a group constituted little danger (Desruisseaux, 1996; Rubin, 1997).
Although the media frequently reported, following the 9/11 attacks, simply that 
U.S. colleges and universities had opposed the CIPRIS provisions, inferring that this 
slowed the implementation of a system which could have prevented the attacks, there 
were in fact several kinds of responses to CIPRIS from the higher education 
community; many practitioners supported data collection on students and a more 
efficient processing system from INS. At the time of the 9/11 attacks, 22 colleges and 
universities in the INS's southeast region were piloting CIPRIS and another 12 schools 
in the Boston area were ready to join the testing, working with INS and EDS, the 
private contractor hired by the government to develop the tracking system, in an effort 
to identify and eliminate technological and systemic problems with implementation. 
Objections to CIPRIS within the policy community were distilled and focused, 
targeting aspects of the law, specific rules and regulations governing implementation, 
or aspects of the technology that were ineffective. For example, the American Council 
on Education (ACE) took the position that better tracking of student visas, student 
entries, length of stay, and student departure would provide useful data on this now 
very large post-secondary population. This perspective emphasized that the problem 
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with CIPRIS was that INS was ineffective and the technology was untested, and when 
the system failed in any way, students suffered unnecessarily harsh penalties. 
However, ACE did not back CIPRIS repeal, holding the position that it was largely 
workable once piloted and implemented, and that the user fees which had been 
mandated were not large for long term students. NAFSA, as a public policy stance, 
agreed with ACE but ultimately concluded that repeal was possible and should be 
supported. In the meantime, as a practitioner membership organization, NAFSA also 
worked with INS to pilot the system, provide education sessions to system users, and 
develop guidance for advisers to give to students subject to the system. NAFSA was 
concerned about the user fees, particularly the mechanisms for payment, which seems 
unworkable and obstructive. The American Association of Intensive English 
Programs (AAIEP) objected particularly to the fee amounts, which were 
proportionally large for a short term student, as well as the system for collecting them, 
which had complex and unworkable components involving overseas credit card 
payments and required regular post confirmations, a problem in countries where mail 
service is unreliable (AAIEP Position Paper, 2000). All international education 
organizations objected to having to collect fees on behalf of the government, and they 
also resisted becoming agents of INS enforcement, collecting extraneous data from 
students, perhaps fingerprinting, and reporting violations of status (Southwick, 
2001b).
The issue, though a component of the student visa policy environment, was 
embedded in the broader tapestry of a positive international education policy 
environment. NAFSA used the presidential and Congressional level commitment to a 
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national international education policy as a platform to actively pursue reducing 
obstacles to international exchange, including calling for repeal of the CIPRIS 
provisions as a whole rather than working to mitigate them through influencing the
INS rules and regulations being written to promulgate CIPRIS. As noted in Chapter 1, 
at the time of the 9/11 attacks, a House bill calling for repeal of CIPRIS had been 
posted.
Focusing Events and the Policy Process
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the exchange policy community was succeeding in 
shaping positive policy to a remarkable extent. Then the 9/11 attacks suddenly and 
dramatically reshuffled public policy priorities and a new agenda took precedent, one 
in which national security trumped all other issues. In rapid succession, the 
international education community, including program administrators as well as 
students and scholars, were subject to or affected by waves of new legislation and 
regulation.
The 9/11 attacks were unanticipated and sudden, significantly harmful and 
filled with powerful visual symbols. They were witnessed by policy elites, the 
advocacy community and the general public simultaneously. As the media carried the 
unfolding story, memorable images and symbols emerged, some socially constructed,
and shaped the public discourse. The public as well as policy actors participated in 
interpreting causes and identifying specific failures of previous policy. The range of 
acceptable policy alternatives narrowed as the perceived policy failures which 
permitted the attacks rose on the political agenda. Policies were changed in direct 
response to the perceived failures of past policy which allowed the attacks to occur. 
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These characteristics make the 9/11 attacks a prototypic focusing event in policy 
making (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Birkland, 1997; Edelman, 1988; Elder, 1983; 
Kingdon, 1995; Stone, 1989). The international education community was 
experiencing firsthand the power of focusing events that draw intense media attention, 
link the focusing event to a policy failure, trigger deep change in policy agendas, and 
amend the public’s and policy makers’ perceptions of problems and the policy 
alternatives considered acceptable. What happened to U.S. international education 
policy, specifically what happened to student visa policy and regulation; how policy 
makers, advocacy organizations, and international education administrators on U.S. 
campuses reacted; and how these reactions are informed by policy making concepts
accounting for focusing events provides the background for this descriptive case 
study.
Purpose of the Study
In response to the radical nature of the 9/11 attacks and their extreme impact 
on many aspects of U.S. public policy, the federal government, the media, and the 
public turned urgent, emotional and justified attention to national security issues. The 
9/11 attacks clearly functioned as a focusing event in U.S. public policy across many 
policy domains; international student visa policy is only one of many areas impacted 
by the rapid shifts in regulation and increased pace of policy activities. Still, for the 
international education policy domain, relative particularly to visa regulations and 
related processes for international students applying to enter or already in the U.S. and 
the practices of program administrators who serve them, the changes in landscape 
were quick and dramatic. The first months after the attacks brought weekly policy 
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developments, many reflecting deep changes in laws and regulations, and thus in the 
processes governing prospective and current international students. Hindsight, and 
softened memories, have provided a sense of organization and clarity that were not 
present during the months when the landscape was changing. The cascade of changes 
in policy and the upsetting and shifting perceptions of international students and 
programs that serve them often seemed, at the time, chaotic and irrational.  
Therefore, the first purpose of this study is to use documentary data to tell the 
story of what happened to international student visa policy and then describe the 
themes of response of the international education community (advocacy organizations 
and international education administrators) following 9/11, leaving an account of this 
unique and powerful focusing event. Birkland’s (1997) research indicates that the 
largest impact of a focusing event occurs in the first two years following it; this study 
captures the events of the first 20 months. Descriptive case study is an appropriate 
vehicle to capture multiple sources of data and tell what happened (Merriam, 1998; 
Stake, 1994), particularly when ample literature and discussion of the context of the 
case exists, and multiple types of data are available or accessible, which provide 
multiple perspectives on the case and permit triangulation among sources, what Stake 
(1994, p. 242) calls pattern recognition and “‘crisscrossed’ reflection.”
The second purpose of this study is to record experiences and responses of 
international education administrators in order to gain insight into what happened to 
administrator/advocates’ thinking and within their programs in the aftermath period. 
While documentary data can be collected and analyzed to reconstruct the statutory and 
regulatory actions, the advocacy organization responses, and media reports, only by 
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talking to international education administrators themselves can I obtain their first-
hand, and most informative, experiences.
The third purpose is to identify what concepts in the policy process apply to
the case of such a unique focusing event. Drawing themes and patterns from the data 
(the government agenda, the responses of the advocacy organizations as well as 
individual administrators, and the media reports relating to international students and 
visa policy) are activities essential to making sense of and effectively responding to 
such a changed policy environment. Focusing events, crises, triggering events, and 
high-profile events are frequently described in the literature analyzing policy 
processes (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, 2002; Cobb & Elder, 1983; Fowler, 2000; 
Kingdon, 1995; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994).
Now three years after 9/11, study of its aftermath is fully underway. Study of 
the impact of this extreme and unique focusing event on aspects of international 
education policy are appearing. However, none of the studies I reviewed investigate 
international student visa policy in relation to policy study of focusing events. This 
descriptive case study adds a perspective to many narratives and accumulating studies 
of policy following 9/11.
Finally, as an outcome if not a purpose of the study, this descriptive case study 
provides one brick in a foundation for future studies on various aspects of the impact 
of 9/11 on international study visa policy, government actions, and the reaction of the 
international education community. Chapter 7 lists the topics of future study that 
emerged as I carried out this case study. 
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Research Questions
Creswell (1998, pp. 99 - 101) recommends "reducing [the qualitative 
researcher's] entire question to a single, overarching question and several 
subquestions" that may be framed to study either topics or issues. Topical 
subquestions anticipate information that will be needed to describe the case and may 
"foreshadow what the reader will find later in the study." Issue subquestions address 
the "major concerns and perplexities" of the case. In order to meet the purposes of this 
study, I developed one primary question and five subquestions to channel 
investigation of both topics and issues.
Primary Question:  In the 20 month period following the 9/11 attacks, what was the 
impact of the attacks on the international student visa policy domain?
Subquestion 1:  How did the governmental agenda change relative to student 
visa policy?
Subquestion 2:  What themes related to international student visa policy and 
regulation emerged in mass media newspapers during this period?
Subquestion 3:  What themes of response emerged from the policy 
community?
Subquestion 4:  How did international education practitioners experience and 
respond to these changes?
Subquestion 5:  What policy constructs helped me understand these themes 
and responses?
50
The Method of the Study
Birkland (1997, p. 144) cautions that unique or near unique focusing events 
cannot be studied using quantitative analysis or comparison with similar events across 
time. I acknowledge this concern by using a qualitative approach and descriptive case 
study methodology which resulted in an in-depth view of one case, an approach 
Birkland suggests is appropriate for “novel” events (p. 148). A complete description 
and defense of the method of this study, including enumeration of the documentary 
and interview data categories, are presented in Appendix B. However, three aspects of 
the study's framework provide necessary background for the case description which 
follows in Chapters 3 and 4 and I therefore present them here.
Timeframe
Birkland’s data on focusing events indicates that the majority of policy action 
occurs in the first 24 months after the focusing event. The case study I have conducted 
captures data from the first 20 months after the 9/11 attacks, from September 2001 
through April 2003.
Definition of Policy
Multiple definitions of policy exist in contexts of both prescriptive and 
descriptive typologies (Fowler, 2000; Guba, 1984; Hogwood & Gunn, 1984). In this 
study I use policy to mean the outputs of the policy making system (Guba, 1984), 
including expressed intentions of policy makers as well as official enactments 
(Fowler, 2000). Guba (1984) emphasizes that the operative definition of policy one 
adopts implies the likely data sources and forms of inquiry or analysis to be used in 
the study. When policy is the outputs of the policy making system, the type of data 
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likely to be collected includes “relevant laws, court decisions, executive orders, 
administrative guidelines, regulations, memoranda, instructions, behavior of street-
level bureaucrats; responses to the above by clients; [and] opinions of experts”, and 
the forms of inquiry or analysis will likely be “statistical data analyses, documentary 
analyses, interviews, observation, unobtrusive measures, investigative inquiry 
techniques” (p. 69). As implied by Guba’s definitions of policy as outputs, and by 
Fowler’s inclusion of expressed intentions as well as enactments, the policy data 
categories I employed included documents such as transcripts of committee hearings, 
the text of federal statutes, agency rules and regulations, executive memoranda, and 
State and Justice Department statements relating to international education, 
specifically student visa policy, before and after 9/11. I also collected data through 
interviews of international education administrators who were, in addition to their 
work, active members of advocacy groups, and documentary material produced by 
these groups, in order to build thick description of the policy community’s actions and 
perceptions of the student visa regulatory environment post 9/11. Use of these 
multiple sources of data also provides triangulation, as described more fully in 
Appendix B: Methodology.
Definitions of Other Terms
In the narrative which follows, I use the following terms requiring definition.
International education administrator:  Individuals who direct international student 
programs on U.S. campuses or in private institutions or organizations and who are 
responsible for policy implementation related to international students. In this study, 
all international education administrators interviewed are active in advocating for 
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public or institutional policies supporting some aspect of international education.  
These individuals are advocates within the context of their professional positions in 
international education or language programs offices, or within the context of 
membership in professional organizations or coalitions which have an advocacy 
function. Relative to this study, the administrators must have at least 5 years’ 
experience as an international education administrator and provide evidence of 
advocacy activities related to international student visa policy. (For a complete 
description of interview participants' characteristics, see Appendix B:  Methodology, 
Interviews).
Advocacy group:  Members and organizations which have a public policy mission or 
department to support policy development favorable to the organization’s 
constituency. In the international education domain, examples of advocacy groups are 
the Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange (Alliance), 
American Council on Education (ACE), NAFSA:  Association of International 
Educators (NAFSA), and Association of International Education Administrators 
(AIEA). In some cases, advocacy organizations have formed coalitions and acted in 
concert.
Focusing event:  In policy study, focusing events are primarily addressed as part of 
concepts and theory related to agenda-setting. Focusing events overlap considerably, 
at times completely, with crisis, high profile, or triggering events. In this study, I use a 
definition derived from Birkland (1997, 2001), who has carried out concentrated study 
on the focal power of such events. A focusing event is rare, significantly harmful and 
sudden, and becomes known to the mass public and policy elites simultaneously, 
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draws high mass media attention, has compelling symbols and images, draws 
attention to an actual or perceived policy failure, and has agenda-setting or agenda-
changing power.
U.S. international education:  The education, training, and cultural programs and 
institutions for foreign international students and scholars who enter the U.S. 
temporarily (i.e. as non-immigrants), to study, train, teach or conduct research at the 
post-secondary level. The international education arena includes the administrative 
infrastructure and personnel of programs which deliver the academic, professional 
development, and/or services components of the educational program.
International student visa categories:  Visa categories are distinguished by letters.  
Non-immigrant (temporary) visa categories F, M, and J are reserved for students and 
scholars and their families. An F-1 visa is for the student permitted to enter the U.S. to 
study in a post-secondary program or institution. An M-1 visa is for the student 
permitted to enter the U.S. to study or train in a vocational-technical or training 
program. The J-1 visa is for the exchange scholar who enters the U.S. to teach or 
conduct research at a U.S. university or institution, usually as part of a sponsored 
program. 
International students:  This study focuses on policies affecting F category 
international students particularly. I also at times refer to policies affecting 
international scholars, in the J category, and trainees, in the M category. 
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Background of the Researcher
Case study, as a qualitative research tradition, casts the researcher in the role 
of the "primary instrument for gathering and analyzing data" (Merriam, 1998, p. 20). 
This position leaves the researcher within the study, selecting some forms and sources 
of information and while rejecting others, interpreting documents and interview 
comments, judging what will amount to evidence or illustration of the case and 
making decisions about what to tell in the narrative. Therefore, the researcher has a 
responsibility to be clear about his/her background, perspectives, and "the inherent 
biases of this type of research" (Merriam, 1998, p. 22). Creswell (1998, p. 172) 
recommends that the narrative reporting the case include a section on the role of the 
researcher. I have included that here.
I was a director of intensive English programs or international education 
programming units in either a public university or a private company from 1983 
through 2001. During this time I served in national leadership positions in 
international education organizations and worked to shape U.S. public policy in ways 
that would support and increase the number of international students and scholars in 
the U.S. I was directly involved in advocacy work on a variety of the policy issues 
prior to 9/11 that I discuss and analyze in this case study. I have a strong belief in the 
value of international education for the traditional reasons of extending global 
understanding and developing citizens knowledgeable about the world's ways, as well 
as for the enhancements it brings to public diplomacy and workforce development for 
all countries that have students crossing borders. Like most administrators and 
advocates in the field, I watched the rapid policy making affecting international 
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students after 9/11 with shock, dismay, and confusion. Unlike those currently 
administering programs, however, I was not directly involved in coping with the 
aftermath of new legislation and regulations, leaving me an observer to this process. 
Also, I have held malleable views about the relationship of international student visa 
policy relative to national security, shaped by the increasingly clarified stream of 
information now available regarding what actually happened on 9/11, how the SEVIS 
student tracking system is working, and information developed through this study.
In this study I act more as an observer than participant. The government 
documents, advocacy organization statements, and media reports I have collected for 
the documentary data study are part of the public record. In the interviews as well I 
act more as an observer than a participant, but my background as an international 
education administrator and advocate no doubt shaped the follow-up questions I asked 
and the themes I detected and coded. I have used several techniques to balance these 
preferences and biases as recommended by theorists of quantitative study. I have used 
multiple sources of data, applied critical reading techniques, and maintained 
transparent records to support decisions about coding and interpretation as checks on 
inappropriate intrusion of researcher bias (Bell, 1999; Majchurzak,1984; Ozga, 2000). 
As recommended by Creswell (1998), in Chapter 7 I report what I have learned 
through this research, how my understanding of issues may have deepened, and how 
my position on issues may have evolved. I have also reported how the research project 
itself evolved as aspects of the data guided me or resulted in obstacles.  
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Conclusion
The widely recognized educational, economic and diplomatic value of 
international students did not protect this education arena from a cascade of U.S. 
government policy changes that occurred when national security dominated public 
policy and  international students were implicated in the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. 
international education community, including students, campus advising officers, and 
policy advocates, also experienced the impact of the 9/11 attacks, both in dramatically 
changed policy and in the day-to-day affects of the policies themselves. Among other 
causes, the 9/11 events were seen as a failure of U.S. policy regarding the monitoring 
of international students and their educational programs, and drew mass media and 
government attention. This attention resulted in legislation and rule-making intended 
to address this perceived policy failure. These dynamics are characteristic of focusing 
events, which may be followed by rapid, non-incremental policy activity within a 
policy domain. Models of such events continue to be expanded, and the 9/11 attacks 
were spectacular. Investigation and capture of what happened in this policy domain 
after this unique focusing event provides an account of the times, and may provide 
some insight into the policy processes which follow extreme events. The records and 
reports of these changes (the statutes and regulations debated and adopted, the 
reactions of the advocacy community, the media reports which shaped or reflected 
public perceptions, the response of campus international student office administrators)
combine to paint a vivid picture of the aftermath in one policy domain of a unique 
focusing event in U.S. history. The patterns of the policy activity impacting this 
domain (the characteristic agenda shift, identification of a policy failure and 
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redefinition of the policy problem, narrowing of policy alternatives and subsequent 
legislation, the changed political environment, and the changed role of policy actors 
that follow a focusing event) provide a link to policy studies and concepts. Finally, 
beyond the description of the case, this study illuminates, at the end of the arc of 
experience, discussion, policy change, and implementation, how the value of 
international education is still argued.
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Chapter 3
Changes in Public Policy following 9/11
Introduction
The 9/11 attacks functioned as a focusing event by all definitions. As Birkland 
(1997) points out, introduction of legislation is “prima facie evidence of the focal 
importance” of a high profile event (p. 147). With the 9/11 attacks, the incremental, 
accumulating and positive policy developments supporting international student visa 
policy were overrun as the dynamics of a unique focusing event came into play. In the 
20 months following the 9/11 attacks, three major pieces of legislation were passed; 
numerous proposed, interim, and final rules and regulations were promulgated; and 
executive orders and agency notices were posted which have impact on international 
student visa policy. This chapter lists these actions, the "outputs of the policy making
process," and describes how these actions represented the post-9/11 student visa 
policy environment.
Student Visa Policy after 9/11
As indicated in Chapter 1, until the week before 9/11, legislation was 
developing which reflected the international education community's preferences 
regarding limiting the negative aspects of CIPRIS, perhaps even repealing the 
requirement. However, within days after 9/11 it became apparent that legislative and 
regulatory changes would result that would have direct impact on international student 
visas. The Feinstein proposal issued on September 27 was a first concrete example of 
a government actor identifying international student visa practices as a national 
security loophole, and although the moratorium in the proposal was withdrawn, in part 
59
thanks to advocacy work by the international education organizations, features of the 
increased regulation remained on the governmental agenda (Curry, 2001). On October 
8, President George W. Bush issued a lengthy Executive Order establishing the Office 
of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, with the charge to 
"develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to 
secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks" and outlining all of the areas 
of action assigned to the office and council (Exec. Order 13228). Legislative action 
began rapidly, with the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act on October 26, 2001. This 
was followed on October 29 with executive branch action, with President Bush 
issuing a Homeland Security Presidential Directive which established a national 
policy for combating terrorism through immigration policies, saying 
The United States has a long and valued tradition of welcoming immigrants and 
visitors. But the attacks of September 11, 2001, showed that some come to the 
United States to commit terrorist acts, to raise funds for illegal terrorist activities, 
or to provide other support for terrorist operations, here and abroad. It is the policy 
of the United States to work aggressively to prevent aliens who engage in or 
support terrorist activity from entering the United States and to detain, prosecute, 
or deport any such aliens who are within the United States. (Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive - 2, 2001)
This directive included six sections, one of which was entitled "Abuse of International 
Student Status." In this section, the directive states that "The United States benefits 
greatly from international students who study in our country. The United States 
Government shall continue to foster and support international students" and then goes 
on to specify that 
the Government shall implement measures to end the abuse of student visas and 
prohibit certain international students from receiving education and training in 
sensitive areas, including areas of study with direct application to the development 
and use of weapons of mass destruction. The Government shall also prohibit the 
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education and training of foreign nationals who would use such training to harm 
the United States or its Allies. (Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 2, 
2001)
Specifically, the directive indicates that Secretaries and others across agencies will 
develop a program to accomplish this goal, including identifying sensitive courses of 
study and developing a system to "identify problematic applicants for student visas 
and deny their applications," tracking of international students' status after receiving 
visas, and development of other control mechanisms. It is quite specific in outlining 
what information should be collected in a tracking system and specifying that INS 
will periodically review schools certified to receive non-immigrant students and 
exchange visitors, echoing the mandate in the PATRIOT Act to implement the 
tracking system (discussed below) and forecasting the details which will appear in 
other legislation.
In the 20 months following 9/11, legislation was passed and rules and regulations 
developed which were consistent with the Presidential Directive. The policy activity 
flow was rapid and intense; legislation and regulations were peppered with interim 
events. Systems and programs were rolled out by mandated deadlines, even when they 
conflicted with one another or required use of untested or inefficient technology. 
Below I list these governmental actions, and then describe several in detail. 
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Table 5. Government Actions List (Executive, Legislative, Regulatory)
September 2001 - May 2003.
Date Type of Action Title and Reference
10/8/01 Executive Order Executive Order 13228
Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and 
the Homeland Security Council
10/26/01 Final Legislation Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001
Pub. L. 107-56
H.R. 3126




Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 2
Subject: Combating Terrorism Through 
Immigration Policies
Section 3: Abuse of International Student Visas
3/7/02 Interim Final Rule Documentation of Non-immigrants Under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended:  
Automatic Visa Revalidation
Issued by Department of State
Amends 22 C.F.R. section 112(d)
4/12/02 Interim Final Rule Requiring Change of Status from B to F-1 or M-1 
Non-immigrant Prior to Pursuing a Course of Study
Issued by Department of Justice, INS
Amends 8 C.F.R. parts 214 and 248
4/12/02 Proposed Rule Limiting the Period of Admission for B Non-
immigrant Aliens
Issued by Department of Justice, INS
5/6/02 Proposed Rule Labor Certification for the Permanent Employment 
of aliens in the United States; Implementation of 
New System
Issued by Department of Labor
5/7/02 Presidential 
Directive
Interagency Panel for Advanced Science and 
Security (IPASS)




5/16/02 Proposed Rule Retention and Reporting of Information for F, J, 
and M Non-immigrants; Student and Exchange 
Visitor Information System (SEVIS)
Issued by Department of Justice, INS
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5/30/02 Proposed Rule Academic Honorarium for B Non-immigrant Aliens









6/26/02 Policy Change Initiatives to Strengthen the Integrity of the Social 
Security Number
Issued by Social Security Administration
6/27/02 Proposed Rule Participation in the Exchange Visitor Program as 
Professor and Research Scholar
Issued by Department of State
7/1/02 Interim Final Rule Allowing Eligible Schools to Apply for Preliminary 
Enrollment in the Student & Exchange Visitor 
Information System (SEVIS)
Issued by Department of Justice, INS
7/26/02 Proposed Rule Address Notification To Be Filed With Designated 
Applications
Issued by Department of Justice, INS
8/12/02 Final Rule Registration and Monitoring of Certain Non-
immigrants (NSEERS)
Issued by Department of Justice
8/27/02 Interim Final Rule Reduced Course Load for Certain F and M Non-
immigrant Students in Border Communities
Issued by Department of Justice, INS
9/6/02 Notice Registration and Monitoring of Certain Non-
immigrants from Designated Countries (NSEERS)
Issued by Department of Justice
9/11/02 Implementation 
deadline
Implementation date for NSEERS at ports  of entry
Implementation date for ISEAS 
From Border Security Act 120 days
9/18/02 Interim Final Rule Visas:  Documentation of Non-immigrants Under 
the Immigration & Nationality Act, as Amended:  
Transitional Foreign Student Monitoring Program
Issued by Department of State
9/25/02 Interim Final Rule Requiring Certification of all Service Approved 
Schools for Enrollment in the Student and 




NSEERS call-in (in person) registrations begin
11/6/02 Notice Registration of Certain Non-immigrant Aliens from 
Designated Countries (NSEERS)
Issued by Department of Justice
67 Fed. Reg. 67766
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11/25/02 Final Legislation Homeland Security Act
Pub. L. 107-296
H.R. 5005/5710
11/22/02 Notice Registration of Certain Non-immigrant Aliens from 
Designated Countries (NSEERS)
Issued by Department of Justice
67 Fed. Reg. 70526
12/11/02 Final Rule Retention and Reporting of Information for F, J, 
and M Non-immigrants; Student and Exchange 
Visitor Information System (SEVIS)
Issued by INS
12/12/02 Interim Final Rule Exchange Visitor Program:  SEVIS Regulations
Issued by Department of State
12/16/02 Notice Registration of Certain Non-immigrant Aliens from 
Designated Countries (NSEERS)
Issued by Department of Justice
12/18/02 Corrected Notice Registration of Certain Non-immigrant Aliens from 
Designated Countries (NSEERS)
Issued by Department of Justice
1/16/03 Notice Registration of Certain Non-immigrant Aliens from 
Designated Countries (NSEERS)
Issued by Department of Justice
1/16/03 Notice Permission for Certain Non-immigrant Aliens From 
Designated Countries to Register in a Timely 
Fashion (NSEERS)
Issued by Department of Justice
1/24/03 Interim Final Rule Adjustment of Immigration Benefit Application 
Fees
Issued by INS
1/24/03 Interim Final Rule Removal of Visa Passport Waiver for Certain 
Permanent Residents of Canada and Bermuda
Issued by Department of State
1/31/03 Implementation 
deadline
Mandatory SEVIS use begins
ISEAS sunsets
2/19/03 Notice Registration of Certain Non-immigrant Aliens from 
Designated Countries (NSEERS)
Issued by Department of Justice
2/19/03 Notice Notice Designating Additional Ports-of-Entry for 
Departure of Aliens Who Are Subject to Special 
Registration (NSEERS)
Issued by Department of Justice
2/28/03 Final Rule Transfer of the functions of INS to DHS and 
reorganization of CFR chapter 8 to implement
Issued by Department of Justice
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Together, these policy activities constitute the outputs and expressed intentions of 
government policy actors to the focusing event. The three major pieces of legislation 
and four other policy actions are described here.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56 
(H.R. 3162), October 25, 2001.
 This act contains a number of immigration-related provisions, two of which 
shaped the post-9/11 regulatory environment for international student and scholar 
visas. Section 414, titled Visa integrity and security, directs full implementation of a 
visa entry/exit system as quickly as practicable. The visa entry/exit system must be 
designed to record the entry and departure of every non-citizen, and must trigger a 
notification to INS that the non-citizen did or did not depart the U.S. within the time 
granted by the terms of the visa. This section also mandates use of technology to 
accomplish the goals of the system, cites a preference for using biometric data to 
identify visitors, for example, and requires that the entry/exit system interface with 
intelligence and law enforcement databases, in order to provide a screening system for 
identifying potential terrorists among the non-citizen visitors.  
Section 416, titled Foreign student monitoring program, provides $36.8 
million to implement Section 641 of IIRIRA, essentially CIPRIS, by January 31, 
2003. (CIPRIS will eventually be renamed Student and Exchange Visitor Information 
System, SEVIS; it is one part of the Student and Exchange Visitor Program, SEVP.)
In IIRIRA of 1996, the monitoring program which was mandated was to have been 
funded by user fees; as noted above, the amount and collection methods related to 
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these fees was a primary issue to the international education policy community. The 
1996 law required that all higher education institutions authorized to enroll non-
immigrant students and scholars participate in the monitoring program; Section 416 of 
the USA PATRIOT Act added language training schools and vocational schools, 
including flight training schools, to the list of institutions required to participate.  
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, Pub. L. 107-173, (H.R. 
3523, H.R. 1885), May 14, 2002.
This act builds on some aspects of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 by 
amending some provisions of the IIRIRA legislation to strengthen student monitoring, 
requiring that electronic means be developed to monitor and verify steps in the visa 
issuance process. It also adds reporting requirements not in IIRIRA to the charge 
given schools enrolling international students. By specifying the information required 
and the timeframes for reporting categories of information, the Border Security Act 
provides the architecture of an electronic net intended to tag and follow students from 
school application in the U.S., visa application in his/her home country, visa issuance, 
entry into the U.S., enrollment at the authorized school, maintenance of enrollment 
and progress toward academic goals, to final departure from the U.S. after completion 
of studies. If at any point the student fails to meet the terms of the visa status, reports 
should be triggered notifying enforcement agencies. Data-sharing between 
departments, agencies, and schools through electronic interfaces are a critical 
component of the success of the mandated systems. Other provisions in the Border 
Security Act included interim requirements for reporting until the SEVIS program is 
fully implemented in January 2003, through a program known as the Interim Student 
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and Exchange Authorization System, or ISEAS (discussed more fully below), and 
required re-certification of all schools authorized to enroll non-immigrant 
international students and scholars before being permitted to enroll students through 
SEVIS.
Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. 107-296, (H.R. 5005, H.R. 5710), November 25, 
2002.
The Homeland Security Act establishes the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), and importantly, dissolves INS and moves all INS functions into the new DHS 
structure. The impact on international student visa policy stems from two aspects of 
the new DHS structure. The new division of functions within DHS leaves former INS 
functions divided between three bureaus, with services in one bureau and enforcement 
in another. SEVIS is overseen by the enforcement bureau, Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (BICE). Enforcement actions, in addition to SEVIS oversight, 
include investigations, detentions, removals, and intelligence; these are security 
functions. Services actions generally include processing change of status and 
extension of stay requests, for example. Reform of the INS has been discussed by 
congressional leaders prior to 9/11 and proposals reviewed (e.g. Senate’s Committee 
on the Judiciary hearing on INS Reform:  Services Side, 1999) and the international 
education policy community had advocated for such reform (NAFSA Issue Brief, 
2001). Both Congress and the advocacy community sought to separate the INS’s 
enforcement functions from its services functions; however, the objective of the 
advocacy community was for non-immigrant entry and monitoring, including for 
international students, to be on the services side. After several iterations of the DHS 
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structure, the reconfigured functions resulted in enforcement taking precedent in the 
DHS relationship to international student visa policy.  
Four regulatory changes will be discussed in more detail here, due to their 
direct impact on international students and the international education practitioner 
community. Three of these were actions mandated in the legislation above and one 
was based on an executive order. (Table 5 includes additional regulations and notices 
which are referenced in the data sources and which had impact on unfolding policy. 
The frequency of these events is an important part of the dynamic to which advocacy 
organizations and practitioners responded.) The four regulatory changes are 1) the 
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) rules, 2) Interim Student 
Exchange Authentification System (ISEAS), 3) the Interagency Panel for Advanced 
Science and Security (IPASS), and 4) the National Security Entry-Exit Registration 
Program (NSEERS).
SEVIS
The SEVIS rules are those developed by the INS to establish the computerized 
student tracking system mandated by the USA PATRIOT Act and the Border Security 
Act. The monitoring system is the third generation of the CIPRIS system mandated by 
IIRIRA in 1996 and is now the primary symbol among international educators of the 
regulatory aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Because the charge to INS to track students 
became embedded in the broader need for national security, the SEVIS rules are not 
only about tracking students; the rules established a net of requirements and 
restrictions on students and their program providers. For example, the SEVIS rules 
establish that schools authorized to enroll non-immigrant students be re-certified by 
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INS before they have access to the SEVIS system, including an on-site visit by an INS 
contracted inspector to ensure that schools are in compliance with regulations, and 
that they be re-certified every two years. Schools were given dates by which to be re-
certified and to have all students entered into the computerized system. The policy and 
practitioner communities’ responses to these rules were complex; they pointed out 
that the deadlines were unrealistic, the computerized system was untested and 
frequently failed, the net of requirements was highly obstructive to prospective 
students, the backlog of INS processing delayed students past the dates of their 
enrollments (Arnone, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Hebel, 2003; Schemo, 2003). At the 
height of the difficulties, with the mandatory compliance deadline of January 31, 
2003, INS functions were transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and were divided among three bureaus there. Responsibility for administering 
SEVIS was enfolded in the DHS structure, overseen by the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) National Security division when it was established effective April 
2003 (ICE SEVIS Fact Sheet, 2004). Hearings and reports assessed the progress and 
difficulties of the implementation of the rules; the consensus is that the system worked
poorly and that students and practitioners were struggling with multiple 
implementation problems. The Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector 
General, for example, published a report on its review of the government’s progress in 
implementing SEVIS; problems cited in the report included multiple problems with 
school certification practices, insufficient staffing to process applications, various 
problems with the software and computer system, insufficient training for inspectors, 
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and a forecast that the transfer of SEVIS to the DHS would cause further disruptions 
(Office of the Inspector General, 2003).
ISEAS
SEVIS was mandated to be in place and fully operational by January 30, 2003. 
However, Section 501[c] of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act 
of 2002, which was signed into law on May 14, 2002, required that a transitional 
system of electronic data sharing be put in place to track students within 120 days of 
enactment. Approved schools’ participation was mandatory and no F, M, or J visa 
could be issued without the approved U.S. institution providing the overseas consular 
office an electronic notification that the visa applicant had been accepted by the 
institution. Therefore, on September 11, 2002, the Department of State began 
accounting for students through the Interim Student and Exchange Authorization 
System (ISEAS). ISEAS functioned by establishing a web page at the Department of 
State website “onto which approved institutions and exchange visitor programs can 
enter student of visitor acceptance documentation for transmission to the department,” 
so that consular officers conducting visa issuance background checks and interviews 
could confirm school enrollment verifications and align them with visa issuance 
verifications. The Department of State then had the responsibility to, at the end of this 
process, transfer information to the INS port-of-entry officers so that they would then 
be able to confirm that students were legitimate F, J and M category non-immigrants.  
The issues related to ISEAS implementation included untested technology and 
a rapidly assembled system of instruction for all entities involved (consular officers, 
port-of-entry officers, school officials, and prospective international students). As the 
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DOS cable announcing ISEAS’s operation states:  “ISEAS is being established as an 
interim system, with the limited support and capacity implied by the term” (U.S. 
Department of State, 2002a). Because schools could use SEVIS on a voluntary basis 
from July 1, 2002, the ISEAS reporting system operated as a parallel system for the 
period it was in place; school officers and consular officers were required to check 
both databases to confirm the provenance of enrollment documents until the 
mandatory SEVIS compliance date (and ISEAS sunset date) of January 30, 2003. The 
cable is frank about this redundancy, saying “what was intended to be strictly a 
transitional program has become in practical terms a parallel requirement on the 
academic and exchange communities, the Department, and INS.” To the policy and 
practitioner community, ISEAS also represented one more case of near-weekly 
changes in deadlines and procedures, for procedures which were mandatory. ISEAS 
had been anticipated by the policy and practitioner community, but because the date 
for its establishment was 120 days after signing the Border Security Act, and that 
signing date slipped from an anticipated December 2001 to the May 2002 date, it was 
not clear when the required reporting would begin and how it would occur. As the 
cable states, 
Due to the very short development period mandated by the legislation ISEAS 
cannot be deployed before [the mandate date, September 11], and participating 
academic institutions and program sponsors will be unable to enter the 
required data into the system before the statutorily mandated date. Therefore, 
full ISEAS deployment on September 11 could result in an interruption in the 
processing of F, J, and M visas until participating academic institutions and 
program sponsors have an opportunity to enter the mandated data into ISEAS. 
(Department of State, 2002a)
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Because no visas could be issued after September 11 unless the DOS received 
“electronic evidence of documentation of the alien’s acceptance,” backup procedures 
were devised for the first 30 days of implementation; schools used emails. When 
ISEAS was finally implemented, its lifespan was five months, September 2002 
through January 2003. There were numerous difficulties with the system, with 
frequent practice advisories and updates posted (U.S. Department of State, 2002b). 
IPASS
The attention brought by the 9/11 attacks to international students and scholars 
and to terrorism joined to bring possible regulatory action to restrict access by foreign 
nationals to sensitive science and technology courses and research topics in U.S. 
universities. Before being issued visas, students applying to study in one of 16 
technology-related fields required additional review and background checks by 
consular officials; however, after 9/11 these reviews had not been done 
systematically. By presidential directive in May 2002, the Interagency Panel for 
Advanced Science and Security (IPASS) was established with, among others, the 
charge of updating the scientific fields of study that should be monitored when a 
prospective student applied for a visa and establishing consistent review processes for
applications for foreign students and scholars seeking to study in selected subjects that 
might include knowledge that could be used to make conventional, nuclear, chemical, 
or biological weapons. While the 9/11 hijackers did not have such training, the media 
and some government policy actors have in the past presented a connection between 
U.S.-trained foreign scientists and activities which may pose a threat to U.S. national 
security and these concerns were raised again following 9/11 (World’s educator, 
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2002; Kieman, 1999; Schemo, 2001; Southwick, 2002). The IPASS panel included 
representatives from a cross-government range of departments and agencies. As some 
graduate programs in computer technology and engineering have been dominated by 
international students, college officials had been worried that government actions to 
implement restrictions on some courses and fields, such as chemical engineering, 
nuclear technology, biotechnology and computer technology, would damage the 
quality of and enrollment in these programs. However, international education 
advocacy organizations indicated that IPASS would balance national security issues 
and science study concerns (Hebel, 2002).
NSEERS
In August 2002 the Department of Justice established a final rule for the 
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) which required male 
non-immigrants older than 16 years a from certain countries to report in person at 
designated times during their stays in the U.S. so that their presence and status could 
be confirmed by an INS inspector. The non-immigrants were photographed and 
fingerprinted; when exiting the U.S. they were required to use only designated airports 
and were required to meet with a Departure Control Officer. The rule also established 
that the U.S. Attorney General would publish a list specifying which countries were
affected as necessary. The special registrations began in December, 2002, and at the 
time of this study applied to males over the age of 16 born in the following 25 
countries. The registrations were required in three waves of country groups. With the 
exception of North Korea, all are Middle Eastern or Muslim:  Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, 
Syria, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, 
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Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, and Kuwait. As non-immigrants, male 
international students from the NSEERS countries have reported at designated times; 
their campus advisers monitor compliance. NSEERS was not directed at international 
students per se, but all international students in the designated categories were 
required to report, and this included F-1 student visaholders, who would otherwise be 
in violation of the law for failing to comply. As described in the ICE NSEERS Fact 
Sheet (2004) 
ICE's National Security division, within the Office of Investigations, also 
created an innovative compliance program that, for the first time, tracks and 
aggressively pursues foreign students, exchange visitors, and other non-
immigrants who violate their immigration status. This ICE component 
coordinates all enforcement efforts related to the Student and Exchange Visitor 
Information System (SEVIS), the National Security Entry Exit Registration 
System (NSEERS) and the U.S. Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator 
Technology (USA-VISIT).
The NSEERS program has been questioned on a variety of bases, from poor 
implementation and questionable effectiveness, to the symbolism it evokes of foreign, 
Muslim men being “rounded up” (Efron, 2002, September 5). Responsibility for 
administering NSEERS was transferred to DHS/Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) National Security division along with SEVIS when DHS took 
over INS and Customs responsibilities effective April 2003, per the Homeland 
Security Act (ICE NSEERS Fact Sheet, 2003). NSEERS annual re-registration was 
suspended effective December 1, 2003, when the program was transitioned into the 




International students were not the only focus of all this legislative action, of 
course. The INS had been under fire for a long time as being inefficient and unable to 
protect U.S. borders, and much of the changed government agenda focused on INS 
reform, ultimately resulting in abolition of the INS and the creation of the Department 
of Homeland Security. Visa reform had also been a topic of government action prior 
to 9/11, with calls for the State Department to more effectively and efficiently process 
visas, including conducting the mandated background checks to guard against 
terrorists being granted visas. Stricter monitoring of international students became 
symbolic of the momentum toward INS reform and visa reform, and represented 
action on these problems. 
Relative to international student visa policy, the government agenda had 
shifted during the 20 months following 9/11 from one of support to one of restriction, 
monitoring and enforcement. In addition to the content of the legislative and 
regulatory changes, the volume of events and the frequency of hearings, bills at 
various stages, interim and final rules constitute an important part of the dynamic for 
the international education policy community. These government actions were often 
on conflicting timelines. Adding to the impact of these rapid changes were the 
mandatory implementation dates particularly for all SEVP and SEVIS-related 
requirements, which were problematic because of the number and types of schools 
involved and because the technology upon which the database system was based was 
untested. In Chapter 4, the responses of the advocacy community during this unique 
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Impact on Advocacy Organizations and Their Reactions
Introduction
The international education policy community is framed to a great extent by 
advocacy organizations which have a membership constituency, particularly those 
which have missions or operating units dedicated to policy study, development, or 
government relations, including lobbying. The membership of these organizations 
may be individuals, many are organizations of institutions, and some of these are 
organizations of associations, building a somewhat integrated top-tier policy 
community which can, when the issues warrant, speak with some continuity across the 
field. Advocacy topics and strategies for addressing specific public policy initiatives 
vary among these organizations depending on the constituency and mission of the 
organization or coalition; not all of the broadly representational higher education 
organizations have international education, or more particularly international students 
in the U.S., as a primary focus, although all referenced in this chapter do have 
international student and scholar policy, visa policy, or homeland security panels or 
divisions. On some student visa policy issues prior to 9/11 (CIPRIS fees and 
implementation for example, as discussed in Chapter 2) the organizations did not 
agree at times, and did not necessarily coordinate advocacy efforts. However, in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11, the international education policy community came 
together to defend the value of international education and continued thereafter to 
collaborate rather extensively. This chapter describes the impact of 9/11 on the 
organizations in this policy community, their reactions and responses, initially to cope 
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with the dramatically changed policy environment while continuing to serve their 
constituents, then to re-establish the value premises for international educational 
exchange so that momentum for policy support could be regained. I have organized 
the presentation of information and themes I identified from this documentary study 
into six areas.
1. A list of the organizations and their missions relative to international education, 
international students, practitioner support, and public policy, which I reviewed
2. A description of the advocacy organizations' actions and responses to 9/11 in the 
first weeks following the attacks, prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act at 
the end of October, 2001, including their endorsement of a student tracking system 
and other security proposals
3. The evolution of the argument addressing how international students serve national 
security 
4. The shift in the policy image of international students from positive to negative and 
the advocacy organizations' responses
5. Advocacy work of the organizations related to 9/11 policies and regulations
6. Practical work of the organizations to serve their constituents as the policy cascade 
intensified
The Organizations
I collected and reviewed the public policy statements and other materials 
issued by 11 organizations, associations and coalitions comprising central groups 
active in the international education policy community and which have public policy 
or advocacy units, or which maintain information services for international education, 
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addressing issues in international educational exchange. To facilitate later description, 
these organizations, their missions and constituencies are listed below. This list also 
illustrates the range of organizations which found the need to respond to the 
legislation and regulations affecting visa issuance and other international student 
issues.
Table 6. Advocacy and Public Policy Organizations Reviewed in this Study.
American Council on 
Education (ACE)
ACE is the most comprehensive of the higher 
education associations, with members from all 
sectors of higher education. ACE works on policy 
issues in the areas of institutional and federal support 
for international exchanges and foreign languages 
and maintains relationships with national, regional, 
and international higher education associations 
around the world.  Non-profit.  Founded 1918. 1750 
institutional members.
Alliance for International 
Educational and Cultural 
Exchange
(Alliance)
The Alliance is an association of non-profit 
organizations comprising the international 
educational and cultural exchange community in the 
U.S. Its mission is to formulate and promote public 
policies that support the growth and well-being of 
international exchanges between the U.S. and other 
nations. The Alliance conducts government relations 
activities, including direct representation with policy 
makers and the marshaling of grassroots 
constituencies, to advance public policy concerns in 
support of the international exchange community, 
and builds public awareness about international 
education and exchange. The Alliance issues 
publications about related policy issues. 60+ member 
associations and organizations.
NAFSA:  Association of 
International Educators
(NAFSA)
NAFSA is the largest association of international 
education professional in higher education. Members 
include most of the designated school officials and 
responsible officers who manage the SEVIS system 
for colleges, universities, and exchange programs. It 
promotes the exchange of students and scholars to 
the U.S., sets and upholds standards of good practice 
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and provides professional education and training to 
individuals and institutions. NAFSA provides a 
forum for discussing issues and a network for 
sharing information among members. It seeks to 
increase awareness of and support for international 
education in U.S. higher education, government, and 
communities. Founded in 1948. 9000+ individual 
members.
Institute of International 
Education
(IIE)
The IIE mission is to promote excellence in 
international educational exchange. In partnership 
with forward-looking governments, educational 
institutions, corporations, and foundations, the 
Institute's worldwide staff and programs enable 
emerging leaders to think globally as they work to 
improve the societies in which they live. Founded in 
1919. 600+ institutional members. 
Association of International 
Education Administrators
(AIEA)
AIEA is composed of principal international 
education administrators on college and university 
campuses in the U.S. and abroad. It is dedicated to 
enhancing opportunities for key campus-based 
international administrators to join forces, exchange 
ideas, share information strategies, and provide an 
effective voice on matters of public policy. Founded 
in 1982. 320+ institutional members.
AAU AAU serves its members by assisting in developing 
national policy positions on issues that relate to 
academic research and graduate and professional 
education. It provides them with a forum for 
discussing a broad range of other institutional issues, 
including international education. Member 
institutions are represented by their chief executive 
officer. Founded in 1900. 60 U.S. university 
members and 2 Canadian universities. 
http://www.aau.edu/aau/aboutaau.cfm
University and College 
Intensive English Programs
(UCIEP)
UCIEP is an independent consortium of university 
and college-administered U.S. intensive English 
programs. UCIEP's purpose is to advance standards 
and quality instruction in intensive English 
programs. It is a member of the Alliance and 
cooperates on policy issues. Founded in 1967. 70 
program members. http://www.uciep.org/about.php
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American Association of 
Intensive English Programs
(AAIEP)
AAIEP is committed to support the professional 
image of ESL instruction in the U.S. and to work for 
the well-being of the profession and the individual 
member-programs. AAIEP is a vehicle for working 
with NAFSA, TESOL, the Department of State, the 
Department of Homeland Security, and other 
organizations who use IEPs or whose actions affect 
IEPs, including U.S. and foreign government 
agencies, sponsors, and admissions officers and 
counselors. Founded in 1986. 290+ program 
members.
http://www.aaiep.org/membership/mission.htm
American Association of 
State Colleges and 
Universities
(AASCU)
AASCU is a higher education association of public 
colleges, universities, and university systems across 
the U.S. and Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin 
Islands. Among the association's purposes is to 
monitor public policy at the national, state, and 
campus levels. 400+ institutional members.
National Association of State 
Universities and Land-Grant 
Colleges
(NASULGC)
NASULGC promotes all facets of 
internationalization on campuses, including 
facilitating exchanges, study abroad, faculty 
development, international research, and 
language/area study and development. Founded in 
1887.
American Association of  
Collegiate Registrars and 
Admissions Officers
(AACRAO)
AACRAO's mission is to provide leadership in 
policy initiation, interpretation, and implementation 
in the global educational community, through 
promotion of best practice in enrollment 
management, information technology, instructional 
management and student services. Founded in 1910. 
9,400 individual members representing 2,500 
institutions and agencies in the U.S. and 28 
countries. www.aacrao.org
Note: Excerpted from International Exchange Locator: A Resource Directory for 
Educational and Cultural Exchange (2000) and mission statements from association 
documents as referenced.
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Initial Impact of 9/11 before Passage of the USA PATRIOT Act
It is important to recall that in the year, indeed the very weeks, before 9/11, 
significant progress toward a national international education policy had been made 
and the tenor of overall discussion of policy and regulatory issues was quite favorable 
to international education. Within three weeks following the attacks, a variety of 
developments were having impact on the international education advocacy 
community and were symptomatic of the problematic and changed landscape for 
international students. References to international students and failed monitoring had 
begun within a week to appear in the press, although at times the emerging 
information was inaccurate information. Government leaders had already begun 
speaking about restrictions on international students, often in the context of INS 
ineffectiveness and border control issues, and linkages to the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombings were frequently cited by lawmakers and the media. Congressional 
hearings had begun which gave some attention to the purported role of international 
students in 9/11, discussed the policy community's opposition to CIPRIS, and forecast 
stringent student tracking and INS reform. And the first of many government actions 
reflecting the changed agenda and the identification of international student visa 
processes as a policy problem had been proposed. The Feinstein proposal had been 
released on September 27, calling for a six-month moratorium on foreign student 
visas "to give the INS time to fully develop its foreign student tracking system and to 
put into place the necessary infrastructure to detect foreign students who have violated 
the terms of their visas . . . once they have entered the U.S." and calling for a variety 
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of other new procedures and restrictions on students, schools, and the INS (Feinstein, 
2001). 
The first responses of the advocacy organizations, shocked as the rest of the 
nation but quite aware of what these early changes portended for international 
education issues, were assertive statements usually framed with the old "value of 
international students" statements. These responses urged perspective, noting 
repeatedly for example that international students, if any were in fact involved in the 
attacks, were a tiny portion of the non-immigrants who entered the U.S. each year. 
Strategies included citing data illustrating this small number of international students 
relative to the total non-immigrant count. ACE, for example, issued a Facts in Brief
dated October 8, 2001, which laid groundwork for perspective by repackaging widely-
available IIE and INS statistics as "recent data," to emphasize that students constitute 
only a small percentage of non-immigrants entering the U.S. each year.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, questions have been raised 
about international students who receive visas to study at American colleges. 
However, recent data show that international students represent a relatively 
small number of those who receive visas to enter the United States each year. 
Statistics also show that many international students attend research 
institutions and pay for their education through personal funds. A total of 31.4 
million non-immigrant visas were issued in 1999. . . . Of the 31.4 million, 
approximately 567,000 – or 1.8 percent – were educational visas. Nearly 
558,000 were admitted for academic studies (F1 Visa) and 9,500 for short-
term vocational training (M1 Visa). (p. 1)
The advocacy organizations were also carefully monitoring the numerous 
developments and working to keep their members informed, when possible defending 
against unfair assertions and correcting incorrect data. Throughout these weeks, the 
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advocates continued to assert the value of international students in comments to the 
media.
Two weeks later, on October 26, 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act was passed, 
with Sections 414 and 416 providing funding for CIPRIS/SEVIS and mandating its 
implementation. The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2 was published on 
October 29, 2001. The definition of the problem, at least that portion of it related to 
international students, had quickly crystallized, and the policy alternative had been 
chosen. The tracking program was going to happen. The advocacy and practitioner 
organizations had to begin in earnest planning for the position in policy of 
international education and international students in the long run. Also, it was 
increasingly clear that much attention would need to be focused on the practical 
effects of the legislation and the regulations which would follow, and that the 
organizations would have to deploy their advocacy machinery to help shape the 
minutiae of rules and regulations as well as broader policy. 
International Students and the National Security Argument
With the Feinstein proposal and early hearings by the House International 
Relations Committee, among other governmental responses, it was becoming clear 
that 9/11 would result in identification of policy failure in border security and that 
major changes in national security policy, including border, immigration, and 
intelligence policies, would occur. The international education advocacy community 
quickly recognized this and, adopting a more uniform, more proactive, even 
somewhat combative message, asserted the value of international students to national 
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security while emphasizing the value of international educational exchange to the 
changed national environment. 
Early media reports identified students as likely targets of policy. In a 
representative example illustrating the confluence of these developments the Wall 
Street Journal, 10 days after 9/11 reported that "Federal officials and lawmakers are 
expected to review programs allowing foreign workers and students to enter the U.S., 
or at a minimum to boost the ability of immigration officials to spot potential 
terrorists." (Adams, 2001, September 19). Although the initial focus of such review 
would likely be on the "relatively tiny" M-1 program "that allows foreign students to 
come here to study at vocational or technical schools, such as flight academies. . . . 
lawmakers say the issue of who gets let in on M-1 visas highlights a broader problem 
with the nation's ability to screen students, visitors and businesspeople coming to this 
country." While the report identified INS ineffectiveness as the top-level source of 
concern and tied this into on-going Congressional criticism of INS, the example 
which gets cited when ineffective border and monitoring practices are discussed is 
CIPRIS:  "Among other things, a controversial INS program to monitor foreign 
students in the U.S., which was mandated by Congress in 1996 but has been slow to 
get off the ground, is certain to see a revival."  The article quotes V. Johnson, 
NAFSA's senior director of public policy, in a statement giving insight into the field's 
changing advocacy stance, one which will be repeated in various public comments 
from the international education community. "We have been opponents of increased 
monitoring of foreign students, but that debate is over now." This language, clearly a 
considered message, is repeated in an op-ed piece circulated at this time by NAFSA, 
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in which executive director and CEO M. Johnson (2001b) states: "There has been 
much debate over the tracking proposal, and my organization has been its leading 
opponent. That debate ended on September 11, 2001. The time for debate is over, and 
the time to devise a considered response to terrorism has arrived." M. Johnson 
continues, reminding the reader of the pre-9/11 rationales for supporting openness to 
international education and linking international exchange to improved national 
security, and increased scrutiny of international students to a misguided and wasteful 
focus, saying 
Obviously, much changed on September 11. But not everything changed. The 
United States still needs friends in the world – now more than ever. One of the 
most important but least appreciated successes of American foreign policy had 
been the reservoir of goodwill toward our country that we have created by 
educating successive generations of world leaders. As the debate on foreign 
students proceeds, we must recognize that our country gains much from being 
their destination of choice. It also remains true that that 99.99 percent of the 
foreign students enrolled in our institutions wish us no ill, cause no problems, 
and seek nothing more that the best education in the world. As the 
administration seeks to define an effective anti-terrorism strategy, we cannot 
afford to punish the many for the acts of the few. 
In many forums, leadership in all advocacy organizations were all speaking up 
at this time, expressing similar views on the long term and broad value of 
international education as a response to 9/11. In another typical example, Terry 
Hartle, senior vice president for government relations and public affairs for ACE, 
makes the same case, saying "The natural reaction would be to close our doors to 
foreign students, and that would be exactly the wrong step. The lesson of the last 
week is we need more engagement with the world, not less" (Southwick, 2001b).
The organizations were repositioning in preparation for the coming 
discussion over major policy changes, laying the foundations for future arguments. As 
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this happened, the rationale for international students as a benefit to national security 
began to grow more sophisticated and the advocacy organizations began to express 
overt support for many of the visa reforms which were inevitable, while at the same 
time maintaining opposition to obstacles. No one felt national security was not 
important, just that focus on international students was misplaced, that better 
monitoring of the many would not have prevented 9/11, that more focus on 
background checks and the watch lists already in place plus some modest reporting 
requirements would be more effective. In the first weeks of October, the higher 
education community announced their own proposals for better monitoring of 
international students, sent to Congress in a letter from ACE's president David Ward. 
The proposals included a list of new responsibilities for institutions and for INS, 
stated the need for federal funding, and called for special scrutiny for certain 
categories of students: 
Document 1.  Higher Education's Proposals for Improving the Issuance and 
Tracking of Foreign Student Visas.
New Responsibilities for Institutions
• Within 30 days of the end of the enrollment period at the start of each 
academic term, supply an electronic update to INS of the most recent data on 
enrolled international students covering the following items: date of 
commencement of studies; degree program and field of study; termination date 
and reason; and status (i.e. full-time or part-time). 
• Require higher education institutions to report to the INS within 30 days of the 
start of an academic term the non-appearance of any such student indicated by 
the INS to have entered the country on that institution's I-20 form or who 
accepted an offer of admission but did not enroll. 
• Require designated school officials (DSOs) to comply with any "revised 
responsibilities" outlined by INS or lose authority to issue I-20s. 
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New Responsibilities for INS
• Notify a higher education institution within 15 days of a foreign student's entry 
into the United States using that institution's form I-20. 
• Issue a "revised statement of responsibilities" for DSOs that takes into account 
new reporting requirements. 
Funding and Oversight
• Guarantee the rapid implementation and effective operation of the Student and 
Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) by replacing the current fee 
system with a permanent authorization and necessary appropriations. 
• Increase the budget for consular affairs at the Department of State to provide 
additional staffing, improve facilities where necessary, and mandate more 
effective use of information technology. 
• Provide sufficient funding for the expeditious implementation of an electronic 
arrival/departure system for all visa classifications, as mandated by Section 
110 of IIRIRA. 
• Provide clarification that data disclosures to the INS regarding foreign students 
are not subject to restrictions under the Family Education Rights and Privacy 
Act ("FERPA")(20 U.S.C.1232(g); 34 C.F.R. §99.1). 
Special scrutiny for limited categories of applicants.
• Require consular officials to conduct more extensive background checks on 
student visa applicants from countries on the State Department's watch list of 
states supporting terrorism. 
• Delay the issuance of an I-20 form until after a prospective student from watch 
list countries has formally accepted admission. 
• Mandate a 30-day delay on issuance of all student visas for individuals from 
countries on watch list. 
Note: From Chronicle of Higher Education, Documents [On-line]. Available:  
http://chronicle.com/weekly/documents/v48/i07/foreign.htm
These proposals were quite modest, even beneficial to the international 
education community, and served most of the pre-9/11 policy goals of the advocacy 
community. For example, CIPRIS required more extensive reporting than this 
proposal did, and IIRIRA required users (i.e., students) to pay fees to fund the 
monitoring program. Non-immigrants from terrorist-sponsoring countries and other 
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watch list countries, when requesting visas, had been subject to background checks of 
various sorts for decades, and particularly since 1994. Kingdon (1995) and Rochefort 
and Cobb (1994) describe how after triggering or focusing events policy problems 
come to be defined (or redefined), and once that happens the competition among 
policy actors to move forward their own alternatives is a predictable policy process 
phase. By quickly coming on-line with a proposal that embraced a national security 
enhancement component, which implicated other sources of responsibility and called 
for the involvement of various agencies already under scrutiny, and which included 
reinforcement of essential pieces of the framework of argument supporting the value 
of international education, the advocacy community undertook to keep alternatives 
desirable to the international education community on the table despite the changed 
notion and depth of the policy problem. 
Ambassador Kenton Keith, Chairman of the Alliance's board, testified before a 
House International Relations Committee hearing on public diplomacy in early 
October, providing a summary of the proposals, and giving an example of the 
rhetorical context that contained the components of the advocacy argument, that 
international education initiatives are part of the solution to terrorism and enhanced 
national security.  
As a long-term solution to the profound problems of cultural 
misunderstanding, there will be no substitute for public diplomacy. It must be 
a key component of our long-term effort to eradicate terrorism. . . . The attacks 
on the United States brought with them two important lessons. One is that we 
need to be much better equipped to manage and control non-immigrant visitors 
to this country. The exchange community supports sensible, effective 
measures to accomplish that, and I will identify those in my testimony. The 
second lesson, equally important, is that we must remain open to the world. . . 
. Bringing students and professionals to our country provides us with the 
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unique opportunity to educate the next generation of world leaders. . . . Our 
national security requires that we balance these two important interests –
increased security and continued openness. (Keith, 2001)
Among other arguments Ambassador Keith raises is the economic value of 
international students, saying, "Not the least of these [negative] consequences would 
be economic. . . . Beyond the significant policy, social, and academic benefits we 
derive from these visitors, we estimate that they bring as much as $13 billion to the 
U.S. economy annually . . . a sector that constitutes our country's fifth-largest service 
sector." Ambassador Keith then referred to the Senate Concurrent Resolution which 
had passed to shortly before 9/11 which called for a national international education 
policy and called for a continuation of its initiatives, saying "Such a national policy 
combines the two vital interests of which I have spoken – continued openness and 
increased security." Many published comments and other documents from the 
advocacy community at this time bridge to the pre-9/11 status of the international 
student policy argument; such comments represent an effort to keep this policy on 
track and reaffirm its value as the basis of future policy, or at least to make every 
effort to figure it in to discussions of future policy changes. These comments, quite 
typical during this period, also link international student mobility to national security 
in a rhetorical fashion, without providing deep discussion of the immediate 
connection. The near-term responses included development of a consolidated strategy 
of support for international students in the new national security context including 
declaration of support for national security aims of policy being discussed, 
reconciliation over CIPRIS fees vs. repeal, an active response to the changed media 
environment.
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As the first months passed and primary legislation was adopted, the advocacy 
community tightened their arguments linking international student directly to national 
security. As they evaluated the changed regulatory and social environment, the 
organizations convened task forces and produced position papers to consolidate new 
strategic directions for this changed world. Several examples follow.
NAFSA's report of its Strategic Task Force on International Student Access 
introduces the rationale for the proposals it contains with frank acknowledgement that 
the old and general arguments of the value of international education, however true, 
were no longer enough to underpin successful advocacy:
For at least the second half of the twentieth century, it was an unquestioned 
verity of U.S. foreign policy that programs to promote international 
understanding advanced the national interest. It was almost universally 
accepted that educating successive generations of world leaders in the United 
States constituted an indispensable investment in America's international 
leadership. After September 11, 2001, these assumptions are being questioned 
to an unprecedented degree. (NAFSA, 2002)
ACE's Center for Institutional and International Initiatives published a policy
paper endorsed by 35 higher education organizations, including many of the 
international advocacy associations. This paper, Beyond Sept. 11: A Comprehensive 
National Policy on International Education, states at the outset "The tragic events of 
September 11, 2001, crystallized in a single, terrible moment the challenges of 
globalization and the importance of international research and education to our 
national security," firmly linking national security to the policies proposed and 
building a rationale for increasing the number of international students. Gone was the 
tentative couching of the value of international students as public diplomacy assets; 
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now national security must be the direct concern. NAFSA's strategic plan for 2003 
expresses this:
It is NAFSA's deeply held belief that international education is part of the 
solution to terrorism, not part of the problem. Our priority during 2003 will be 
to fortify what we believe to be an existing national consensus behind that 
proposition, and to translate that consensus into practices that facilitate, rather 
than hinder, international education at the implementation level. (NAFSA, 
2002)
To some extent, organizations had to persuade their own constituencies to 
embrace the national security argument. Practitioners' initial responses tended to 
emphasize that only one of the 9/11 hijackers had entered the U.S. on a student visa, 
and legally at that. They held that international students are not terrorists, and 
represented international students as cultural ambassadors with peaceful intentions. In 
addition, they argued that international students are already heavily monitored. The 
interviews presented in Chapter 5 will illustrate that these administrators were 
pragmatic and supported better tracking of students, but didn't think it would stop a 
determined terrorist.
Shift in the Policy Image of International Students 
International students had, by and large, been viewed positively in the media, 
which often used individual student narratives to illustrate the impact of policy 
actions. Local media in particular featured at times the positive aspects of 
international students and visitors, featuring exchange students and homestay families, 
university activities to embrace these "cultural ambassadors," international students as 
athletes, and international students valiantly attempting to adjust to American life and 
values. In the national press, when policy-related issues were discussed, international 
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students were seldom linked to the broader issue of border control and illegal 
immigration, which more often drew decidedly negative presentation. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2, issues related to international students and scholars had at times 
provoked sufficient discussion in the policy community to emerge in the national 
press, but more typically reports were positive. CIPRIS, co-mingled with other 
immigration issues in IIRIRA, greatly concerned the international education advocacy 
community, but for the most part the issues which had an impact on non-immigrant
international students, and the efforts of the international education advocacy 
community to protect them, were viewed sympathetically by the national press. After 
9/11, the advocacy community's role in opposing CIPRIS was simplified into lack of 
cooperation against terrorism, and as such came under considerable negative 
reporting. Also, both before and after 9/11, the INS was portrayed as inefficient; 
before 9/11, however, INS failures did not impinge on positive perspectives of 
international students, who were typically viewed as the victims of bad policy and 
implementation. After 9/11, international students were viewed as part of the policy 
failure that allowed the attacks to occur. In a comparison of this before and after 
picture, consider two articles from the national press. First, excerpts from an editorial 
in USA Today in February 2000, titled "'Terrorism tax' targets students":
A college student scans a packed lecture hall and sees a sea of 
nameless, studious peers. An immigration official scans the same hall and sees 
potential terrorists. Starting next year, all foreign students and scholars on U.S. 
campuses, no matter how loyal, will be treated as suspects. They'll be 
fingerprinted and watched – and they'll pay for the privilege. Under a plan 
proposed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 500,000 
foreigners would be required at registration to pay a $95 fee – call it a 
terrorism tax – to support a computer system that would track their 
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whereabouts. Colleges would be responsible for collecting the tax and 
fingerprints. 
Plans for taxing young visitors originated after the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing: One of the convicted conspirators, Eyad Ismoil, had entered 
the USA in 1989 on a student visa, then remained here illegally after dropping 
out of Wichita State University. In the post-bombing climate, Congress in 
1996 put into law the INS' recommendations about watching foreign students 
more closely. The INS contended that its tracking system would alert the 
agency when a student acted suspiciously, say, by dropping out.
Yet, exceptions aside, foreign students are model visitors. They are 
aggressively recruited by U.S. colleges and employers. The biggest proportion 
comes from Japan, Western Europe, and Canada. Fewer than 3,000 are from 
Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, North Korea, and Cuba – countries the State 
Department accuses of sponsoring terrorism.
What's more, the U.S. government already has checks on foreign 
students, which it fails to utilize efficiently. Colleges have for decades been 
required to report detailed information on any foreign student the INS inquires 
about. . . . 
One terrorist who gets into the USA under false pretenses is one too 
many. But rather than punish with a blanket suspicion all foreign students, the 
government's immigration officials should fix the genuinely troubling 
inefficiencies that already exist.
The tone of this editorial is representative of the image of international students, of 
CIPRIS, and of INS' inefficiencies prior to 9/11. In contrast with this, references to 
international students, the advocacy organizations, and CIPRIS post 9/11 in the 
mainstream press changed considerably in the post 9/11 environment. This excerpt 
from The New York Times (2002, January 28) provides an illustration of the size of the 
changed view of the advocacy environment as presented in the press.
Despite promises to tighten controls on student visas after Sept. 11, the 
government is at least a year away from making the system safer from 
terrorists, who used the visas while plotting the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing and the September attacks, immigration officials say. A computer 
network to track foreign students in the country, originally ordered by 
Congress six years ago, is still being tested and will not be running fully until 
next year. . . . Moreover, colleges that see foreign students as a lucrative 
market are raising concerns about how the system will be paid for and 
operated, and their objections could delay if even further. Officials concede 
they do not know for sure where the 547,000 people holding student visas are 
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attending school, or whether they actually are. The halting efforts to plug the 
student visa system reflect the overall difficulty of improving domestic 
defense, most notably airline security. Even in a world said to be forever 
changed by terrorism, demands for better security are, just four months after 
the attacks, hitting an old reality of competing interests, entrenched lobbies 
and reluctance to make financial or practical sacrifices. . . . Certainly, Sept. 11 
inspired widespread agreement about the need to change a system that allowed 
the names of foreign students to pile up unread in immigration offices and 
permitted Hani Hanjour, for example, to enter this country on a student visa 
and roam free until, authorities say, he flew American Airlines Flight 77 into 
the Pentagon. But last week, higher education institutions again raised a raft of 
objections, sending a letter to Immigration and Naturalization Service that 
called the planned system unworkable and demanding technical advisory 
groups and training. . . . Universities say that policing students violates the 
culture of academic freedom. . . . The issue is particularly pressing for 
community and technical colleges, which rely heavily on foreign students 
because they pay higher tuition. . . .
The Iranian hostage crisis in 1979 first raised the possibility of 
militants entering the country disguised as students. . . . In 1996, Congress 
passed a law that required computerized tracking of students when they 
received visas, when they entered the country and when they enrolled in 
college . . . The system was to track what they were studying, and any change 
in address. Higher education lobbying groups resisted, however, saying that 
there was no evidence that terrorists were abusing student visas and that any 
limits would deter foreign students and potentially put their institutions out of 
business. Twice they persuaded Congress to delay the start of the system, most 
recently until January 2003. . . . Small language schools, some of which 
combine three-week language courses with trips to Disneyland, have resisted 
almost any oversight. . . . "This was a system run for the profit and 
convenience of the universities, and it was run more with the intention of 
making money than anything else," said Representative George Miller, 
Democrat of California. Even as late as August, the Association of 
International Educators, an outspoken opponent of the computerized system, 
sent a letter to its members encouraging them to support a bill to repeal the law 
requiring it. The association endorsed the system in the days after Sept. 11, in 
part to fend off an effort in Congress to impose an outright moratorium on 
student visas. . . . In a letter released last week, the higher education 
organizations said they were "deeply worried" that the system would not be 
fully operating by that [January 2003] deadline. "Efforts to launch such 
systems without adequate preparation are doomed to failure," they warned. 
Immigration officials seemed annoyed by the letter. . . . The colleges continue 
to argue that the system would not have prevented the attacks. (Zernike, K. & 
Drew, C., 2002)
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Similar articles appeared in other papers. In another example, The Washington Post
reported that two years before 9/11 the INS was moving forward on an ambitious plan 
designed to "thwart terrorists from taking advantage of the loosely controlled student 
visa system. Then, the program ran into a roadblock: a fierce lobbying campaign by 
colleges and universities that considered students a major source of revenue. The 
schools complained that it was a privacy violation . . . The result of the lobbying effort 
was a scaled-down program that, critics say, left the INS more exposed than it should 
have been to misuse by terrorists involved in the Sept. 11 attacks" (Grimaldi, J., 2002, 
March 16).
Now the advocacy community had to work to control the perception of 
international students, the policies which govern them, and their own image as 
obstructionists. It is important to point out that a variety of perspectives of 
international students were presented in the press, and that other forms of media also 
carried images and perspectives. (A methodic study of this presentation would be 
revealing.) However, the trend illustrated in the examples above were apparent and 
had impact on the advocacy community's actions during this time. The administrators 
I interviewed all commented on the negative tone in the media as well, as I report in 
Chapter 5.
Baumgartner and Jones (1993, pp. 25 - 26) note that "How a policy is 
understood and discussed is its policy image. Policy images play a critical role in the 
expansion of issues to the previously apathetic. . . . Because a single policy or 
program may have many implications, or may affect different groups of people in 
different ways, different people can hold different images of the same policy."  They 
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go on to describe that policy images have both emotional and evaluative components, 
and that either component may be used to present the policy and make appeals about 
its value.
These appeals can be subtle or strong, but they are invariably present. Hence 
every policy image has two components: an empirical and an evaluative. We 
refer to the evaluative component of a policy image as its tone. . . . Tone is 
critical to issue development because rapid changes in the tone of a policy 
image held by key social actors (such as the mass media) often presage 
changes in patterns of mobilization. That is, as the tone of stories in the mass 
media changes, say, from positive to negative, opponents of the policy have an 
opportunity to attack the existing policy arrangement. (p. 26)
The tone had changed from positive to negative. This shift in the policy image of 
international education did not lead to mobilization of interest groups to advocate 
policy change, however, as Baumgartner and Jones discuss. Rather, the power of 9/11 
as a focusing event led to this policy image shift, as well as the cascade of policy 
changes. Majone (1989, p. 23-24) states that "Objective conditions are seldom so 
compelling and so unambiguous that they set the policy agenda or dictate the 
appropriate conceptualization." However, the power of 9/11 was "so compelling and 
so unambiguous" that it did dictate the conceptualization of international students as 
terrorists. The advocacy community became aware that one of its long term tasks was 
to reclaim the positive policy image of international education, to change the tone of 
the policy image from negative to positive, in order to enhance traction for the policy 
work to be undertaken.
Issue Advocacy Work of the Organizations 
Throughout the 20 months I examined, the associations comprising this policy 
community continued to actively work the machinery of advocacy despite, and at 
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times because of, the lack of clarity in the directions of possible policy. The advocacy 
organizations monitored the cascade of policy developments and identified issues 
which required response and from these, focused on the particular issues they felt they 
could influence or which they felt were so portentous that action must be taken to try 
to affect some later development. This work was complicated by the disruptions in the 
relationships and communication networks with law- and regulation-makers which 
had been so carefully laid prior to 9/11. However, the organizations' internal advocacy 
mechanisms were still in place, including communications networks to keep members 
informed of issue developments and to mobilize them on specific issues. 
Immediately after 9/11, for example, one of the first NAFSA legislative alerts 
to members was to draw their attention to the Feinstein proposal and ask them to write 
to their senators; the primary message of the alert was that "Feinstein's proposal would 
greatly jeopardize the U.S. foreign student flow to the United States by scrutinizing 
student applicants while virtually ignoring every other category of visa applicant, 
thereby doing nothing to effectively combat terrorism" (NAFSA Legislative Alert,
2001). During October, as the USA PATRIOT Act was quickly formed, advocates 
were aware that tracking provisions would be put into place, and in response argued 
for a workable system, funded by the government, and continued to emphasize the 
value of international student flows to the U.S. Then, as the policy and regulatory 
cascade began to intensify, numerous issues drew advocacy concern, many of them 
practical concerns which would appear in rules and regulations, and the organizations 
worked to intervene where possible. Attention to features of SEVIS was primary, 
including the recertification of schools, implementation issues including technology 
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deficiencies, multiple and conflicting deadlines, and fee amounts and fee collection. 
Issues which drew advocacy organization action related to the visa processing matters 
addressed in the Border Security Act included ISEAS and its ineffective interface with 
schools and SEVIS, and increased backlogs at consular posts due to visa interviews 
and background checks. INS reform discussions were heavily monitored; when the 
Homeland Security Act abolished INS and transferred its responsibilities to the new 
Department of Homeland Security, the advocacy organizations worked to influence 
where international students would be "housed" in the new structure, emphasizing that 
international students should be on the "services side" of the new structure rather than 
the "enforcement side."
As some legislative support for amelioration of or remedies for various 
impacts on the international education community began, or other legislation that 
addressed aspects of the international education community's overall agenda such as 
funding for exchanges was proposed, the advocacy organizations issued support 
statements. For example, the Alliance issued an action alert calling for support for 
cosponsors for the "Cultural Bridges Act of 2002," introduced by Senators Richard 
Lugar (R-IN) and Ted Kennedy (D-MA) which would authorize funding for exchange 
programs with the Muslim world. When Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) issued 
a letter calling for allowing short term students to enter on B visas, a matter of specific 
concern to intensive English programs, AAIEP, with NAFSA's collaboration, 
mounted a phone call campaign to encourage other Representatives to cosponsor.
Driven by common cause in support of the broad value of international 
education and aware that regulatory encroachment in one sector may lead to addition 
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regulation in other areas, the advocacy organizations, which had often in the past 
worked in partnerships or signed letters in consortia began to work together regularly 
to determine and carry out strategic interventions. In one of many examples, AAU, 
NASULGC, and ACE collaborated on SEVIS fee issues in a letter to DHS, saying 
"We write to bring to your attention a matter of significant concern related to the as-
yet-to-be proposed fee collection system associated with the Student and Exchange 
Visitor Information System (SEVIS), and to ask your assistance to help implement a 
solution that will avoid potential problems." The letter went on to discuss specific 
issues and suggest remedies (AAU/ACE/NASULGC Letter, 2003).
The flow of advisories, action alerts, comments on rules, letters and hearing 
testimony from the advocacy organizations linked directly to policy developments 
related to 9/11 was immense. In addition, the advocacy organizations continued to 
work on issues related to their overall associational plans.
Practice Support to Serve Constituents as the Policy Cascade Intensified
A primary impact on the advocacy community in the post 9/11 environment 
was the imperative to manage the practical aspects of the regulatory changes and the 
implementation of new systems on a short timeline in order to keep international 
education practitioners serving students while coping with the chaotic flood of 
information and regulation. To meet this challenge, the organizations recognized the 
needs of their members to have information and guidance on the issues, and in many 
cases, extensive practice support for those implementing SEVIS.
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Practice advice, support, and resources
Among the organizations, NAFSA, with a membership of thousands of 
designated school officials (DSOs) and responsible officers and a mission focus on 
practitioner issues and training as well as public policy advocacy, led in consolidating 
and providing hundreds of downloadable updates on the unfolding, densely detailed 
issue and implementation events. A list of the headlines included on the SEVIS 
information pages on March 12, 2003, stretching back to January 2002, each followed 
by discussion and other information, illustrates the kaleidoscope of regulations, 
implementation details, deadlines, and agency relationships the associations and their 
members were facing. 
Table 7.  Sample NAFSA Information Page Topics
January 2002 - May 2003.
Posted Information or Resource Topic
March 10, 2003 DOS field cable explains how SEVIS information made 
available to consular posts.
February 26, 2003 Updated version of INS RTI [Real Time Interface] and 
M User Manual posted on INS website
February 13, 2003 INS responses to NAFSA SEVIS questions
February 13, 2003 Changes described in SEVIS 4.4 release notice, effective 
January 20, 2003
February 6, 2003 State Department issues consular guidance cable on 2-
week SEVIS grace period and ISEAS
February 5, 2003 Schools that filed by November 15, 2002, but haven't 
had site visit yet, invited to contact INS
February 3, 2003 INS affirms two-week grace period applies to schools 
enrolled in SEVIS as well as those whose applications 
are pending
January 28, 2003 Reports of slow RTI response time
January 27, 2003 NAFSA requests INS conditionally enroll schools whose 
enrollment is still pending on January 30, 2003
January 23, 2003 INS announcement clarifies conversion of ASOs 
[Administrative School Officials] to DSOs [Designated
School Officials] in SEVIS
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January 23, 2003 New SEVIS batch resources now posted on INS web site
January 22, 2003 DOS cable on ISEAS sunset and SEVIS forms
January 22, 2003 NAFSA updates its compiled version of F SEVIS rule
January 16, 2003 INS provides instructions on entering OPT [Optional 
Practical Training] students into SEVIS
January 16, 2003 INS makes J SEVIS user manual available
December 12, 2002 Comments on J SEVIS interim rule due by January 13, 
2003; J Working Group provides template for letters
December 19, 2002 Summary of December 19, 2002 NAFSA-Government 
liaison meeting now available
December 26, 2002 DOS posts INS user manual for completing DS-3036 to 
enroll in SEVIS as J exchange visitor program sponsor
December 23, 2002 Clarification on F-1 OPT [Optional Practical Training] 
eligibility for December 2002 graduates
December 12, 2002 Interim final J SEVIS regulation published by DOS on 
Thursday, December 12
Updated December 11, 
2002
Final F and M SEVIS regulation published by INS on
Wednesday, December 11
Updated December 4, 
2002
DOS instructs exchange program sponsors to apply for 
SEVIS enrollment by December 16, 2002 to ensure 
approval by January 30, 2003
November 8, 2002 Update on SEVIS fee study conducted by NAFSA 
Global Adviser BearingPoint
September 25, 2002 INS publishes SEVIS interim  certification rule, strongly 
suggests filing by November 15, 2002
September 24, 2002 INS makes SEVIS batch Q & A available
September 24, 2002 INS prepares SEVIS batch test environment
September 18, 2002 House Hearing on SEVIS implementation progress
September 18, 2002 DOS institutes ISEAS system to implement Border 
Security Act section 501(c)
June 12, 2002 DOS issues field cable instructing posts on SEVIS forms




singResources.htm.  Retrieved 3/12/03.
The information page linked to an even more detailed "SEVIS Practice 
Resources Download Page", which provided additional materials under headings 
including "Understanding and applying the regulations," "Campus impact and 
planning," "Technical resources," "Law texts and other sources of authority," and 
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"News, updates, and networking" NAFSA posted advisories, association-developed 
documents, and compilations of government-issued rules, regulations, cables, 
clarifications, and other actions. Weekly electronic updates directed practitioners to 
the most recent developments. A sample of a NAFSA update in March, 2003, shows 
the range of topics being managed at any given time and gives a snapshot of the depth 
of information administrators and practitioners were juggling with the help of the 
membership organizations and their collaborative efforts. The notice notifies members 
that NAFSA's SEVIS information pages have been updated to include three new 
items: 
1) SEVIS Resource SR-2003-e, which covers F-1 regulatory and SEVIS issues 
from the perspective of English language schools; 2) Department of State 
cable that instructs how far in advance of start date applications for F, M, and J 
visas can be submitted; and 3) Written responses from the Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services and the Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement to SEVIS questions from ACE seminars [On-line].
(Retrieved March 31, 2003:  http://www.nafsa.org/sevp)
Other organizations which served practitioners also provided information particular to 
their constituencies. AAIEP and UCIEP delivered frequent updates through listservs 
to member programs and institutions in the intensive English arena. Admissions 
officers and registrars on campuses received a great deal of primary information 
through the NAFSA resources to the organization's admissions section, but were also 
served by AACRAO. ACE held seminars, among other initiatives to bring guidance to 
practitioners, in Spring 2003, at which they addressed questions to the Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) and the Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (BICE).
103
Data collection and generation
Another aspect of the advocacy organization's practical support for the field 
and their constituencies during the post-9/11 policy making and implementation 
period was to generate data which could be used to identify issue trends and, perhaps, 
bolster arguments related to SEVIS and visa processes. Some of the data collection 
was part of regular practices by some organizations, such as IIE's annual statistical 
survey of international student and scholar population in the U.S., conducted since 
1948, and reported in Open Doors. Many other data collections efforts were targeted 
to aspects of the post-9/11 environment. Finer slices of enrollment data were needed 
as various aspects of SEVIS and the visa procedures such as the additional 
background checks and mandatory consular interviews came on line; different sectors 
were affected in different ways and at different times by the process. IIE had 
conducted on-line surveys, for example, to assess enrollment closer to semester start 
dates rather than waiting for its usual annual reporting cycle (Chin, 2002) and 
collaborated with AAIEP and UCIEP to conduct "flash surveys" of enrollments in 
intensive English programs, whose enrollments had been the most severely impacted 
by the changes and who needed data to support advocacy for changes to the B 
regulations (Chin, 2004). Organizations in the advocacy community often 
collaborated to enlarge the pool of respondents, permitting a variety of data types to 
be pulled from a single survey, and increasing the impact of the data if reported to 
outside sources. For example, AAU and NAFSA conducted a joint survey of 
international student and scholar visas in October 2002, surveying 482 colleges and 
universities; in addition to reporting data broken out by categories of enrollment, the 
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survey inquired about visa delays that caused a student to miss the start of fall 2002 
classes and visa denials (AAU Survey, 2002). NASULGC's November 2002 survey of 
member universities and colleges traced regional trends (NASULGC Press Release, 
2002). Through its Center for Institutional and International Initiatives, ACE 
conducted sophisticated multi-level surveys and reported public attitudes about 
international education after 9/11, providing information which, for example, 
indicated that "80% of the 2002 survey respondents agreed that the presence of 
international students on U.S. campuses enriches learning experiences for American 
students, with 40% strongly agreeing," the sort of data that would later be 
incorporated into position papers and policy statements (Siyaya, Porcelli & Green, 
2002). NAFSA continued to lead on practice issues, collecting snapshots of 
information from members by, for example, posting forms for international student 
advisors to use to document each instance of visa applications that had been pending 
more than 30 days "to help describe the scope of the visa delay problem to the 
Department of State and Congress" as described in a NAFSA government relations 
email, April 3, 2003. 
Sector-specific issues
In addition to the two broad thrusts of policy change – visa processing and 
SEVIS development and implementation – with which all certified schools were 
coping, sectors of the schools and programs field were addressing issues custom to 
their organizations and their student and scholar populations. Two examples illustrate 
the nature of these impacts; one example crossed organizational lines and one did not.
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The obstacles faced by students and scholars in science and technology who 
were subject to the delays and obstacles related particularly to additional background 
checks because of their areas of study or research drew attention and supporting 
action from a cross-section of the advocacy organizations. In part this was because 
these students, scholars and researchers were at a nexus of issues and advocacy 
arguments in the new policy environment. They were subject to the most delays and 
obstacles under the new policies, they represented the argument that the U.S. 
benefited from the work and contributions of bright minds and future scientists, and 
they were a link to the national security rationale, they were a link to the argument 
that U.S. leadership in science and technology was threatened and tapped into the 
argument that the U.S. was loosing its edge in global competitiveness. This sector 
received focus in the press as well as from the advocacy organizations. For example, 
The Economist (2002, May 21) summarizes these sector-specific concerns and gives 
an example of how this issue is framed among other visa policy changes:
As the United States government moves to scrutinize more closely 
foreign students entering America's colleges and universities, there is growing 
unease among academics that new homeland security measures would deter
international exchanges, deprive science and research departments of valuable 
talent from abroad, and ultimately damage the vaunted openness of the 
American university system.  
Recently, the White House announced its intention to form an 
interagency panel for advanced science and security [IPASS] that will review 
more carefully all visa applicants who want to study "sensitive topics" such as 
bio-warfare or missile guidance. The White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy has set up an anti-terrorism committee that is reviewing 
issues related to foreign students. And the Agriculture Department has quietly 
reached a decision to bar any more foreign scientists from its research 
division.  Congress has done its bit too. . . . 
Without these students [who study mathematics, computer science, 
engineering and technology], research that keeps the United States at the 
scientific and technological edge would flounder. . . . In the past, most [of 
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these students] stayed on to participate in the U.S. economy, and many of 
those that went home took American attitudes and values with them. This has 
been an important influence on America's links with other countries. . . .
Events since September 11th have actually highlighted the need for 
more research and development – to counter the threat of bio-terrorism, for 
instance – not less. The country cannot afford to slow investment in scientific 
research or staunch the flow of top scholars and researchers from abroad. The 
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, which is providing 
technical assistance to the Office of Homeland Security and making 
recommendations about foreign students, has to strike a delicate balance 
between continuing to promote the valuable, and in some fields, irreplaceable 
flow of foreign students with the urgent need to protect national security. 
(World's Educator, 2002)
A consortium of associations would eventually join together to advocate for this 
student, scholar, and research sector. In a May 2004 press release from NASULGC, 
for example, announces that a consortium of "more than 20 science, higher education, 
and engineering groups, representing some 95 percent of the U.S. research 
community, today urged the federal government to adopt six practical 
recommendations for solving the current visa-processing crisis, by removing 
unnecessary barriers to multi-national discoveries." AAU, ACE, NAFSA, CGS, and 
NASULGC are all mentioned in the announcement, joining the AAAS, the world's 
largest general science society, in calling for changes in a system riddled with 
repetitive security checks and processing requirements, inefficient visa-renewal 
processes, lengthy delays, and inconsistent treatment of visa applications; the SEVIS 
fee mechanism was also of concern (NASULGC, 2004).  
Another sector-specific concern, this one drawing less cross-organization 
advocacy, related to the issue of B visas. The B visa is issued to tourists and business 
people who plan to be in the U.S. for only a short period of time and who are not here 
to pursue study as the primary purpose for entering the U.S. Schools which provide 
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courses which are relatively short, such as Intensive English programs, for many years 
have argued that non-immigrants entering the U.S. for part-time study for a limited or 
short period, should be able to enter the U.S. on a B visa rather than on an F visa. 
With the obstacles presented by SEVIS, and with the major enrollment declines in the 
20 months following 9/11 being accrued by these short-term programs, the urgency of 
advocating for changes in the use of the B visa, and for resisting pending restrictions 
to travel in these categories, grew. AAIEP, an association of intensive English 
programs, devoted considerable advocacy action to this issue on behalf of member 
programs. The Spring 2002 AAIEP Newsletter, for example, described in detail the 
association's advocacy work, saying "AAIEP s also very closely monitoring proposals 
for changes in the B visa regulations. These changes have the potential to be even 
more devastating to us than SEVP/SEVIS" (Thomas, 2000). While working with other 
organizations in the field on SEVIS and student visa processing issues, AAIEP sought 
partnerships with organizations outside of education for advocacy work on the B 
visas. The Christian Science Monitor reports this trend, for example, saying the 
overall "visa crackdown since Sept. 11 – which includes slower processing and 
changes in rules – is having a profound effect on many segments of society, from 
education to healthcare to agriculture. . . . businesses are crying foul, saying the 
economy's been hurt enough by the events of 9/11 . . . Tourism industry officials are 
especially upset about the [visa waiver] proposal because they feel they've been 
hardest hit since Sept. 11" (Axtman, 2002). Such collaboration with organizations 
devoted to the interests of tourists and business people, which were also facing 
changed policy and increased regulation, provided a reminder that international 
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education advocacy organizations were not alone in developing responses to the 
aftermath of 9/11. 
Conclusion
The advocacy organizations in the international education policy community 
faced a truly chaotic policy environment in the 20 months following 9/11. Initial 
responses show efforts to protect advocacy and policy gains made in the years before 
9/11. As the policy cascade began and international student visa policy underwent 
significant changes, the advocacy organizations worked to shape legislation and 
regulations as they could, often working in ad hoc consortia, and emphasizing that 
they supported changes which would protect national security. Organizations such as 
NAFSA and AACRAO, which served members who were practitioners turned to 
intense practice resource and information work. All organizations also dealt with the 
changed policy image of international students by advocating for their value.
 It was a difficult time full of challenges but not without successes. Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security Tom Ridge addressed the AAU in April 2003. He 
addressed both visa processing issues and the difficulties the university community 
was facing with SEVIS implementation. He affirmed the active role of the 
international education advocacy and practitioner communities in advocating for 
changes in aspects of SEVIS implementation and visa processing policies, and he 
confirmed that the associations were again in the communication loop with policy 
makers:
Let me first say that I appreciate the university community's continued support 
for the system and your hard work to deploy it. At the very same time, I 
appreciate and understand, because I've heard it from many of you, your 
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legitimate concerns. . . . No university official should have to spend countless 
hours trying to enter the records of one individual student or learn that one of 
your student's records suddenly popped up on another school's computer. To 
universities and to those students, these aren't merely glitches or 
inconveniences. Taken together, we understand they threaten your ability to 
conduct research and obtain funding and attract the best students you possibly 
can, and they put your students and researchers at risk of severe delays, or 
even deportation. . . . I should tell you that we began to hold weekly 
conference calls with major education associations to identify and correct the 
problems. . . . And as we approach the deadline for putting one million student 
files onto SEVIS, we'll work to get people the training they need to use the 
system . . . [Regarding visa processing], we know that your foreign students 
are indispensable to America's continued leadership in science and in medicine 
and in technology. . . . We can't do anything about the timing that's imposed, 
but I assure you we're going to try to do a lot better job working with you 
under the time limits that are imposed to avoid these [background check delay] 
problems in the future. . . . I believe that if we regularize our communications 
and conversations with this organization, as well as your colleagues in other 
academically-centered organizations, we will be able to meet the challenges 
that we each have in pursuit of what is a common goal; that is, not only a more 
secure, but a more prosperous, country. (Ridge, 2003)
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Chapter 5
Administrators' Reactions and Experiences
Introduction
International education administrators in higher education settings were at the 
crossroads of the policy dynamics which came into play in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks. In this chapter, I describe the reactions, actions and perceptions of eight 
international education administrators to the 9/11 attacks and the regulatory cascade 
which followed, as expressed in interviews I conducted in their offices between 
December 2003 and February 2004. As practitioners, at the time of the interviews all 
were directors or senior administrators responsible for a large international student 
population at a university campus or language school; prior to 9/11 these 
administrators worked on a daily basis with international students, the INS regulations 
and their own school or campus systems established to issue visas, document student 
arrival and departure, monitor student presence and academic progress, and arrange 
any post-study action. As advocates for students, these administrators were committed 
international education supporters, believing strongly in the value of having 
international students in the U.S. and on campuses. As policy actors, they were 
involved in pre-9/11 advocacy for regulatory perspectives which facilitated student 
mobility, largely acting through their professional organizations such as ACE, 
NAFSA, AIEA, AACRAO, AAIEP and others. On campus, they were (and continued
to be after 9/11) central to shaping campus policies to admit international students, to 
assist in their cultural learning and adjustment, and to educate the community about 
the value of international education. As described in detail in Appendix B, these 
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administrators were active international education practitioners and 
campus/organization policy actors for at least five years at the time of the interviews; 
in addition, all had been or were in governance within advocacy organizations in the 
five years prior to being interviewed. The interviews, which I transcribed, coded for 
themes and issues, and then reduced and synthesized for presentation of content 
pertinent to this case, provide an in-depth view of the impact of this spectacular 
focusing event on the administrators who are most directly affected by the policy 
changes and who must implement the outputs of the policy system. The administrators
also described personal experiences and their own reflections on the events-at-large, 
adding considerable depth to the description of the case.
The details these interviews provide to this case study are numerous and wide 
ranging. For presentation here I have organized the themes of response into clusters as 
noted below; the first two provide context for the case, followed by those topics which 
consistently emerged in all interviews, and concluding with the administrators’ 
perspectives on the overall effects of 9/11 on their work and beliefs.
1.  The administrator profile – snapshots showing who these administrators are, what 
their work is like, and why they are particularly useful respondents to describe the 
impact of 9/11 on the international student visa policy environment.
2.  Administrators' near-term experiences and actions – descriptions of the 
administrators’ experiences as the 9/11 policy events unfold and their growing 
understanding of what this meant for international students and their programs.
3.  Topics which saturated the interviews – descriptions of five topics which emerged 
in all of the administrators' comments when they discussed the impact of 9/11, 
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including the visa policy changes, on specific aspects of their work and advocacy 
activities. These topic areas are the changed work and role of the administrators and 
their offices, perspectives on media involvement, political implications locally of the 
post 9/11 national agenda, the effectiveness of the policy changes, and advocating for 
international students after 9/11.
4.  Positive aspects of the post 9/11 environment – administrators’ affirmative views 
of aspects of the policies and the benefits which have resulted.
5.  Overall effects – administrators' summations of the overall impact of 9/11 and the 
policy cascade on their work, the long-term prospects for international students in the 
U.S., and the status of their commitment to the value of international education.
In Chapter 6, I discuss the key issues and links to the policy process distilled from 
these interviews.
The Administrator Profile
The administrators whom I interviewed were all practitioners who worked 
daily with visa regulations and systems, active members of advocacy organizations 
which worked to influence public policy affecting international students, and long-
time international education advocates committed to the value of international 
students in the U.S. A typical profile of the respondents is reflected in these comments 
by Administrator A:
Well, prior to 9/11 and currently I am director of the office of international 
student and scholars. I'm the primary, responsible officer for the F-1 program 
and the J-1 visa program here at the university. I think prior to September 11 
our office was responsible to recruiting international students, the admission of 
international students, credential evaluations, the I-20 issuance for all students, 
new and continuing, J-1 scholar documents, programming, orientation, 
training on campus on intercultural issues, those sorts of things.
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Because the administrators held positions at director or senior administrator levels, 
they interfaced in authoritative and substantive ways with other offices and 
departments to deliver services to international students. Administrator F describes 
some of these linkages:
I serve as the officer who on campus is the director of international programs. 
As such I oversee the intensive English program and study abroad exchange 
agreements, special programs, short term - long term, facility-student staff 
exchanges, as well as all international student undergraduate admissions, 
international visa applications, I-20s, DS 2019s as well as for undergraduate 
and graduate students. I'm also involved in federal grant development, and I 
work extensively with both with the TESOL program and other TESOL 
programs on campus and in the United States and the world. Our admissions 
include recruiting of international students, undergraduate and graduate level 
and searching out different types of special programs, short term and long 
term. We're responsible for the whole range of services to faculty and students 
and staff wanting to go overseas as well as people overseas who want to come 
to us. [These are my same major responsibilities] before 9/11 and after 9/11. 
We're the policy shaping arm for the university and anything having to do with 
international exchange, study abroad, international student admissions 
services. We also provide the international orientation support services to 
international students, sponsor student clubs and such things. 
As Administrator F points out, these administrators were campus policy actors; they 
played active roles relative to policy and regulatory systems for international students
for their institutions. In addition, they also were active advocates for public policy 
supporting international education, often carried out in conjunction with their 
leadership roles in the advocacy organizations which work to affect international 
student visa policy, as described by Administrator B:
I served as director of the office of the international student affairs at [a large 
state university]. I was in that capacity since 1987 through August 2003. Since 
that time I relocated to [a large university in another state] where I serve as 
director of the office for services for international students and scholars. . . . 
My work as an administrator, I think you can look at it in certain tiers. One 
relates to advocacy outside of the campus, externally. To that extent, I always 
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played an active role as an advocate for the general international education 
exchange field and suddenly, in general, and suddenly for individual cases in 
particular. So to that extent, I have participated in advocacy efforts on the Hill. 
. . . I've probably participated in a half dozen of those initiatives. I have
engaged in letter writing campaigns, again, both for policy and regulations as 
well as in individual cases, for particular individuals. So that’s pretty much at 
the external level. . . . Other roles that I have held during this period, my role 
really relates to my outreach and volunteer efforts within my professional 
association. In fact, during the period you are referring to, I was serving as 
[senior leadership position] for [a major advocacy organization].
A most important aspect of these administrators’ identities was their work as 
educators, which all participants reported as central to their commitment to 
international students, programs, and services. Administrator D describes this 
commitment, saying "Myself, as an international educator, I consider myself to have 
the emphasis in that title on 'educator.' We are part of student affairs here at [state 
university name] and in our particular case I think that is a very good match because 
our real emphasis in terms of our work with students is in student development, 
student development theory, giving our students the kinds of opportunities they have 
to enhance their education both inside and outside the classroom."
All of the international education administrators I interviewed had well-
developed views and deeply-held beliefs about the value of international education in 
all of the value areas described in Chapter 1; international students represent a cultural 
resource on campus, they tend to be good students, they have an appreciable 
economic impact on the local community and nationally, and they often serve the 
needs of the academic community as teaching and research assistants, particularly in 
the sciences and technology. These administrators shared with each other a very 
strong sense of the public diplomacy value of international students and a strong 
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commitment to educating “the world’s future leaders.” The administrators emphasized 
particularly the overarching value of an international perspective in today’s world, and 
the role of an international student presence in the U.S. and university international 
educational exchange as a means for making that value concrete. Administrator A 
expresses this sense of hierarchy of values, pointing out “how important [international 
education] is to us not only as an institution economically and culturally but as a 
nation, the impact it has on the world.” Administrator H expands this sense:
I see it in all of us in the universities. I see it again within, again I am lumping 
when I say all of us, you can lump us and say that we are very liberal in the 
sense that we feel that the university is not a university without the presence of 
international students. I think that is a principle we that have. So, from that 
point of view, we are liberal in the globality that we feel international 
education should be here. . . . And much more the U.S. because I think the 
U.S. is a leading country. It is the leading country right now. But I think that it 
should lead in every way and education is perhaps, in my mind, the most 
important component of any society.
The administrators were aware of their value system and perspective, and how this 
shaped their views of both the pre-9/11 and post 9/11 environment as well as how it 
shaped their reactions to the policies which followed. Administrator B provides an 
example of this self-awareness:
This country is still in an emotional state and when the emotions are stirred we 
look at things in a different perspective. We hold things dearer to our hearts 
and to our value system. In this post 9/11 environment, we tend to, or I’ve 
observed, that we are looking at things as more of what is right and what is 
wrong. . . . As individuals working in the field of international exchange, we 
bring to our work certain biases, certain values. Not everyone shares that. . . . I 
personally think now more than ever before we need to be encouraging more 
learning, more exposure to other cultures, a better appreciation of other 
cultures, religious beliefs, religion, gender issues, you know, the role of music, 
the role of art in one’s culture. . . . I think now more than ever before we need 
to learn even more about all that.
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These administrators were well-informed student services practitioners and involved 
international education advocates who also felt a strong responsibility to be effective 
educators. They tended to share a belief structure that values international students as 
part of an overall approach to effective interaction in a connected world, believing that 
international education in various forms should be part of a U.S. university 
experience.
Administrators' Near-term Experiences and Actions
If I had to pick a date when things changed, 9/11 certainly changed it. If I look 
to an event that happened that Friday before, it was the retirement of a person 
that I'd been very close to here at the university, who was executive assistant 
to the president. . . . She asked me to speak on a September afternoon. . . . It 
was one of those gorgeous days; there was a golden glow to everything. I just 
remember that day as, this is really as good as it gets. . . . And then the 
following Tuesday comes and it's been cloudy ever since in many respects. 
While there has been growth and while there's been success, the success has 
been mostly in overcoming the bad. (Administrator E)
As professionals whose work was underpinned by a belief in the value of international 
connectedness, whose daily interactions were with international people, whose work 
had been to identify and implement policies and programs which made their values 
concrete, the impact of 9/11 coupled shock with the realities of needing to act. Their 
reactions would not be limited to emotional responses and discussion among 
neighbors. Immediately they began communicating, learning, monitoring the campus 
and community environments for effects on their students. Administrator A described 
initial memories:
The day that the 9/11 [attacks] happened two things struck me. One, I was, I 
received emails from all over the world from our international students who 
graduated, commenting, who talked about the reaction where they were. I had 
not realized they had to evacuate the economic towers in Tokyo and in 
Malaysia and all these other places because they were afraid that it would not 
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be just the United States that was targeted, but other countries as well. So that 
was very interesting. 
It became clearer that the 9/11 events were attacks by foreigners; the terrorists were 
linked to the Middle East. Then, early reports linked the attackers to flight schools, 
identifying some as “students.” Reminders of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing 
suffused news reports, including frequent comments that one of the men convicted in 
that bombing had been an out-of-status international student who had some years 
before entered the U.S. on a student visa. In this context, and in the general and 
extreme uncertainty of the first days and weeks following the attacks, ensuring the 
safety of international students was critical. Tensions ran high and administrators 
soothed students who felt their security threatened, as expressed by Administrator H:
[Anti-foreign sentiments following 9/11] caused all kinds of, not complaints, 
but very, a great deal of anxiety in a number of students. I have some student 
presidents from various student associations that will not even call me here [in 
the office] to express some things, but they will call me at home because they 
were afraid that maybe here somebody is hearing, you know, just, you know, 
just because so and so lived in our dorm, or because he participated in
activities, we don't want to be blamed by association and what we should do? 
So the [anxiety] level was very, very strong at that time.
Administrators monitored the students’ experiences. “As we were all checking in with 
our international students after 9/11” said Administrator D, “[we were] all very 
worried and the first thing we were all saying to our students as they came in for 
appointments or walk-ins after 9/11, how are you doing? People treating you right, 
harassing you, bothering you, what have been your experiences?” These concerns 
were shared by international educators and international students across the nation, as 
reported on September 21, 2001, in The Washington Post: 
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A small but growing number of Middle Eastern students are withdrawing from
U.S. colleges and returning home, some to comfort worried parents on the far 
side of the globe, others to flee an environment they fear is turning hostile to 
young foreigners. . . . At American University in Northwest Washington, 32 
students . . . withdrew this week. About 25 left the University of Missouri, and 
about 24 from North Africa or Arab states have left the University of Colorado 
at Denver. . . . In the days since the terrorist attacks on New York and the 
Pentagon, universities have rushed to respond to students' fears by holding 
vigils and public forums, while also offering support and protection. 
(Argetsinger, 2001)
Administrator G conducted such events to support students:  “One of the things that I 
remember that we did do, is that we got together and did a safety and security 
workshop with all our international students. It was for three nights immediately 
following 9/11.”
On campus, faculty and senior administrators relied on the international 
student administrators for information and answers. Administrator H observed that 
other sectors of the campus community was not immune to fears while events were 
still unclear:
One of the terrorists was a student, as you know. . . . I guess he'd come to get 
instruction in aviation and had lived at one time in [a nearby city]. There were 
many faculty, non-international as well as international, that would ask me, do 
you know how that has happened, do you have any knowledge about it? 
Trying to just make some kind of cohesion to all of the uncertainty and shock 
that they all had. It's like, anything like this you want to know more about 
somebody that participated, and then, you don't. Because you are afraid of the 
connections one may have in terms of having had a student in class.
Typically administrators and international students were receiving support from their 
senior university officers in responding effectively to the situation. Administrator D 
describes a series of campus actions:
I was extremely touched, really personally touched, as well as professionally, 
how can I say, supported by the reactions President [university president 
name] took of sending a letter to all of our international students here, by 
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sending a letter to our international students abroad, by having forums through 
which the values, the norms, and rituals of all religions were discussed, having 
presidents of all international student organizations, the ecumenical council. I 
thought that we responded in a very effective way. Simply by doing that in 
such a public way, such an open way, we were telling our students that we are 
with them and that we respect who they are in spite of the fact that some co-
citizens of their own country may have been a part of the whole 9/11. I think 
there has been sensitivity before [9/11] and sensitivity after.
International student personnel are usually active in the local community, 
believing that an important part of their charge is to expose their international students 
to “typical” American culture, and to expose the local community to the variety of 
cultural experiences their students can provide. International student offices generally 
conduct community outreach resulting in programming such as homestay networks 
and ambassador clubs which give international students a place in the community. 
International student organizations hold “country nights” and food fairs on campus 
which local community members are invited to attend. Perhaps because of these 
efforts, most administrators reported receiving support from their communities during 
this time, reflected in this response from Administrator A:
I also received about 20 calls from community members asking if they could 
be of any assistance and wanting to step in and help any of our students of 
Muslim descent. So I found, [while] there were stories of a lot of people acting 
very strongly, emotionally, targeting and mis-targeting many people because 
they though they may be Arab, I found that this community, actually I found 
people to be much more concerned. I received many more reports of people 
wanting to help than I did of people reporting that they had any problems. 
All of the administrators I interviewed reported encounters with the media, all 
locally, most regionally, some nationally. Initially, they and their students were called 
on to be cultural informants, to provide personal narratives, often particularly to 
illustrate that international students in the U.S. from the Middle East were not hostile 
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to the U.S. and were good students. As the public became somewhat conversant with 
information about the visa system and began to speculate on more sophisticated 
discussions about the place of immigration regulations (and the place of foreign 
nationals) in the U.S., administrators were frequently called upon to describe how the 
student visa system worked, and to respond to criticisms that, for example, the 
international education field had resisted efforts to track international students by 
objecting to the CIPRIS provisions or to report on the status of their adoption of 
SEVIS requirements as deadlines loomed. Relatively quickly, within a month in some 
cases, administrators began to be involved in media events (panels for television 
broadcasts, interviews in local, regional and national newspapers, radio interviews) 
where they largely were advocating for the value of international education. 
Administrator A, for example, was involved in several media events.
Our local [newspaper name] contacted me and they put together a series of 
kind of panel discussions about the impact of 9/11 on international students. I 
was very involved with the media here in [city name]. . . . [The panel] was 
held on campus, it was broadcast on local TV stations.  They also ran a series 
in the newspaper where I was a contributor. Then I was also invited to be on a 
show . . . where they talked about the PATRIOT Act and its impact on 
international students.
Five Topics Emerging in All Interviews
Five topics emerged with such consistency among the interviews that they 
characterize the impact of 9/11 in the interviews. The topics overlap and cross-inform; 
together they paint a picture of the multiple layers of change and impact experienced 
by the international education administrators and the offices they headed following 
9/11.  Each of the following topic areas was densely reported: 1) the changed work 
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and role of the administrators and their offices, 2) perspectives on media involvement, 
3) political implications of the post 9/11 national agenda, 4) the effectiveness of the 
policy changes, and 5) how they now advocated for international students.
1.  Changed Work and Role of the Administrators and Their Offices
International student office personnel, and particularly the directors, found 
their work lives altered, eventually drastically altered. Some changes were 
amplifications of their pre-9/11 charges to be cultural informants, immigration 
specialists, and international student advocates within the campus community. In the 
immediate aftermath, as events unfolded and it became clear that there would be 
significant impact on international students, the administrators were called upon by 
faculty and senior administration for their expertise on intercultural issues, 
particularly related to Islam and the Middle East, and to discuss the international 
student population on campus. Administrator F describes this role:
But certain things became more focused or more intense. For example, one of 
the things we have always done is we've tried to foster and promote 
communication and good relationships between faculty and international 
student staff and international students. We suddenly found ourselves stepping 
up opportunities for international students coming in to share their feelings. 
We found ourselves intensifying communication with staff, faculty, and 
students about we are the same people they had before 9/11 in their classes.  
And so we found ourselves spending a little more time promoting an 
understanding of other cultures and acceptance of people for whom they are 
and not where they come from or what they look like or their religious status.  
As immigration specialists with ties to practitioner organizations they were 
recipients of frequent regulatory advisories, giving them late-breaking information 
about the unfurling changes and deadlines related to SEVIS, NSEERS, ISEAS, and 
IPASS, which often hit weekly and in some spells, daily. They often found themselves 
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educating faculty, provosts, and presidents. Administrator G describes how the
international student office became more responsible for educating faculty.
What we're trying to do is to make sure that the faculty know about 
international student requirements, how many hours they have to keep enrolled 
in because sometimes the faculty will let the student drop without knowing the 
circumstances. We want them to know when they have a change of funding 
that can necessitate the need for a new I-20 because the faculty will sometimes 
ask us questions about that. It's kind of going out there and educating the 
faculty about what situations or circumstances surrounding international 
students will necessitate a change. Or prove to be a problem. . . . Now we 
understand that the student is supposed to be responsible for their own status 
and we do remind the faculty of that as well. But what we see is a lot of finger 
pointing to the international office. We have emails, we have information, but 
ultimately many times, the finger pointing comes back here. With the number 
of international students we have, we just cannot micromanage every single 
one of them. So our message is if we can all work together it'll help the 
student, but the student is ultimately responsible for their own status. 
Administrator B echoed this need to keep all working groups in the institution 
informed and the responsibility the international student office administrators felt to 
be the source of training and information, particularly as the policy cascade was 
resulting in frequent change. 
Clearly for us, we felt like we were successful in getting the departments to 
indeed improve the turnover time for the admissions function so that students 
could get admitted, get a visa, a document in their hands that allowed them 
sufficient time to get that visa interview date, whatever. There was, again, an 
example of a collaborative effort with the admissions office and all the 
academic units and even the graduate college. . . . I think fortunately for me I 
had been at [university name] a long time and created the infrastructure to 
allow for frequent regulations. So we already had in place a system for doing 
workshops on a regular basis. Every semester some kind of workshop was 
developed for administrators, for faculty and for staff. . . . We continued those 
workshops, just the topic changed and then even the frequency of those 
workshops changed. The volume increased as well whereas maybe prior to 
9/11 we would get 100 to 150 participants, it doubled post 9/11. . . . 
Sometimes change was taking place monthly, even weekly. In that case we 
looked to other models for communication. One of [them] was an electronic 
newsletter that we utilized and so we were able to keep in regular 
communication with colleagues across campus . . .
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They also found their power increased beyond their roles as information 
gatekeepers. As designated school officials (DSOs), their pre-9/11 work screening, 
admitting, and registering international students carried responsibilities framed in INS 
regulation, but post-9/11, the regulatory provisions were more complex and most 
importantly, were mandatory. The stakes were higher, and non-negotiable. This got 
the attention of presidents and provosts as well as faculty. Because they understood 
the implications of the new regulations and the consequences of failure to comply, 
particularly as students would be affected, the administrators in most cases took 
charge, suggesting or building infrastructure, attempting (and often succeeding) to 
consolidate information and compliance functions in their offices; sometimes this was 
welcomed, as indicated in Administrator B's comments:
I would say this heightened interest in our international population was 
demonstrated by colleagues across the campus. I used it as a window of 
opportunity to take that even a step above because they were more receptive, 
more open to change towards practices on the campus [at this time]. And so I 
used it as a window of opportunity to ensure that we were indeed able to 
develop campus processes and policies, of services that best benefited our 
students. I saw that as a leadership role on my part. When I saw my colleagues 
presenting this opportunity, I stepped up to the plate.
However, several administrators described a more contested arena; Administrator A
provides an example of how some international student office administrators became 
pivotal to SEVIS implementation and for educating other administrators, but struggled 
with the power shift.
I think one of the biggest changes in terms of my work on campus was trying 
to educate other administrators about the implications of SEVIS, for example, 
CIPRIS, ISEAS. And also, we had a situation here on this campus, still are 
having our various administrators that felt like they should be in charge of 
reporting to the government or taking a more active role, not understanding all 
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the implication involved in SEVIS and what SEVIS was. So I started a 
university wide committee, a SEVIS Committee, that was looking at how we 
were going to implement this as a campus and instead of trying to fight with 
people. I was going to take control and say, OK, assume this was under my 
jurisdiction and get a committee together to assist in the implementation. That 
worked fairly well. Although it is an ongoing issue, I don't know why.  
Administrator F was pragmatic about managing the policy changes, which were rapid 
and consequential, saying "The Provost and the President have been extremely 
supportive. Some of the deans have been upset about that support, but we have to 
follow some sort of protocol."
The administrators also describe the intense and practical impact on their 
office's services as they became the implementers of various policy components, 
SEVIS certainly, and ISEAS, NSEERS, and IPASS at times. At the first news of new 
legislation and regulations, because many administrators and practitioners, veterans of 
the CIPRIS debate, had been subject to an unsteady flow of negotiated policy changes 
with the CIPRIS requirements, few initially felt that SEVIS would be successfully 
implemented by the mandated deadlines, and felt that some sort of negotiated 
rulemaking would unscramble the mix of competing deadlines and insufficiently 
tested software. Administrator E described how the fits and starts with CIPRIS (see 
Chapter 2) affected the implementation of SEVIS and other changes, saying that some 
practitioners initially took “more or less a role of just wait and see,” believing SEVIS 
would “probably implode and nothing is going to come of it.”
However, as it became clear that the deadlines were generally firm, despite the 
untested technology and multiple and overlapping deadlines, administrators worked to 
increase resources for their offices, and they tended to receive amplified support from 
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senior administration. Increased support – IT personnel, additional software, 
additional funding – however, did not mitigate the extreme pressures felt by the 
administrators as they worked to implement an untested system with many problems 
by mandatory deadlines, in the face of consequences for their students and their 
campuses. In many cases, the mission of the office was redefined, in effect when not 
in fact, by the intense demands of SEVIS implementation, a change that appeared to 
be deep and permanent, and administrators mourned this shift away from what they 
felt was their primary calling as educators and cultural informants. Administrator G 
gave this perspective:
Since 9/11 we have had to pull those resources and invest them in software 
programs to support SEVIS. We've had to take that money and put it into 
coordinator position which we hired, basically we called a SEVIS coordinator 
position. So we have one person, she is actually physically located across the 
hall from where we are right now, who is our SEVIS database person. We 
have also taken a secretarial position to support that position. So the shame of 
it is that we have become more recorders and reporters instead of our old 
relations of being friends to international students. A lot of that has taken place 
because of the funding situations. Some of it has happened in that because we 
have to spend so much of our time keeping everyone's nose clean, if you will, 
it doesn’t allow much time for casual conversation, to listen to questions and 
[so forth]. I feel in some ways we have gotten some bad rap from the students 
because they understand, we tell them that we try to facilitate, we try to help 
them, but at times we appear to be more policemen, have a policeman kind of 
role. And so it almost creates a more antagonistic relationship which is 
unfortunate.  
Administrator A provides additional perspective on how the attention of those in the 
international student office was pulled away from students and advising and invested 
in the SEVIS implementation.
I spend more time in that, in the past, I would hire students typically to create 
the I-20s, DS-2019s, and now I can't do that. Only the responsible officers can 
do that. So that means I'm spending more time on the computer making the 
visa documents than I did in the past. Before I just checked them over and 
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signed them. I'm definitely spending more time. I think there is definitely more 
time spent reviewing the alerts on the system and needing basically to pay 
attention to all the data, all the information on there. It's overwhelming, at 
times I talk with a colleague, or go to a conference, I find out something new 
that I wasn't aware of, "Oh, I didn't realize I was supposed to do that."  
Administrator A went on to point out that the office sought and won increased funding 
and staffing, however, and this represented a heightened status on campus as well as a 
more intense role in regulatory application and dealing with data.
My sense is that people don't have a thorough understanding of what is 
involved, and the fact that it is really, in my mind, so clearly, it is the 
responsibility of the International Student and Scholars Office. So trying to 
educate people about what SEVIS was, what it meant for campuses, and also 
trying to get support for some of the new technology. We had to buy new 
software; we had to get dedicated servers for that software. I was able to put in 
a petition and get the university to do some cost sharing with me. We raised 
our international fee to help pay for some of the expenses. We also put in a 
proposal for a new position which was granted.
All of the administrators I interviewed emphasized the ways in which their work lives 
and the structure of their offices and services had been changed with the need to 
implement SEVIS, often with emphasis on the gritty practical aspects of this 
transition. Administrator E adds this vignette:
We are really dealing with these changes here in the office and a lot of that has 
to do with our IT situation. We started up with FSAatlas [a software program 
used for admissions and SEVIS functions] so quickly, a lot of mistakes were 
made. We had server problems. In fact it was three weeks ago that one of the 
computers that four people were housed on IT noticed that it was just about to 
go down. So it's a complete rebuilding internally, which means that historical 
data we had all needed to be reentered or it's basically lost. So if we could just 
get in a position where we feel like we are not starting over every semester, we 
would really appreciate that. Like I said we had to start up so quickly, we had 
to make some decisions so quickly that some of them were mistakes. We did 
the best we could with what we had at the time. We still don’t have the staff, 
the IT staff, probably never will, that is needed to support it the way we would 
like to see it. But again we hope that we can just reach a little bit of a plateau, 
a normal working environment. It seems like so far we are having trouble 
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finding that norm. It's a constant battle, trying to find the biggest problem of 
the week.  
Administrator D summarizes the state of difficulties with implementation one year in, 
illustrating that implementation was going to be an enduring issue:
We certainly keep that [advising and student development] as our primary 
goal, but I'm disappointed to say that here we are well over a year after the 
mandatory implementation of SEVIS, and we are still spending an inordinate 
amount of our time, the complexities of getting our student data from our 
student record system at the university into our own batch processing software 
has proven to be a challenge that I never, ever could image would be so great 
and time consuming for us. And I don't think we are unique in that. In that 
sense it's like when is this going to be over, when is it going to be routine, it's 
not routine yet. Even now, especially dealing with 1500 international students 
on a campus like ours, [which has] a large number [of international students].  
And Administrator F sums up the implementation issue from the administrators' 
perspective, saying "The government really didn't have their act together before they 
implemented all of this. And I understand bugs always have to be worked out. It was a 
nightmare. Their own people aren't trained."
2.  Perspectives on Media Involvement
The administrators were all thinking about the role of the media in reporting 
and interpreting the events of 9/11. Within a general context that seemed unfavorable 
to international students, several news patterns seemed to the administrators to 
epitomize what they felt was unfair representation of their work and their students. 
They felt international students were identified as a group early and unfairly in the 
first weeks after the attacks as the source of the terrorist problem, usually linked to 
emerging details about the hijackers having been students at flight schools. (See for 
example Yardley's September 13, 2001, New York Times article which is about pilot 
training at Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, but carrying the more generic 
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headline "After the Attacks: The University." It is worth noting that subsequent 
information confirmed that no hijackers attended Embry Riddle.) All administrators 
cited the influence of the first reports that one hijacker had been admitted for a 
California language school but had never shown up at the school (Goldstein & Morse, 
2001). As problems with the INS became the broader focus of policy makers, the 
image of the change-of-status notifications for the two hijackers who had enrolled at 
the Miami flight school, sent 6 months after the attacks, reinforced the public 
perception that international students were a poorly monitored alien population (K. 
Johnson, 2002). As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the advocacy community’s struggle 
with CIPRIS fees and implementation prior to 9/11 also was reported, and came to 
represent the international education arena’s resistance to student monitoring, 
interpreted in the media as a disregard for national security. Administrators felt efforts 
to set the record straight were overridden by the power of these stories and images. 
Administrator C commented on a 60 Minutes segment which many in the field 
expected and hoped would give them an opportunity to provide an affirmative 
argument for international students, with NAFSA's CEO Marlene Johnson speaking to 
critics:
Basically the media is all sound bite to me. Diane Feinstein started a lot of the 
whole thing and the media just picked up on that and ran with it. You 
remember when they interviewed, there was a big thing on, was it 60 
Minutes?, and Marlene [Johnson, NAFSA’s CEO] was interviewed and there 
was two seconds of what she said there. Completely out of context. And it 
made all of us throw shoes at our television set. . . . And the way Barbara 
Walters started off the interview, walking, just have a vague visual image of 
someone walking with her. There was, it sounded, it was just students really 
were a big threat. That started it off, I think, and the media just picked it up on 
that and ran with it. When something is hot, that is how it works.
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As previously noted, the administrators were called on in the early weeks and months 
after 9/11 to be cultural informants, representing international student perspectives on 
panels and in local media interviews. Interaction with the media became a regular 
responsibility for many, often on topics related to policies and regulatory compliance; 
Administrator F remarked for example that "Mostly what I want you to know is 
suddenly there was an interest [by the local media] were we following the letter of 
law. And I do mean by details of law, do we have the appropriate documentation in 
our files, have we followed deadlines, and I've been called by the local news media, 
by the TV, the paper checking out articles and impact on student enrollment, etc., 
[particularly] when we had to go through that recertification."
All of the administrators reported involvement with creating news stories and 
providing information to print and televised reports, including opinion pieces on the 
value of international students and supportive policy. Administrator E, for example, 
describes writing editorials:
On a personal level, I was successful in getting two op-ed pieces into the [local 
city paper] as part of International Education Week. Both of them were 
advocacy pieces on changing national policy both on immigration and study 
abroad. That provided me with an outlet to share, I would say, our vision, our 
being the international education community's consensus on the need to 
develop a national strategy on international education . . . welcoming 
international student access to higher education in the United States. And then 
to look at ways of doing a better job again on the national level, making this 
country more accessible, making the welcome mat move attractive and making 
the process for coming in for legitimate students less obstructive, less 
burdensome and just to facilitate that access. At the same time, to 
acknowledge the need to keep our borders secure.
As experienced policy advocates they understood the value of narrative in presenting 
memorable and moving argument and often used a recounting of their students’ 
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difficulties as a springboard into the issues of ineffective policy, unfair policy, and 
unintended consequences of policy. Administrator A describes attending meetings 
with international students in tow, to humanize the problem and effectively illustrate 
the impact of the policy changes on actual students. 
[At a media event] I brought an international student in with me who, a Ph.D. 
student from Spain. He had a teaching assistantship and had everything in 
order, had never broken a law. He went home to Spain for Christmas and when 
he returned, it was discovered had had been born in Lebanon. And so the 
officials in Germany tore out his visa, tore up his I-20 and sent him back home 
for a background check because he was on the list of 27 countries. It didn't 
matter, the fact that he was a citizen of Spain and had grown up and spent all 
his life in Spain. It was very interesting to see how those 27 countries were 
identified and targeted and how people were treated differently, men in 
particular, between certain ages. We did have one story here, we had one 
professor, he was Iranian who was traveling with his family. They stopped the 
plane and came on the plane and walked him off, treated him like a regular 
terrorist just because of his country of origin even though he was a citizen and 
was a professor here. He actually quit his job and left the country, because he 
was so upset, so embarrassed by the situation.  
Administrator D's comments indicate an awareness of the short lifespan of many 
media images and acknowledges, perhaps hopes, that unfavorable press images of 
international students would fade: "Well, I like most folks, saw what I thought were 
mostly troubling reports and images of international students post 9/11, but like so 
many issues in this nation, the attention span is so short and we've moved on to a new 
issue and now we are looking at Michael Jackson, Scott Peterson and I guess 
international students just aren't on the radar of the nation or of any interest to them."  
3.  Political Aspects of the Post-9/11 National Agenda
The administrators were very aware of the power of the national security and 
immigration control arguments which underpinned the policy changes, and they 
understood, or held opinions about, the political dynamics of the new policy 
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environment. They expressed a consistent view that the national security argument 
resonated with conservative political culture, militating against an international
worldview, and linked the Republican Bush administration to this political reality, 
despite knowing that support for international education has often come from bi-
partisan efforts; its value links to values on various points on the political spectrum. 
(Current revitalization of support for international education has come from Senator 
Norm Coleman, R-MN. See Chapter 7, for example.) Administrator F made a 
comment typifying this impression, saying that "I don't see under the current 
administration much progress in terms of change. I think if there were a change in the 
presidency, that we might see a little bit of softening." Administrator B described the 
political atmosphere as well, and noted the connection to the current administration. "I 
just returned from [two countries] . . . and talked with so many people from overseas 
and they have so little respect for the current administration. It is embarrassing 
actually, it's really embarrassing. Bush is our national leader, but it is unfortunate that 
we've gone around addressing it in a way that has so alienated us around the world."
The increase in anti-foreign and conservative political views had direct impact 
on some administrators' campuses and on services to international students. Several 
administrators described coping with the effects of conservative views and support for 
national security among local citizens, staff at their own institutions and even staff in 
their own offices. Administrator F reports on one such scenario, saying:
This is a difficult time. We're rural, we tend to be southern in our mind set. . . . 
What I found on the local level, though, was suddenly people, who I thought 
really enjoyed international students, who traveled a lot, were suddenly 
looking at the students and the people around them, even [at] foreign 
professionals in our community as if "I don't know if I should," you know, are 
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they or aren't they. They suddenly were re-evaluating their relationships. That 
was very hard on me. . . . And I found them on my staff . . . [people] who had 
once been supportive, and now, they were just sort of hyper. And there were 
people in financial aid. So I was suddenly having to go back and rethink how 
to work with those people and how to help the students get immediate needs 
met and make sure they were handled fairly and equitably. 
Administrator B reported similar issues; although working in an urban university, this 
administrator reported an increased awareness of the values inherent in the policy 
developments and the impact of the national political atmosphere, saying “That’s 
[people’s attitudes’] something you navigate very carefully. So when I give 
presentations at Kiwanis and Rotary, you have hard core patriotic people in that group 
and whatever information you present, you better [give it] in objective terms and not 
show your position one way or another.”  Like Administrator F, this administrator 
also felt the direct impact of attitudes in the community manifesting themselves 
among staff members. 
You know, if you look at it from my perspective, working at the [university 
name], you were very much in the Midwest and you worked with multi 
audiences, you got the faculty, you got the administrators, and you got the staff 
out there. The staff are the people who came from [local town name], which is 
10 miles down the road. But 10 miles down the road was already the corn 
fields of [state name]. So you had to ensure that you were dealing with the 
work in terms of what the government presented, that you do it, not whether 
you agree with it or not. Reality is there, because with all those people out in 
[local town name], who were 100% behind all of these regulations that were 
coming out. That is the population we are interacting with. One had to be very 
careful that you articulated your position and practices based on "this is what 
has been announced, this is our response," not "we like this, we are going to do 
it this way or we don't like that, so we are going to do it this way." It really 
was, this is the rule, whether we like it or not, this is that way we have to 
handle it.
At the campus level, the political atmosphere had an additional aspect; links 
between funding and compliance were noted. Administrator F mentions this, 
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describing how state political action immediately after 9/11 affected the international 
student office director’s work.
In fact, right after 9/11, [state governor's name] came and sent someone from 
his staff in to meet privately with the president saying he would expect our 
support on all items that come forward on his bill. And I was not even called 
in to the meeting; I was advised later even though there was a statewide 
announcement later. And as I found out from my other colleagues from other 
state institutions, it was all handled by presidents. Very few of them talked to 
the director of international programs and you would think they would turn 
there first. But the truth is, I think, our administration is thrown off a little bit.
In advocating for changes, Administrator B noted that prior to 9/11, contact with one's 
senator or representative may have been a useful approach, but the avenue of turning 
to elected officials was no longer effective after 9/11. "I think we also recognize right 
now, at least this last 10 or 12 months, it's hard to get government [officials] to stand 
up on any issue that may be perceived weak or not in sync with what the White House 
is doing. So you're in an environment where you have to be careful about appearing 
unpatriotic. So we have to weather that away. . . . It's been difficult. It's something so 
many people don't want to touch." As described later in this chapter, most 
administrators in the interview group, though they held informed views and at times 
took personal action, relied on the advocacy organizations to shape a strategy and 
define tactics for surviving in the changed political atmosphere.
4.  The Effectiveness of the Policy Changes
A primary theme in all of the interviews can be summed up with the question 
"Will all of these changes make us safer?" The administrators viewed this issue from 
several perspectives, but all questioned the ultimate effectiveness of the changes either 
at the operational level (would the systems work at all) or the policy level (will they 
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prevent terrorists from entering the U.S.) That implementation was so problematic has 
already been discussed, and the fact that SEVIS, ISEAS, the background checks 
mandated in the Border Security Act, and other policies were being carried out 
through underdeveloped operations and untested technology when implemented 
resulted in widespread perceptions of ineffective policy. Every interview abounded 
with examples.
To a great extent, the administrators felt that the focus on international 
students for stringent and rapid regulation was unfair because they questioned the 
validity of the link between international students and terrorism, and at a minimum 
questioned the simplicity of that formulation. (These interviews took place prior to the 
conclusions about the terrorists' backgrounds documented in The 9/11 Commission 
Report (2004). The report confirmed that all but two hijackers had entered the U.S. 
legally, and that the man who had entered the U.S. on a student visa had done so 
legally, although he did not report for classes after entering.) They questioned the 
identification of international student visa issuance as the policy failure which 
permitted 9/11 and this led to questioning whether SEVIS tracking would prevent 
terrorism. International students had been the most regulated of the non-immigrant
visa categories already, due to the approval loop created by required school 
authorizations and the linkage between INS (in-country status) requirements and 
Department of State (visa application) requirements. The administrators were 
knowledgeable about the lack of any monitoring of the millions of foreign tourists and 
business people who entered the U.S. each year. They questioned to a lesser extent the 
effectiveness of policies of additional background checks, focusing on the poor 
135
implementation of those policies, the defect-ridden technology, and the resulting 
malfunctions and bottlenecks in the visa processing system. In the end, all felt that 
visa reform and SEVIS would not prevent the determined few from finding a way to 
enter and stay in the U.S. However, in an inverted way, they recognized that school 
and student compliance with SEVIS inoculated the field from being accused of being 
a conduit. Administrator E discussed this lack of policy connectedness and the 
frustrating results for international student advocates.
Out of the 19 hijackers two were defined as having student visas, only one of 
which was actually coming into the United States on a student visa, and in 
fact, that was coming to an intensive language school program. Immediately 
all the focus falls on student visas and the need to reform the system that was 
"opening the flood gates to terrorists." Never once do you hear anything about 
the other 17 visa holders, what their categories were, how they came in. But 
because the student visa community, the student community had always been 
identified as the one that was the most identifiable and the most controllable, 
and the most monitorable, and the one around which most of the regulations 
had evolved over the last 40 years. They were the ones always pointed at; this 
is where the terrorist come from. I can understand the politics of reality and 
the politics of, you know, having to find the scapegoat, having to find, you 
know, we're going to make the world more secure because we are going to 
control this community. It's only 2 percent of the people that come into this 
country each year. It's so ludicrous and it's so pretentious and so political. It 
sells, it sells everywhere. Students are always looked upon as where the 
dangers are going to come from. Whether it be the tourist visas or the business 
visas, or the 60 different other visa categories people can come into this 
country on, no attention is ever focused on that. That's my sermon.  
Administrator H, like other administrators, stated that as a practical matter SEVIS and 
other policies will not be effective in preventing terrorism because "you cannot 
regulate the lives of anybody to the level proposed and that you cannot achieve, if 
there is a person who wants to arrive at an institution as a student and then wants to 
disappear, that person will disappear. You can report twenty times that that person is 
no longer here, no longer. That person can disappear." 
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5.  Advocating for International Students after 9/11
The remaining of the five topic threads which ran through all interviews was a 
discussion and reaffirmation of the many ways the administrators continued to 
advocate for international students on their campuses, in their communities, and as a 
group in U.S. national policy. All reported changes in the advocacy environment. 
Administrator F, for example, described the way advocates worked to affect policy 
before 9/11, and how that changed after 9/11.
Before 9/11 I felt I was interacting with government officials and colleagues as 
we would talk about what policy would work and there was a certain 
intellectual tension and sparing that was rather pleasant as we tried to work 
these things out. There didn't seem to be quite the same pressure or intensity 
because one could be more rational or logical, at least it felt that way. We 
could look at different examples and discuss. I found myself being able to 
educate using articles or using this or that, some of my best advocacy, that was 
within the professional organization, speaking up at meetings, setting up 
forums so that people could come together to discuss their differences, albeit it 
in a professional manner. There was something sort of – is the word erudite 
proper here? – sort of intellectual kind of thing. And the government seemed 
to be willing to listen and to see if we could work this out. . . . And I felt I 
could talk with my congressman and my senators quite frankly, political 
leaders. So I could worry about on the local level sending my students out to 
speak to people that was kind of advocacy because that helps the students go 
out and get into groups and interact and talk and the questions people were a 
bit more leisurely about asking and more open to having a broader range of 
people to come out and talk. . . . After 9/11, there became tension and sparring, 
and it's easing now, but the sparring, it felt nasty between the government [and 
practitioners and advocates] and the government become very rigid – no, we're 
not going to work this out, we're going to da da da. Even though we were 
sharing with the government the economic repercussions of some of the things 
they were doing . . . these interviews in countries we knew that are our friends
– Japan, they're waiting six to eight weeks to get a visa interview. They are not 
going to turn them down, these are our partners. I suddenly found that there 
isn't an avenue, they don't really want information and it's as if the government 
is going on and doing their thing whether it's homeland security, and that 
whole reorganization and this whole visa and interview thing and how groups 
will work together. 
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Regarding the value arguments supporting international students and upon 
which advocacy was built, a primary theme the administrators reported was a renewed 
emphasis on international students as cultural ambassadors, focusing on their value to 
public diplomacy as a way to address national security in the long run. Further, the 
administrators did not back down from arguing the economic and commercial value of 
international students to the U.S., despite early criticism by the media and policy 
makers that the field valued the economic benefits of having full-tuition paying 
international students more than they valued national security. Administrators 
continued to argue that other countries were recruiting international students away 
from the U.S. as visa procedures became obstructive, and that this would not, in the 
long run, be ignored by policy makers. Administrator A couples these value 
arguments into an overall support for international student mobility that was
expressed by the administrator group generally.
Before I focused more on the value of basically how international students 
contribute to the education of all students. Now I think I tend to focus more on 
the fact that international students are actually ambassadors. When they go 
home and they've been educated in this country they actually are some of our 
greatest ambassadors of, and basically it's an export industry. The students we 
educate have a huge ramification, many of them become professors or teachers 
and they impact hundreds of students a year and they impact hundreds of 
students a year, etc. So if you can think about that ripple effect of educating 
these people in the United States, and the impact they have when they go 
home. I can think of at least 20 or 30 students I know now that are professors 
at other universities around the world that received their Ph.D.s here. That's a 
huge and positive impact. And I think one thing the United States doesn't 
realize, and one thing I've been trying to get our higher administration to really 
focus on is the benefit of international education. How important it is to us not 
only as an institution economically and culturally, but as a nation. The impact 
it has on the world. The key is really education. If we are able to, it is through 
education you can dislodge a lot of stereotypes and misperceptions, that you 
can really have an impact on, not only on those individuals that come here, but 
everybody that they touch, their lives they touch when they go home as well. 
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It's a huge impact. I think it is very short sighted for the government to target 
that specific group and make it more difficult. In other countries they realize 
this and are jumping on the wagon and saying, "Hey come to Canada, come to 
UK, we'll take your money, we'll educate you." I think now there is a 
recognition of this, that this is a huge impact a country can have through 
education. And so by having these policies, our top administration advocates 
for open doors and that we really encourage government officials not to, you 
know, it's a very fine balance of trying to support the government and make 
people feel that we are doing something to create, to tighten the borders to 
create a more secure place. Certainly that is what terrorism is, it is a great fear.  
What if someone slips in and kills hundreds of thousands of people? On the 
other hand, trying to balance that with these benefits, what are going to be the 
repercussions if you cut out even a few thousand students? In the long term 
that could have a tremendous impact as well.  
Although the administrators accepted the reality of some connection between the 
international student visa system and national security, and on a personal level 
expressed a desire to support national security efforts, the administrators I interviewed 
did not present the national security argument developed by the advocacy 
organizations (as described in Chapter 4). Rather, they continued in the pre-9/11 strain 
of argument that heavy monitoring of international students was not appropriate and 
would not result in better national security. They emphasized that international 
students were legitimate, juxtaposed the trade-offs in restrictive visa processes and 
tighter monitoring after entry, expressing special concern that all of these efforts 
would not stop terrorism. Administrator E illustrates this perspective.
But is seems, out of the half million students that come into the country each 
year, they come from legitimate educational backgrounds. They've been in 
school, they've developed competencies, they've developed language 
proficiency, they've developed focus, that they're a cohort that can demonstrate 
their legitimacy as students. How we provide a test for whether they are a 
terrorist or not, I don't think anybody has devised that. Whether they be 
foreign or whether they be domestic. That's within one's own capacity for 
duplicity. I think that if anything was just unbelievable about the lives of the 
terrorists of 9/11, it was their capacity for duplicity. To lead normal, 
unsuspected lives within a community here and be on one track and be 
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undetected, and at the same time follow this passion, this commitment and not 
be discovered. And so I don't think there is any test for that. I don't think 
anything Homeland Security can do can create a selection process that will 
eliminate that in the visa processing thing. I think security experts can do well 
in intercepting calls and listening to communications and filtering all that stuff 
is good. But there are literally hundreds of thousands of students and scholars 
and scientists, and artists, and visitors being held up from coming into this 
country who have legitimate reasons to be here, we have legitimate reasons to 
have them come and it's unnecessary.  
Pointing out that the intensive English programs and other international education 
groups had allied themselves with other advocacy groups for non-immigrants such as 
tourists, Administrator C emphasized that the economic value of students still is an 
important argument: "I think, I'm hoping that their voice will continue to make those 
that can affect policy understand that its going to have a big economic effect, if it 
hasn't already in the United States, and they will listen to that.  I think the economic 
argument will have some power. . . . The media also, I think, has picked up on that 
and . . . talked about the economic impact." 
The ways in which the administrators interacted with their professional 
associations as they worked with the policy changes and chose advocacy channels 
included two main themes. First, the administrators relied on the professional 
associations for information -- the numerous and frequent bulletins and updates 
supplied by the associations regarding developments on laws, regulations, and 
implementation issues. The administrators received their information from a wide 
variety of organizations, not relying exclusively on one or two sources, and they 
reported actively searching an array of sources for information. Administrator F
commented that "I felt that I could turn to NAFSA who has always worked closely 
with the government on regulation, that they were respected and trusted. And I think 
140
the same with AIEA, that there was a way we had recourse." This administrator went 
on to list a variety of sources of practice and advocacy news, noting that these sources 
often had "an entirely different tone, style of communication and content." 
I get the NAFSA listserv from my area. I get the AIEA listserv which I follow 
very carefully. The AAIEP listserv comes into my director of intensive 
English programs, and then the TESOL listserv. . . . So among all these 
listserves I was constantly getting information. Plus, I have a lot of federal 
grant money from the U.S. Department of Education, and believe it or not, 
they were sending a lot of information to education people. . . . The Chronicle 
of [Higher] Education, professional newsletters, journals, and we all read the 
newspapers. . . . There is another group I followed and that was AASCU 
because they sent things to the president. The other one we followed was IIE. 
AMIDEAST [a nonprofit agency serving international education needs in the 
Middle East] did not send so much but IIE would send things.  
Since so many developments related to post-9/11 policies were late-breaking and 
delivered in a saturated news environment, with many developments embedded in or 
inferred from policy news about other topics, administrators consistently mentioned 
the need to stay informed about both the policy environment and particular 
international student visa issues. Administrator B describes this range and the reasons 
for it: 
Sources of information was widespread. I mean, certainly NAFSA was one 
source, but it was just only one source. AAU, American Council on Education, 
the media, the New York Times, you were getting information from a lot of 
different sources, you couldn't rely on any single source that you may have 
been relying on prior. Partly, because so much of it was coming out that may 
impact the communication schedule of particular organizations, so you cannot 
rely. If NAFSA only comes out with communications on Monday and 
something came out on the day after, you couldn't wait a week. So you had to 
rely on multi sources. So the Federal Register certainly was another interim 
release. So you had a number of sources of information. Websites, you had to 
go to websites to scan websites to obtain information. I certainly had to rely on 
all of the information, because, you know, if we weren't fast enough, 
sometimes the public we serve are the ones who know. And they would even 
say, "Have you heard this?" And you would get emails from the student and 
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they would say, "Have you heard this?" If you don't watch out, students would 
get information before you.
Administrator C relied on IIE, and with a particular interest in the policies and student 
needs related to intensive English program enrollment, turned to AAIEP and UCIEP 
for information and advocacy support. 
Second, the administrators were wearied by practical aspects of coping with 
the SEVIS changes in particular, as well as the other regulatory requirements, and 
they relied heavily on the professional organizations to do the work of strategizing for 
the future regarding public policy. They did not especially try to shape the policy as 
individuals, but responded as requested when asked. The administrators left it to the 
professional organizations to frame the overall strategies for responding to the policy 
cascade. As several said, “I’m not a national security expert.” They got information 
from the organizations, used it to influence opinions in their institutions at times, 
responded to calls for action such as letter-writing on the fee issue, but generally they 
were overwhelmed with implementation issues. Administrator D described advocacy 
efforts of this sort: "I do participate and I probably respond to, I would say, 80% of 
their [the advocacy organizations'] requests. When there is a particular issue, I will 
follow up and write to my congressperson or senator or whatever, or the particular 
committee that might be looking at some issue." Administrator G's perspective was 
not unusual:
As far as affiliation with, formal advocacy groups, we are represented in AIEA 
and NAFSA. I personally am, have not taken a strong position because the 
office staff is small and I can't be away as much as I probably should be. But 
our administration here does take a role and as we receive information that 
comes in via email and what have you, we generate letters and get them to our 
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chancellor. And I know that a couple months ago we drafted some information 
that went up the line.
Interestingly, since all of the administrators in my interview pool were long-term 
advocates for international education as documented by their active participation in a 
variety of professional association, some administrators were concerned about inter-
associational conflict on the issues at a time when collaboration seemed critical. 
Administrator D expressed this perception:
I just read post 9/11, getting messages from other organizations that were very 
often forwarded to me by colleagues in other areas, like Council of Graduate 
Schools, ACE, some of the folks in the admissions area. They were getting 
very similar kinds of messages. It really struck me in the post 9/11 times how 
in such times, still these organizations were [it] seemed to me, in my view, 
very kind of egocentric. They were all trying to be the experts on SEVIS, and 
what we should be doing in terms of advocacy. It troubled me to see that. I 
wasn't seeing the same level of collaboration as one might hope. Now I'm 
aware though . . . between the organizations, I'm aware that, yes, there was an 
extraordinary collaboration but I recall . . . that the organizations were very 
willing on specific issues to collaborate, but my sense was that people went on 
to their own agendas, at which point really disappoints me.
Positive Effects of the 9/11 Policy Changes
Some of the most interesting information to emerge from the interviews was 
that the administrators, despite the tremendous pressures and negative perspectives of 
the policy changes, identified numerous areas of positive effects of the policy 
changes. All liked various aspects of and effects of SEVIS, noting that tracking and 
data collection has benefits and that students can no longer ignore regulations. In 
comments which are characteristic across the interviews, Administrator D describes 
positive aspects of SEVIS related to controlling students on campus:
From a regulatory standpoint, international students are no longer able to 
easily ignore us, ignore the regulations. I've seen over a dozen students over 
the last year and half or two years for whom I've made the comment:  "Maria, I 
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really don't like to say this, but you are really a poster child for why they have 
created this whole SEVIS thing." Students who habitually ignore or even just 
consciously dismiss the regulations and all that sort of thing. I'm pleased that 
we have a mechanism in place that is fair and consistent and objective for 
reporting students who fail to meet their responsibilities of their status. I'm 
glad that that is there. . . .Yeah, I think there are far fewer opportunities for the 
student to circumvent the system and work around, whereas before there were 
a lot of ways a student could get away with things and I don't like that. . . . I 
think this gives kind of an even playing field for everyone, these are the rules, 
some of them you are going to like, some you are going think are stupid. But 
they are the rules and we play by the rules. If you are going to school, you are 
going to play by the rules, too. Our job is to help you play by the rules, so let's 
do this together. I think that is very positive.  
The value of having data on international students was one benefit many professional 
organizations and international student administrators saw resulting from CIPRIS, and 
improved data on international students was also a recognized value of SEVIS and 
visa processing policies, as Administrator E indicates:  "I always think this is a 
blessing in disguise. We always knew we needed good documentation, good record 
keeping, data, stuff." Administrator G elaborates this, while also pointing out a 
common problem for international student offices, that of having maintained more 
than one database for various users and purposes:
I want to reiterate that I think that it is good that we have [SEVIS tracking and 
other monitoring] in place. . . . I think that we, the U.S., needed to know who 
was here, when, and what for. In fact, even before the regulations were in 
effect, before I was director of this office, every semester we had prepared all 
that information on an Excel spread sheet. Because many times I wanted to 
know for one reason or another, we also handled the recruitment component, 
so I used it a lot for that. I wanted to see how many graduate students came 
from a particular region or a particular institution because I wanted to try to 
determine where our recruitment efforts were more successful. We also 
wanted to look at where we were underrepresented on campus and target our 
recruitments efforts accordingly.
Nearly all of the administrators felt new power within their institutions as the 
“go to” experts on visa policy developments, and with that more influence to draw 
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resources and manage international student policy on campus. They reported a 
heightened profile of international student officers on campus as experts in both 
cultural and regulatory arenas, and welcomed the attention and support from 
university administration, presidents and provosts in particular. Administrator F 
comments that, for example, the campus president is more knowledgeable and aware: 
"As I said there has been some good fall out because the president now is more careful 
about looking at exchange agreements, asking questions. He has thrown far more 
support to us, even restructuring our reporting order so it is a more effective one. So 
you see it's a strange thing where some positives come out of the negatives."
This increased attention and heightened profile had practical value. 
Administrator F, for example, pragmatically noted that the international student office 
became the focus of administrative and regulatory applications after 9/11, saying 
"After 9/11, the administration suddenly took note that this office needed to be in 
power to make sure that we were following the letter of the law. And legalization, and 
part of that was the political environment. This is a conservative rural area and we rely 
heavily upon financing through special earmarked funds through our US senator and 
our Congresswoman."
In addition, renewed focus on the economic value of international students to 
the institution and to the nation was identified as a beneficial outcome of the increased 
attention. Although in the aftermath of the attacks, schools were accused of valuing 
the income international students bring to a campus or school over the national 
security concerns, administrators were frank in talking about the revival of the 
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economic value of students, due particularly to the negative pressures on enrollment 
attributable to “visa policies.” Administrator H described this benefit.
I think maybe a couple of things that have come that are positive. One of them 
is that we looked at the income that the international students bring. And when 
I say we, I mean all of the universities, and in [state] perhaps it was very badly 
needed. But every school looked at that. It was, we want more. We want to at 
least remain with the same numbers, or we want to continue to have 
international students as part of the community of students. . . . This past year 
[a special panel] addressed the needs and benefits of international students on 
campus. That group has done a terrific job. They looked at everything and 
perhaps because of these regulations that threatened to have a large flow of 
international students to continue to come, there has been a great deal of 
emphasis to what we can do with recruitment, what we can do to better the 
relationships among international students and American students. I think that 
is a very positive thing that has happened. 
Administrator F emphasized the view that the economic value of international 
students could not be ignored and that national policies must facilitate the 
international students flow to the U.S.
I think part of what is going to happen, this summer when I was in Japan, I 
met with members of the US Dept. of Commerce in our US Embassy in 
Tokyo. They are saying that the commercial interests around the nation, 
around the world are really being hurt by our visa rules, that education is our 
fourth national import/export . . . and we rely heavily on that economy and 
they are suddenly becoming aware of it. I don't see under the current 
administration much progress in terms of change. I think if there were a
change in the presidency, that we might see a bit of a softening. I think we are 
going to have to wait for things in the Middle East settle down.
In perhaps the most common benefit cited by administrators, as a direct outcome of 
the increased attention on campus and the increased workload and technology needs 
imposed by SEVIS, international student offices were receiving additional funding 
and personnel. This perspective is expressed by Administrator A.
So it actually in some ways, I would have to say in some ways, it was a real 
benefit as it highlighted the importance of our office, it raised our stature, I 
think; the importance of our office, I'd like to think. So far it has manifested in 
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funding decisions that have benefited us, paying for software, paying for 
positions, which we had been trying to procure for years. So I think in some 
ways, having a mandated federal law come in that had significant changes in 
some ways assisted international offices around the country in terms of raising, 
you know, making higher administrators aware of that they are very important 
and play an important role.
Other positive aspects of the post-9/11 environment included a boost to the 
educational value of international students on campus. "In some ways, this will sound 
terrible, but in some ways it worked as an asset because our students are now more 
interested in people from other cultures and study abroad," said Administrator F. "The 
things we did to hasten the communication process has attracted more people to 
looking at study abroad and mixing with our students through their Habitat for 
Humanity program, and students, Friends Without Borders. So it is a strange kind of 
cycle." Several administrators described the post 9/11 policy cascade, and the various 
sector responses it provoked, as positive in providing a spark to reignite political 
realization that a national policy shaping and supporting international educational 
exchange was indeed necessary. Administrator E describes this transformation: 
So, whatever advocacy there was pre 9/11, it was basically at the educational 
level and the institutional level. Let's get student mobility higher on the 
institutional agendas. The national agenda will just continue to flounder 
forward and long as it is not an obstacle, there was always the critical, critical 
absence of leadership of vision, of national strategy to promote international 
education. There was a vacuum for years and years. And if there is any one 
thing 9/11 has done on the positive side, it's helped people on both sides: there 
has been a vacuum and that there is a tremendous need to fill that vacuum with 
a strategy.
Perspectives on Overall Impact of 9/11, the Policy Changes, and the Future
Most international education administrators accept the national security value 
of monitoring international students, although they do not accept the premise that 
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international student visa policy represents the pivotal policy failure responsible for 
9/11 or that international students are a more likely population to become terrorists 
that other, less monitored populations. We need to keep in mind that these interviews 
were conducted before The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) came out describing the 
terrorists’ visa statuses and other avenues of entering the U.S. All of the 
administrators remained highly committed to the value of international education in 
its traditional senses (educational, cultural, economic values), and all observed that 
effective intercultural and educational experiences in the U.S. must, and could, occur 
within the new framework despite the doubts about the problems it contained and the 
obstacles it posed for prospective students. As Administrator F observes:
I think eventually these things will all have new policies and procedures in 
place. I think some of the changes with Homeland security are such that 
they're good for the nation. I think some of this will work its way out. . . . Yes
[international education will survive], but in a different form and shape. I think 
we'll see perhaps some of the smaller regional state universities, such as ours, 
attracting more students, because the parents are worried, too, overseas. . . . I 
think we will see more exchange, certain foreign language interest has picked 
up. No, I think good things will come out of it in terms of international 
education. I think we will find more money being spent in that area of faculty 
exchange. Things may look a little bit different though.
Administrators had the perspective that after the chaotic and rapid period of policy 
activity, regulation of international students and support for international education 
would settle down, even improve. Some felt this would happen because of the 
unintended consequences of the policies, including impacts on student enrollment, as 
reflected by Administrator G: "I would like to see things let up. We are, our 
international student population new enrollment for this past spring was about one 
quarter of the size it was two years ago. Our new students [have declined] and that is a 
148
significant change. That hurts the diversity on the campus. Our international students 
pay three times the in-state rate. There's a substantial financial impact to the campus. 
Particularly at our institution where there is a heavy focus on graduate students. It 
affects our faculty, our research projects."
The administrators had a sense of what Downs (1972) has called the issue-
attention cycle, that public attention will not stay focused on this issue, and also that 
as more information entered the picture, the agenda-grabbing policy activity triggered 
by an extreme focusing event would begin to be mitigated. Administrator E felt this 
way, saying that "I always envisioned the aftermath of 9/11, the regulatory aftermath 
as a temporary blip, as a temporary roadblock. Part of it was technological and that 
eventually, given enough resources, the bridges would meet. I am hopeful the 
government can develop the capacity to accommodate the data that's being delivered . 
. . that the big picture, to me the big picture is fine." The administrators expressed, 
often as a capstone thought, that the overall value of international education and the 
role and value of international students to the U.S. must be reasserted. They 
commented on strategies that would accomplish that, while at the same time 
emphasizing their own values in support of international education, even when in 
balance with national security issues. Administrator E continued: 
It is so much more important than ever before to be helping people from 
troubled regions, from regions that have people that may be hating us, to learn 
more about us so they don’t' hate us so much. To have greater access to 
opportunity for us to be doing more to facilitate mobility, to facilitate 
understanding, to facilitate greater knowledge in these areas. To keep them 
from coming is making us even more of a target of an enemy. We're putting up 
walls where in fact we need to be having open doors.
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As a final summation, Administrator D's comments were quite typical, indicating that 
even while in the process of change and implementation, just past the fringes of when 
the policy and regulatory activity had slowed, there was the perception that some 
stability in the visa and tracking practices would emerge.
Well, I think I can certainly observe, now that things are calmed down and 
we've dealt with the initial craziness of the very initial implementation of 
SEVIS, we're started to hear people ask some of those critical questions again, 
like what do these new restrictions on security mean for research in our top 
universities, what does this mean for keeping America competitive in making 
sure that our universities continue to be the best in the world and have access 
to the best scholars throughout the world and how critical is that to our nation's 
success and to the future of our country. I'm beginning to see things like that 
and so I think that is the sort of thing that's going to, barring another horrific 
terrorist occurrence or something like that, we are starting to see conversations 
again about those sorts of things. I think that is a very positive development 
and I hope that 4 or 5 years from now we can see the impact of those kinds of 
movements and mitigation of some of the negative consequences. Gosh, I 
hope we can begin sometime in the next 5 years to think about a coordinated 
national policy on international education, but I sure don't see many clues on 
the horizon that we are getting any closer to that.  
Conclusion
The administrators who participated in these interviews clearly understood the 
tremendous impact of the student visa polices which followed 9/11 because they were 
at the crossroads of that impact, dealing with campus realities, implementation, and 
importantly, students themselves. They understood that the agenda momentum 
relative to border security and perspectives on international students shifted instantly 
and that that shift would trigger substantive effects. They understood that the nature of 
the national security issue had been redefined and that international students, however 
unfairly, would be the subject of policy events. While they accepted the advocacy 
organizations' new frame of international education and international students “in the 
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national interest” as a national security asset, they did not focus on this argument; 
rather, they tended to report a sense of needing to reaffirm international education 
based on its traditional values as an academic and cultural asset to U.S. institutions, as 
an economic asset, and particularly as a public diplomacy asset. They displayed 
concern about the power of negative images of international students and undertook 
efforts to shape or combat the perceptions of international students as threats to U.S. 
national security. They reported on regional cultural issues and the changed national 
political environment. By far the biggest issue with the most impact on these 
administrators was SEVIS implementation, which concerned them for various 
reasons, including the shift of resources (both time and money) away from serving 
international students as people.
All expressed a number of positive outcomes of the changed policies and the 
challenging environment, noting that tracking and accounting for students has benefits 
and that their offices become more powerful in some ways as the implementers and 
gatekeepers of international student systems. And surprisingly, despite the intensity of 




Key Policy Concepts and Visa Policy Issues
Introduction
Six areas of policy study provide insight into the pattern of events and themes 
described in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. These are the dynamics of focusing events and 
movement of policy issues onto the institutional agenda, the characteristics of 
punctuated equilibrium, policy community learning, use of narrative and causal stories 
in defining a policy problem, the shift in policy image, and the implementation of 
policy. Within the content area of this case, international student visa policy, these six 
policy concepts link to themes which appeared across the documents and interviews. 
In this chapter, I discuss each policy concept and describe how it informs the case.
Dynamics of Focusing Events and Movement of Policy Issues onto the 
Institutional Agenda
Focusing events, derived from Birkland (1997), are events that are sudden, 
significantly harmful, and rare; they become known to the public and to policy elites 
virtually simultaneously; and the issue they are interpreted to symbolize is generally a 
failure of policy, leading to a call for addressing the real or perceived failure through 
policy action. They constitute a variable that opens “policy windows” (Baumgartner 
& Jones, 2002; Kingdon, 1995). The 9/11 attacks functioned as a focusing event for 
many areas of public policy, and as Birkland (1997) points out, enactment of 
legislation indicates that an event had focal power. As shown in Chapter 3, the 
legislative and regulatory cascade impacting international student visa policies 
following 9/11 confirms this power.
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A focusing event is primarily a component of the agenda-setting part of the 
policy process; beyond their harmfulness, focusing events initially derive power to 
move an issue onto the public policy agenda through their capability to reveal or 
redefine a problem (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 2002; Birkland, 1997, 2001; 
Kingdon, 1995). The public policy agenda(s) of the political system as a whole 
comprises issues which are “under serious discussion in relation to a specific policy 
domain” and may be identified by the evidence of discussion by the general public, in 
the mass media, at professional conferences, among well-informed practitioners, and 
among government officials (Fowler, 2000, p. 179). As Peters (1999) describes them: 
“The agendas do not exist in any concrete form; they exist only in a collective 
judgment of the nature of public problems or as fragments of written evidence such as 
legislation introduced, the State of the Union message of the president, or notice of 
intent to issue regulations appearing in the Federal Register” (p. 48). In policy process 
literature, two kinds of agendas are generally identified, the systemic agenda and the 
institutional (formal, governmental) agenda (Cobb and Elder,1983; Fowler, 2000; 
Kingdon, 1995; Peters, 1999). The systemic agenda is broad and includes all of the 
issues the public, outside of government, may be concerned about at a given time. 
Fowler (2000) breaks down the systemic agenda into three subagendas, the 
professional agenda, the media agenda, and the public agenda. The institutional 
agenda is “the list of subjects or problems to which government officials, and people 
outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious 
attention at any given time” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 3). For an issue to be eligible for and 
then result in policy action, it must move from the systemic agenda to the institutional 
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agenda. Space on this agenda is limited and effectively competing for agenda 
attention is the strategic goal of many policy actors and organizations (Hilgartner & 
Bosk, 1988).  Clearly, in the aftermath of 9/11, international student visa policy was 
among the issues which moved from a subagenda (the professional agenda) to the 
institutional agenda, resulting in major legislative and regulatory action.
Policy theorists have analyzed a variety of identifying factors, including the 
roles of policy actors, and have described the dynamics of how issues move into the 
systemic agenda and from there how they move onto or are selected for the 
institutional agenda. Theories of interest group mobilization, issue expansion, 
characteristics of policy actors and institutions, media attention, the power of 
symbolism and influencing language, attention fatigue and issue cycles, and other 
explanations have been advanced which appear to account for various aspects of an 
issue’s journey to public policy (Cobb & Elder, 1983; Downs, 1972; Kingdon, 1995; 
Mead, 1994; Stone, 1989; Walker, 1991). Stone (1989), for example, emphasizes that 
before an issue gets taken up by the formal agenda it must be transformed into a 
problem; that this happens is pivotal to effectively competing for agenda space and 
how it happens is shaped by “causal stories” which identify the source of a policy 
intervention. The important point is that, as Peters (1999) states,  
Problems do not move themselves on and off agendas. Nevertheless, a number 
of characteristics can have an influence in their acceptance as part of active 
systemic and institutional agendas. We should remember, however, that most 
problems do not come with such characteristics clearly visible to most citizens, 
or even to most political actors. Agendas must be constructed and issues 
defined by a social and political process in a manner that will make them most 
amenable to political action. (p. 53)
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Birkland (1997) also emphasizes that the “theoretical strands [of agenda setting 
theories] assume that agenda setting is not a neutral, objective, or rational process” (p. 
11).
Issues may be transformed into problems and be boosted to the institutional 
agenda by several means. An issue may be the focus of a president, senator, or other 
prominent government official (Anderson, 1984; Fowler, 2000). An interest group or 
a policy entrepreneur may effectively frame the issue (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; 
Cobb & Elder, 1983; Walker, 1991). The media may find a gripping story line with 
memorable symbols and images (Downs, 1972; Edelman, 1988; Elder, 1983; Peters, 
1999; Stone, 1989). For example, Edelman (1988) argues that political “spectacles” 
are constructed through effective use of language and symbols, and wield agenda-
setting and policy making power. A focusing event is one means by which an issue 
can be transformed into a policy problem, increasing the probability that it will move 
onto the institutional agenda (Kingdon, 1995; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994).
Other terms used in the policy literature for events with similar catalytic 
power, such as crisis or emergency, triggering event, or high profile event, overlap in 
definition. All essentially are high-profile events: the commonalities among the 
situations these terms connote are that they crystallize or redefine a problem (or can 
be used to accomplish this by the media or policy actors); they move a social problem 
onto a public and governmental agenda; they lead the public and policy actors 
including advocacy groups, government leaders, and policy entrepreneurs to pay 
attention to new, dormant, or redefined problems; the media plays a central role in 
shaping the issue and in drawing governmental attention; and language and symbols 
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are important to their power (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, 2002; Fowler, 2000; 
Kingdon, 1995; Stone, 1989).
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) point out that a triggering event or device 
serves to symbolize a situation, moving it onto the public agenda, thus transforming 
what is perhaps a long-developing social situation into a public issue (p. 129). Unlike 
Birkland’s focusing event, the event itself may or may not be rare, and may or may 
not be sudden or significantly harmful. The media play an important role in 
publicizing the event and therefore the issue it symbolizes, including shaping the issue 
through selected use of language and images (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Rochefort 
& Cobb, 1994; Peters, 1999; Stone, 1989). Many triggering events are actually 
“consolidating events – dramatic symbols of problems that are already rising rapidly 
to national attention” (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 130). When 9/11 occurred, 
terrorism was certainly in the public's mind as a foreign policy concern. After 9/11, 
the event clearly serves to symbolize terrorism, and relative to this study, serves to 
symbolize one aspect of student visa policy.
These events are treated as initiators which help create policy issues. Kingdon 
(1995), who conducted 23 case studies and 247 interviews in a large study of agenda-
setting in public policy related to health and transportation, notes that 35% of the 
interviews regarding how an issue came onto the policy agenda “included a prominent 
mention of crises, disasters, or other such events, and they were important in 7 of 23 
case studies” (p. 95). Kingdon treats focusing events and their variations at some 
length; he also emphasizes the importance of symbols as having focusing power and 
notes that “crises, disasters, symbols, and other focusing events only rarely carry a 
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subject to policy agenda prominence by themselves” (p. 98). He describes the three 
ways focusing events “need accompaniment” in order to move a subject onto the 
policy agenda; they may serve as a reinforcement of something that is already taking 
place, as an early warning of a possible future condition, or if in combination with 
other similar events, they may affect problem definition (p. 99). Although the power 
of the 9/11 attacks was sufficient in itself to carry regulatory change through to the 
agenda, the need for accompanying momentum may have some explanatory power in 
the 9/11 attacks relative to student visa issues. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing 
and its resulting legislation (IIRIRA and CIPRIS) were not sufficient to create a sense 
of a general problem when they occurred, and the legislation and the sense of the 
problem it addressed became “negotiable.” However, coupled with the 9/11 attacks, 
the problem of porous U.S. borders generally and international student presence 
specifically coalesced to redefine the issue and the nature of the problem, which has 
now been addressed by legislation that is viewed as “non-negotiable.”
Their suddenness and magnitude may present a mobilization opportunity for 
groups which are seeking to advance their issues to the systemic or formal agenda 
(Birkland, 2001; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994).
Characteristics of Punctuated Equilibrium
Baumgartner & Jones (1993; 2002) suggest that policy activity in a given 
domain will show oscillations, with periods of relative inattention to an issue area 
giving way at intervals to a spike of attention and activity, a pattern they call 
"punctuated equilibrium." The period of attention and activity may be caused by a 
high profile event which triggers action after an accumulation of issue concerns, by 
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the rise of a policy actor or policy community which champions the issue, by the 
failure of a preferred initiative which gives new life to other alternatives, or by a 
confluence of factors which cause the “policy window” to open. A causal story which 
is compelling and grasped by the mass media may lead to policy activity on a dormant 
or low-activity issue. Relative to policy activity on student visa issues, the data reveals 
that the 9/11 attacks are not viewed as a unique focusing event. Rather, legislators and 
the media linked international student involvement in 9/11 with international student 
involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombings, making 9/11 one of at least 
two events linking international students to terrorism. This linkage was amplified by 
the media, which characterized to the public and to policy makers that international 
students appeared to be a group needing controls. The connection was repeatedly 
drawn between the 1993 World Trade Center bombing with the follow-up IIRIRA
mandate for student tracking, and the 9/11 attacks with the follow-up SEVIS mandate. 
Further, this issue development grew to include other, earlier events which seemed to 
reflect policy activity or government attention to international student accessibility 
and terrorism. The New York Times article (Zernike and Drew, 2002) referenced in 
Chapter 4, for example, added the Iranian Hostage crisis in 1979 to the list of 
occasions when international students were linked to national security concerns, 
assembling an oscillating timeline of events. The media presentation, and some 
Congressional hearings, also added to the oscillation the presence of international 
students who were present in the U.S. at various times legally, and carrying out no 
criminal or terroristic activity, but who were using their time as students in the U.S. to 
plot future attacks. The policy changes were not the result of a series of agenda 
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perturbations, culminating in legislation; as in other policy models the power of 9/11 
overran this process. However, the "points" of punctuation were assembled in 
retrospect to add explanation and pattern to the changes that were occurring, 
illustrating for some the logic of the cascade of policy changes which otherwise did 
not seem warranted. 
Policy Community Learning
The international education policy community played a large role in shaping 
this description of the 20 months following 9/11. The nature of their actions and the 
transition of their work and missions in response to the issues imposed on them by 
9/11 can be linked to several concepts of interest group mobilization. A policy 
community, depending on its nature, may be comprised of closed groups of policy 
elites and experts (as in the “iron triangle” model), may be more open communities 
comprised of active and knowledgeable participants which form into advocacy 
groups, or may be fluid and permeable groups which coalesce but do not form 
advocacy coalitions (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Birkland, 1997). Within the 
international education policy domain, the second pattern largely applied; advocacy 
groups formed, resulting in “policy made through the patterned interaction of 
individual actors who are well-known to each other and who represent a range of 
groups and interests, including government, the private sector, the media, and 
academia” (Birkland, 1997, pg. 16). With the issue redefinition brought by the 
focusing 9/11 attacks, the relationship of interest groups and their advocacy coalitions 
to the policy making agencies was disrupted. Models of how interest and advocacy
groups mobilize and strategize to move their issues onto the policy agenda or to take 
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advantage of a policy window provide some description or explanation for the 
international education policy community’s responses to the wave of international 
student regulation following 9/11. For example, Sabatier (1993) presents an 
“advocacy coalition framework of policy change” which accommodates “policy-
oriented learning” by advocates when alterations of thought or behavior are 
incorporated into the group’s logic, especially when a consideration of external, real-
world changes affect policy objectives. Sabatier’s observation that most advocacy 
groups will “resist information suggesting that their basic beliefs may be invalid” and 
that “they will use formal policy analyses primarily to buttress and elaborate those 
beliefs (or attack their opponents’ views)” (p. 19) except when external 
“perturbations” cause change in core aspects of policies can be seen in international 
education policy community’s actions both before and after 9/11, as described in 
Chapter 4.
Use of Narratives and Causal Stories
The importance of symbols in the 9/11 attacks is widely recognized. Models 
describing how the use of symbols and images, by political actors, the media, and the 
public, affects policy activity may provide insight into meaningful organization of the 
data collected. Cobb & Elder (1983), for example, discuss the role of symbols and 
mass media in issue expansion, and how groups use and respond to symbols in 
achieving objectives. Edelman (1988) offers a detailed analysis of how events come to 
be defined as crises and argues that the social construction of “problems” in policy, 
including the construction and uses of “enemies,” particularly foreign ones, make 
policy changes more acceptable to the public. Elder (1983) emphasizes the ways 
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people relate to political deliberations in a complex environment, where the 
knowledge gap between a policy community and the general public is wide, “politics 
is necessarily a mediated affair often remote from their daily lives and touching them 
only indirectly” (p. 148). In this environment, symbols provide the vehicle for people 
to relate to policy. 
As mentioned above, Stone (1989) presents a model explaining “how 
situations come to be seen as caused by human actions and amenable to human 
intervention” (p. 281), a transformation she suggests is the fundamental catalyst in 
moving a “difficulty” into “problem” status, and thus moving a policy problem onto 
the public agenda. In this social construction approach to policy problems, problems 
which are seen as (or are made by the media or political actors to be seen as) 
stemming from willful human action rather than fate move onto the systemic agenda, 
drawing public discussion and political action (p. 283). She presents a typology of 
four causal theories in which actions (either unguided or purposeful) intersect with 
consequences (either intended or unintended); events which bring together purposeful 
action with intended consequences, such as the known objectives of the foreign 
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, have much power in resulting in policy change.
Stone’s model emphasizes that since causation is usually complex, the resulting causal 
stories have been “managed” by media, political actors, the public, or others: “in the 
world of policy there is always choice about which causal factors in the lineage to 
address, and different choices locate the responsibility and burden of reform 
differently” (p. 296). Among the administrators I interviewed, they were aware that a 
causal story had emerged, that international students were hijackers, providing 
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explanation for the focus on international students and student visa policy despite the 
fact that 18 of the 9/11 hijackers did not enter the U.S. as students, and the three that 
were linked to student visa processes were governed by existing student visa policy 
and had entered the U.S. legally.
Policy Image, and Implementation
Two other policy process issues are raised by the data and described in 
previous chapters, and I mention them again here. In Chapter 4, I provided 
illustrations of how the tone of the policy image assigned to international students had 
changed from positive to negative, and noted that the advocacy community must 
attempt to reverse this shift by finding effective ways to present and argue for 
international education. In Chapter 5, the administrators spoke at length about 
implementation of SEVIS. They described implementation from its operational 
aspects and they also expressed concern about the effectiveness of the implementation 
in meeting its stated goal of preventing terrorists to use the international student visa 
system to enter and stay in the U.S. illegally. 
Although not an aspect of policy image control or implementation proper, the 
drop off in attention to the regulatory issues was noted by the administrators, and they 
linked this to their hope that the application of restrictive visa policies would be 
mitigated as attention to the overall issue subsided and positive images of 
international students returned to the media. In 1972 Downs wrote an article 
(frequently cited since because it suggests foundational concepts picked up by other 
agenda theorists) which asserts that the public and policy makers do not sustain 
interest in an issue, “even if it involves a continuing problem of crucial importance to 
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society”, due to a cycle of attention and inattention that accounts for why issues 
emerge on the agenda and then recede. He calls this the “issue-attention cycle” and 
argues that the cyclical nature of public and policymaker attention is the explanatory 
feature, not the impact of the issue or even its resolution:  “Each of these problems 
suddenly leaps into prominence, remains there for a short time, and then – though still 
largely unresolved – gradually fades from the center of public attention. A study of 
the way this cycle operates provides insights into how long public attention is likely to 
remain sufficiently focused upon any given issue to generate enough political pressure 
to cause effective change” (p. 38). He presents a five-part cycle, and suggests that the 
problem may be “far worse” during the pre-problem stage before the public becomes 
interested in it, and that a gradual decline in interest sets in as it becomes clear that 
actually carrying out significant change will be costly in various ways. He emphasizes 
the role of the media in shaping the public’s sense of urgency on the issue, discusses 
the initial value of powerful symbols and how they lose impact, and points out that 
identifying “public enemies” and attaching blame is part of the cycle (p. 47). Downs 
analyzed the ecology domain when presenting this model and used it to analyze 
domestic social problems.
Conclusion
In this descriptive case study of the impact of 9/11 on international student 
visa policy, links to pertinent policy concepts help to identify key concepts in four 
areas. The characteristics of focusing events inform the policy cascade, and the 
oscillations of punctuated equilibrium shed light on why linking 9/11 to the 1993 
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World Trade Center bombing added to the power of the changes experienced in the 
advocacy community. All of the policy actors I studied – legislators, advocacy 
leaders, administrator/practitioners – were using causal stories and narratives to 
identify preferred policy actions and enhance their arguments. Of all of the effects 
administrators reported after 9/11, implementation of SEVIS held the greatest impact 
on their work lives. 
 In Chapter 7, I summarize assertions from the case, present questions for 
future study, describe my own experience and learning, and in closing, provide 





This concluding chapter comprises three parts. Regarding content, I draw 
together the final observations and assertions yielded by this description of the case 
and list topics which are fertile for future study. Regarding method and approach, I 
comment on issues which emerged in my research process per se and how I addressed 
those, and describe what I learned about the issues through the inquiry process. This 
chapter ends with a sampling of snapshots, illustrating the status of international 
student visa policy as it emerges from the whirlpool of regulatory activity triggered by 
9/11.
Assertions about the Case, From Summary of Themes from the Data
As Stake (1994) and Creswell (1998) point out, intrinsic case study is on a 
continuum with instrumental case study, which acknowledges that the case which is 
of interest for its own particularity may be determined to be an example of a pattern or 
model of an issue or event. The policy aftermath to 9/11 in the international student 
visa policy arena provides an illustration of a focusing event and provides an example 
of agenda shift, problem redefinition, and subsequent rapid policy activity. Other 
concepts and models in policy making are also recognizable in the data generated by 
this descriptive case study, including the patterns of punctuated equilibrium which 
enhanced the force of the policy response focus on international student visas. The 
shift in the tone of the public image of international student visa policies was clearly 
reflected in the media reports I reviewed. All of the political actors around which I
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collected data – lawmakers, advocacy organizations, and practitioners – understood 
the impact of individual narratives and causal stories on the changed agenda, and in 
shaping response and opinion about how the government should respond to the 9/11 
attacks and the visa policies which resulted. As indicated by the intense practice work 
of the advocacy organizations and particularly as emphasized by the administrators I 
interviewed, implementation was a primary issue in the policy cascade aftermath, and 
models organizing how SEVIS and other systems were implemented and addressing 
the success or effectiveness of the implementation would be applicable in shaping 
follow-up studies.
Advocacy organizations, and to some extent international education 
administrators, accepted and participated in redefining the value of international 
students as supporting national security during the 20 months I examined, and then 
used that to build a case for support for changes in the international student visa 
policy which had been put in place in the months following 9/11. By adding an 
argument that international students, appropriately accounted for, served the national 
interest by aiding national security directly, rather than as policy and opinion leaders 
on the far horizon as in the previous public diplomacy sense, international education 
advocates shaped a survival strategy that bought time for the effects of the crisis 
activity to play out and some control of the agenda to return.
For administrators, meeting the regulatory requirements which flowed rapidly 
into the international student arena became the focus. Implementation of SEVIS 
became the core activity for administrators and resulted in reconfiguration of the 
services provided in international student offices. Administrators also found 
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themselves empowered by their international and intercultural expertise, both on 
campus and in the community, where they became resources to senior administration, 
campus committees and the local media. The 9/11 policy cascade felt unfair to them, 
targeting a non-immigrant population already regulated based on unfounded linkages 
between international student visas and terrorism, and they believed that it harmed 
international education exchange. They also felt that there were positive effects. The 
administrators, all of whom were active as advocates before 9/11, continued to be 
advocates on their campuses and in their local communities for the value of 
international students and intercultural learning; many were strengthened in this view.  
However, they tended to leave the strategy for response to the rapidly-breaking 
regulation and policy cascade to the professional organizations which were equipped 
to act on policy matters, responding to calls from these organizations to write letters 
and contact decision-makers.  
Questions for Future Study
With a unique focusing event of the power of 9/11, characterized by so many 
policy actions affecting so many categories of actors, the areas fertile for future study 
are numerous. Detailed analysis of any of the major legislative or regulatory activities 
affecting international educational exchange would be a useful policy study, 
particularly if long-term impact is examined, including how the policies have evolved 
after the initial period of focal intensity.
As direct outcomes of my study, six topics have arisen which bear future 
study. 1) The implementation of SEVIS is a large part of the post 9/11 story reality for 
the international education field. The administrators whom I interviewed reported this, 
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it is reflected in the work to advise practitioners on operational issues by the advocacy 
organizations, and it is indicated in on-going government agency work on SEVIS 
operations. Among the aspects of policy study which link to this implementation issue 
are whether the program is having intended results, how implementation altered the 
program’s initial goals, and how “street-level bureaucrats” carried out 
implementation. 2) As illustrated in the policy work of the advocacy organizations 
whose documents I collected and reviewed, decisions were made regarding how to 
present international students so that their value to the national interest would be 
credible and what strategies would advance international education in public policy. 
How these organizations, and others, argue for the value of international students and 
international education and how these formulations continue to evolve in response to 
policy developments bear further study. 3) The area most directly linked to my 
descriptive case study as an examination of a specific period of time following a 
focusing event would be a continuance of this study, that is, a study of aspects of the 
policy process in the next time period following the 20 months I investigated. In 
particular, questions for study might be how (and whether) advocacy organizations 
regained some control of the agenda for policies related to international students and 
how they have regained traction on an international education policy for the U.S. 
Study of the trajectory of the policies put in place rapidly after 9/11 would examine 
their durability and would be informative regarding the lifespan of focal power 
following a catastrophic, policy-provoking event. 4) As an indicator of the impact of 
SEVIS, additional background checks, new fees, and other policy changes, the 
number of international students and scholars applying for visas and then entering the 
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U.S. is used as a barometer of the size of obstacles. The direction of enrollments 
generally, the direction of enrollment by subsets of international students by country 
and area of study, cross-time comparisons, and cross-country comparisons, for 
example, are still emerging and the meaning of enrollment fluctuations is contested 
(See for example AAU, 2002; Chin, 2004; National Association of State Universities 
and Land-Grant Colleges, 2002; Satloff, 2005). Collection and analysis of enrollment 
patterns, the implications of trends, and linkages to specific policy actions would be 
an extremely informative and useful study. 5) I did not include interviews or other 
data from international students themselves, and this very rich source of information 
on all aspects of the policies bears study. 6) Finally, study of the way international 
students and policies targeting them are portrayed in the media would benefit from 
methodical study, perhaps through content analysis methods.
My Experience and Learning
Creswell (1998, p. 188) suggests that in qualitative research, the writer's 
experience be described, including whether the writer's initial generalizations have 
been changed conceptually or challenged. As I indicated in Chapter 2, Background of 
the Researcher, I have been committed to international education for its variety of 
values and to policies that make the U.S. accessible to international students. Not 
surprisingly, although I was not a practitioner involved with SEVIS implementation at 
the time of the interviews, I identified with the general experiences of the 
administrators I interviewed. Like them, I was aware that international students in the 
U.S. could be poorly accounted for and agree with the administrators’ perceptions that 
a system which accomplished accounting for the entry, exit, and maintenance of status 
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of students would be useful to the field. Like them, I acknowledge that foreigners who 
may undertake terroristic acts may use the international student visa system to enter 
the U.S. And like them, I question, and would like to see additional study of, whether 
the policy actions undertaken after 9/11 will result in reducing the threat of terrorism 
in the U.S. as well as tracking and accounting for students.
Regarding the process of this research, the huge amount of data available 
posed difficulties for me. Accounting for materials was a project in itself, including 
labeling, establishing systems for filing and recovering, and coding and creating 
themes across data were challenges. All qualitative research guides (Creswell, 1998; 
Merriam, 1998; Stake, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994) as well as my committee 
chair warned of issues related to focusing the report given volumes of data and 
indicated that one of the qualitative researcher’s primary responsibilities is to make 
decisions about what informs the case, what is extraneous, what is necessary, what is 
excess. Despite bounding the case by time and identifying initial data sources 
consistent with the international education arena and policy process I intended to 
blend into the description, I labored to make informed decisions regarding how to 
limit the material I reviewed, analyzed, and synthesized into the case. In particular, I 
realized that two components of the case, the media reports referring to international 
students and visa policies, and the government hearings which are a subset of the 
material illustrating the intentions of policy makers beyond the enactment of 
legislation, presented two problems for me. I had superficially surveyed materials in 
both areas prior to proposing this study and both were categories of data typically 
included in case studies of policy domains. The first problem was one of volume per 
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se, and deciding what was in the purview of my study and what was not. (This was 
not a problem with the other data sets, in which materials were more purely topical, in 
title and content.) The second was that the volume of materials was far too large and 
complex for the method I employed, that of hand coding and condensing themes from 
the texts and then incorporating the distilled themes into the description. For example, 
the number of newspaper articles which referenced international students but had 
nothing to do with 9/11, reflecting instead how international students were seen and 
valued in their academic communities seemed to have pertinence that could not be 
adequately described with out a formal content analysis. Also, the way the public 
viewed international students during the unfolding of the 9/11 aftermath was played 
out in media other than newspapers, with TV and radio reports having an impact as 
well. Regarding the hearings, although key word searches led me to testimony focused 
on international student visa policies, additional research approaches such as content 
analysis to account for other topic areas (and their frequency) within which discussion 
of international students and scholars arose would give a better picture of the policy 
making environment faced by the advocacy groups during this chaotic period. With 
counsel from my committee, I recognized the media reports and hearing testimony as 
providing context and used them when pertinent to enrich the description and provide 
triangulation. 
I also discovered that the most interesting aspect of this case study for me were 
the interviews with the administrators, whose first-hand experiences were compelling.  
Their roles as policy actors, practitioners grappling with the implementation of 
policies, community informants representing their students, and revitalized advocates 
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for the value of international education would bear continuing inquiry and analysis. I 
hope to extend my research agenda in the future by revisiting the perceptions, 
experiences, and policy and advocacy work of administrators who serve international 
students.
The Direction of International Student Visa Policy after the Study Period
When asked in December 2003 and January and February 2004 about the 
longevity of the policy issues prevalent in the 20 months following 9/11, international 
education administrators responded with concerns about the implications of a SEVIS 
reporting system that failed to work, a visa processing system slowed by background 
checks and regulatory obstacles, and long-term impact on the numbers of international 
students enrolling in U.S. institutions and programs. Still, when asked about what they 
felt the future held for international education in the U.S. five years after 9/11, the 
administrators largely forecast optimism about a return to forms of public policy that 
support international education, and a re-emergence of legislative commitment to the 
value of international students and scholars linked to the values held by various 
groups prior to 9/11, holding that these students are academic and cultural assets to 
the U.S., they constitute a very large economic resource, and they have unique value 
to the U.S. public diplomacy efforts. As Administrator G forecast:
Well, we are really hoping that this is part of the pendulum swing that when 
anything new starts, like when you have a child who is naughty, you stay on 
them, watch their every move until they prove themselves and then you start 
letting them have a little more leniency. What we hope is that it is part of that 
pendulum, however, a good balance, a natural balance needs to be maintained.  
I think that a lot of the regulations are good and they are merit based. But I 
think that we also need to use a common sense approach in some situations. I 
think that, hopefully, in five years, that we will have reached a natural state.
What I'm hoping is that we will be able to pick up to where we were prior to 
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9/11 in five years or so. I'm an optimist, I suppose, but I'm also a realist. 
Hopefully, we can get some of these rules and regulations ironed out and 
things will get back to where we were. 
In snapshots of the international student visa policy domain in 2004 and 2005, 
the administrators’ comments predictions are close to the mark. While not the focus of 
this study, changes are creeping into regulatory practices which mitigate some of the 
effects of the post 9/11 policies. Policy makers’ opinions are increasingly supportive 
of international education once again. Advocacy organizations are working with 
legislators on specific aspects of visa policy, such as mitigation of some lengthy 
background clearance checks, and importantly, calls for a national international 
education policy, including many of the features of the 2000 Senate resolution, are 
again being openly made.
The SEVIS system, now it its fifth iteration, is undergoing constant 
performance review and technical changes to address user issues. International 
education professional organizations constantly monitor the state of implementation 
and report obstacles in the process (Field, 2004). Often the professional organizations 
and their members are at the table when agencies and committees work and are 
engaged in the review effort. A March 2005 Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) study of SEVIS performance, for example, was undertaken because despite 
improvements in key performance measurements “problems were still being reported 
by educational organizations.” In a sign of the re-emergence of advocacy for 
international students, this report also notes another reason it was undertaken, linking 
visa policies to negative consequences:  “In addition, concerns have been raised that 
the number of international students and exchange visitors coming to the United 
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States has been negatively affected by the U.S. visa process. Accordingly, the 
Congress asked GAO to testify on its work on SEVIS and related issues” (U.S. GAO 
Testimony, 2005). Clearly, SEVIS and other DHS functions related to international 
students and visa processing, including Mantis background checks, mandatory visa 
application interviews, and port-of-entry processing practices, are undergoing constant 
review, with some revisions occurring (Glenn, 2005). These practices are being 
reviewed in consultation with stakeholders, and with open discussion of the context 
and implications of the policies and procedures.
Janice Jacobs, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services noted in a May 
2005 speech to international educators that while “No discussion of visa policy would 
be faithful to recent history with out including the horrific events of 9/11 which 
shaped so much of our world,” a balance must be struck between securing U.S. 
borders and encouraging people to visit the U.S., do business here, study here, and 
that to overcome bottlenecks in consulates where visas are processed, one of the 
obstacles resulting from rapid policy changes in 2001 and 2002, the Department of 
State has added 350 new consular positions since 9/11, with an additional 121 
proposed (Jacobs, 2005).
Recent attention has focused on the obstacles faced by international students 
seeking study in the sciences and technology. Because these students represent a link 
to U.S. leadership in science and technology innovation and dominance in research, 
failure of which evoke shadows of declining U.S. economic competitiveness, 
difficulties which these students face in getting visas and reported declines in 
enrollments have placed a spotlight on the consequences of visa policy developed and 
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implemented in response to 9/11. An active policy debate on this issue is being carried 
out in the national (and in some cases international) media with concerns expressed by 
a range of professional organizations such as the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, Association of American Universities, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, the National Foreign Trade Council, and the Business Roundtable, “an 
association of chief executive officers of leading corporations with a combined 
workforce of more than 10 million employees in the United States and $4 trillion in 
revenues, [which are] committed to advocating public policies that foster vigorous 
economic growth and a dynamic global economy” (Business Roundtable Press 
Release, 2005). When organizations such as these distribute policy statements calling 
for visa reform for international students, the nature of the public policy debate has 
clearly changed (Alden, 2004; Association of American Universities, 2005, 2004; 
Diament, 2005; Skorton and Davisson, 2005).
Perhaps most indicative of the general revitalization of public policy support 
for international students is proposed legislation, the American Competitiveness 
through International Openness Now (ACTION) Act of 2005. This bill, first 
introduced in 2004 as the International Student and Scholar Access Act (ISSAA) of 
2004, has been introduced by Senators Norm Coleman (R-Minn) and Jeff Bingaman 
(D-NM). The Act would amend the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961. Their comments, and 
the content of the bill, illustrate the extent to which the various policy actions 
following 9/11 have come into question and are openly discussed for remediation. In 
introducing ISSAA in July 2004, Senator Coleman argues that unintended 
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consequences of post 9/11 visa policies must be mitigated, despite the need for 
national security.
September 11, 2001, was a day that changed America forever. . . . It appears as 
if the measures we have taken [such as the USA PATRIOT Act] have had 
some effect. . . . we all know there is absolutely no such thing as an absolute 
guarantee of absolute security in a free society, so what we do is measure the 
level of threat against the loss of certain other values and then we try to strike 
a balance. In the area of student visas, I believe we have pushed security 
concerns beyond the logical point and need to make adjustments to our policy. 
. . . I believe the result of what has been well intentioned [efforts to ensure 
national security] in regard to student visas has been to push the ball a little too 
far . . . now we have visa processes that are structured in a way that produces 
results that I don’t think we want. . . . Again, it is in the interest of the United 
States of America to bring in the best and brightest foreign students to study in 
America. These are people who will lead their nations one day. . . . Foreign 
students also help our economy. Higher education is a major service sector 
export, bringing in $12 billion to the U.S. economy every year. . . . One of the 
issues CEOs mentioned was the difficulty in having foreign students come to
our country and the impact it has on their opportunities for success and 
innovation, and the impact that has on the American economy. (Congressional 
Record, Senate, 2004)
Following statements of the value of international students to the U.S., the Act’s 
introductory rationale states:  “The policies implemented by the United States since 
September 11, 2001, and the public perceptions they have engendered, have 
discouraged many foreign students from studying in the United States and have 
frustrated the efforts of many foreign scholars and exchange visitors from visiting the 
United States.” The ACTION Act calls for a comprehensive marketing plan for U.S. 
international education to compete with other countries which are recruiting 
international students; visa process reforms including review of fees and some 
interview requirements; changes in the Immigration and Nationality Act to require 
only that students “have the intention, capability, and sufficient financial resources to 
complete a course of study in the United States,” to replace language requiring proof 
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that the student has “essential ties” to the home country and has no intention 
immigrating; and SEVIS “data fixes” requested by universities to resolve vexing 
database problems; and other provisions (Senate Bill 455, ACTION Act, 2005). 
Coleman also mentions the influence that individual international education 
administrators have had on his thinking. 
In another sign of the viability of policies and governmental activity in support 
of international education, 2006 proposed funding limits for international education 
and exchanges have been increased. While the final funding depends on the work of 
various appropriations committee actions in the House and Senate, in July 2005 the 
Senate approved providing $442.2 million for the State Department’s international 
education programs; this is $10 million more than requested by the Bush 
administration, $30 million more than an earlier bill proposed, and $54 million more 
than approved for FY 2005 (Science-State-Justice-Commerce Appropriations bill, HR 
2862, report).
The nature of the public policy debate regarding international students appears 
to have returned to focus on the value of international students to aspects of public 
policy beyond national security and the process of mitigating the effects of the 
cascade of regulation adopted in the aftermath of 9/11 appears to be in progress. 
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Senate Concurrent Resolution 7
107TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
S. CON. RES. 7
Expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should establish an 
international education policy to enhance national security and significantly further 
United States foreign policy and global competitiveness, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. KERRY (for himself, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. REID,
Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. WELLSTONE, Mr. MILLER, Mr. INOUYE,
Mr. LEAHY, Mrs. HUTCHINSON, Mr. HELMS, and Mr. DODD) 
submitted the following concurrent resolution;
APRIL 4, 2001
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should establish an 
international education policy to further national security, foreign policy, and 
economic competitiveness, promote mutual understanding and cooperation among 
nations, and for other purposes.
Whereas promoting international education for United States citizens and 
ensuring access to high level international experts are important to meet national 
security, foreign policy, economic, and other global challenges facing the United 
States;
Whereas international education entails the imparting of effective global
competence to United States students and other citizens as an integral part of their 
education at all levels;
Whereas research indicates that the United States is failing to graduate enough 
students with expertise in foreign languages, cultures, and policies to fill the demands 
of business, government, and universities;
Whereas, according to the Institute for [sic] International Education, less than 
10 percent of United States students graduating from college have studied abroad;
195
Whereas, according to the American Council on Education, foreign language 
enrollments in United States higher education fell from 16 percent in 1960 to just 8 
percent today, and the number of 4-year colleges with foreign language entrance and 
graduation requirements also declined;
Whereas educating international students is an important way to impart cross-
cultural understanding, to spread United States values and influence, and to create 
goodwill for the United States throughout the world;
Whereas, based on studies by the College Board, the Institute for [sic] 
International Education, and Indiana University, more than 500,000 international 
students and their dependents contributed an estimated $12,300,000,000 to the United 
States economy in the academic year 1999-2000;
Whereas, according to the Departments of State and Education, the proportion 
of international students choosing to study in the United States has declined from 40 
to 30 percent since 1982; 
Whereas, international exchange programs, which in the past have done much 
to extend United States influence in the world by educating the world's leaders, as 
well as educating United States citizens about other nations and their cultures, are 
suffering from decline; and
Whereas American educational institutions chartered in the United States but 
operating abroad are important resources both for deepening the international 
knowledge of United States citizens and for nurturing United States ideals in other 
countries:  Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
SECTION 1. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL EDUCAITON POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES.
It is the sense of Congress that the Untied States should establish an 
international education policy to enhance national security, significantly further 
United States foreign policy and economic competitiveness, and promote mutual 
understanding and cooperation among nations.
SEC. 2. OBJECTIVES OF AN INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION PPOLICY 
FOR THE UNITED STATES
An international education policy for the United States should strive to achieve 
the following:
196
(1) Enhance the educational infrastructure through which the United States 
produces citizens with a high level of international expertise, and builds a broad 
knowledge base that serves the United States.
(2) Promote greater diversity of locations, languages, and subjects involved in 
teaching, research, and study abroad to ensure that the United States maintains a broad 
international knowledge base.
(3) Significantly increase participation in study and internships abroad by 
United States students.
(4) Invigorate citizen and professional international exchange programs and 
promote the international exchange of scholars.
(5) Support visas and employment policies that promote increased numbers of 
international students.
(6) Ensure that a United States college graduate has knowledge of a second 
language and of a foreign area, as well as a broader understanding of the world.
(7) Encourage programs that begin foreign language learning in the United 
States at an early age.
(8) Promote educational exchanges and research collaboration with American 
education institutions abroad that can strengthen the foreign language skills and a 
better understanding of the world by United States citizens.
(9) Promote partnerships among government, business, and educational institutions 





In this appendix, I explain the method of the study, including a rationale for 
approaching this topic through a qualitative research tradition, specifically using case 
study method, and the appropriateness of a descriptive case study, with references to 
the use of case studies in similar policy studies. The study design is presented in 
detail, including a description of the data sets I chose and reasons for them, and how 
data was collected, reduced, and analyzed. 
Case Study Method
This study is a descriptive, single-case, intrinsic case study. In establishing to 
use case study method, I rely on Creswell (1998), Merriam (1998), Yin (1994), and 
Stake (1994).  Despite some differences in how these researchers approach case study 
(implications of which, when pertinent, are discussed below), they share common 
perspectives of the defining qualities of the method which structure my study. 
Creswell (1998, p. 61) describes case study as exploration of “a case (or multiple 
cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources 
of information rich in context. . . . The context of the case involves situating the case 
within its setting, which may be a physical setting or the social, historical, and/or 
economic setting for the case.” Merriam (1998, p. 38) states that a case study can be 
“described by the overall intent of the study”, and that descriptive case study is “one 
that presents a detailed account of the phenomenon under study – a historical case 
study that chronicles a sequence of events, for example.” Creswell (1998), Merriam 
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(1998), Stake (1994), and Yin (1994) indicate that case study is appropriate when 
multiple sources of information are available and necessarily important to the 
problem; these sources may include observations, interviews, documents, reports, or 
other data.
My study is an intrinsic case study; it focuses on a single case which, “because 
of its uniqueness, requires study” (Creswell, 1998, p. 62). Stake (1994, p. 237) 
presents the difference between an intrinsic and instrumental case studies as a matter 
of the researcher’s primary focus. In an intrinsic case study, “study is undertaken 
because one wants a better understanding of this particular case” while in an 
instrumental case study “the case is of secondary interest” to the primary concern of 
refining a theory or providing insight into an issue. Stake (1994, p. 237) addresses the 
difficulty in making the distinction in any given case between an intrinsic primary 
focus and an instrumental primary focus, pointing out that because “we 
simultaneously have several interests [in any given study], often changing, there is no 
line distinguishing intrinsic case study from instrumental; rather, a zone of combined 
purpose separates them.” While I devote discussion (in Chapter 6) to key issues to
policy processes which are informed by the case data and which inform the case, the 
primary goal of my study is to describe the impact of 9/11 on a public policy and how 
policy actors and groups responded, rather than to illustrate or provide an example of 
the policy issues, as an instrumental case study would. 
This study is primarily descriptive. Merriam (1998, p. 38) distinguishes 
between descriptive and interpretive case studies; strictly speaking, descriptive case 
studies are “atheoretical” and precede interpretive studies, which are “differentiated 
199
from straightforward descriptive studies by their complexity, depth, and theoretical 
orientation.” However, as with the overlapping distinction between intrinsic and 
instrumental case study, descriptive study also may blend into interpretive study; 
Creswell’s (1998, p. 63) comments illustrate this continuum, indicating that through a 
case study researcher’s collection of data from multiple sources, a “detailed 
description of the case emerges, as do an analysis of themes or issues and an 
interpretation or assertions about the case by the researcher.” Stake (1994) discusses 
the ways in which the researcher’s decisions about how to present the description or 
“tell the story” will lead to decisions about themes or abstract dimensions of the case 
(which “are often issues”), and the researcher will then need to take the step of 
developing or analyzing the issue(s), noting that “Even when stated as generalities, the 
issues are matters for study regarding the specific case” (p. 240). Acknowledging that 
descriptive case study may have interpretive or analytic components, in this case 
study I first investigate and describe the setting, policy events, and policy actors’ 
responses to the 9/11 attacks; then in Chapter 6 I present key issues which inform or 
are informed by the case.
 This study is of a single case. This approach is in keeping with my focus on 
description of the particular case for its intrinsic value. Stake (1994) stresses the value 
of “intrinsic study of the valued particular,” pointing out that  “case researchers seek 
out both what is common and what is particular about the case, but the end result 
regularly presents something unique . . . ” (p. 238). Creswell (1998) also supports this 
focus on the unique, referencing Yin’s concept “that a single case is best when a need 
exists to study a critical case, an extreme or unique case, or a revelatory one” (p. 187). 
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Possibilities exist for multiple-case, cross-case, or collective case study of the impact 
of public policy changes on the international student visa arena if the researcher 
selects other timeframes or defines a range of policy activity not specific to 9/11. 
However, the 20-month aftermath of 9/11 relative to international student visa policy 
is a unique time, setting, and policy domain, reducing options for useful multiple-case 
or cross-case study. As Birkland (1997) suggests, with unique or near-unique large 
events, “it is difficult to detect patterns because there are no other such events in the 
domain” (p. 144). 
Reasons Supporting This Method for This Particular Case
The use of descriptive, single-case, intrinsic case study is appropriate to the 
topic of the impact of 9/11 on a particular policy domain, international student visa 
policy, for three reasons. 
First, the case study method is particularly useful when the case context is 
information-dense, has multiple data sources, and is made up of multiple and complex 
interactions. Yin (1994) characterizes this quality as “when the phenomenon under 
study is not readily distinguishable from its context” (p. 3). Additionally, descriptive 
case study is appropriate when ample literature and discussion of the context of the 
case exists, and multiple types of data are available or accessible, which provide 
multiple perspectives on the case and permit triangulation among sources, what Stake 
(1994, p. 242) calls pattern recognition and “ ‘crisscrossed’ reflection.” Relative to my 
topic, ample literature on the value of international education and international 
students in the U.S. exists, including historical records, statements revealing policy 
intent, public policy enactments (statutes and rules/regulations), and records of 
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discussion in the policy domain and among policy actors. Relative to focusing events, 
particularly when presented in the context of agenda setting and control in the policy 
process, ample literature and research discussion are available proposing and 
analyzing various models of the policy making process and the dynamics of agenda 
setting, problem definition and redefinition, selection of alternatives, the role of the 
media, and the roles of advocacy and interest groups (e.g. Baumgartner & Jones, 
1993, 2002;  Birkland, 1997; Cobb & Ross, 1997; Kingdon, 1995; Rochefort & Cobb, 
1994). My study tapped this literature for description and issue development as 
needed, and to underpin a discussion of key issues raised by the descriptive 
components.
Second, case study is an especially valuable as a way to document events of 
historical significance, as indicated in Chapter 2: Method of the Study. Merriam 
(1998) states that case study design “can be justified on the basis that sometimes it is 
important to leave an account” (p. 39). Birkland (1997) strongly suggests that the 
effect on policy of unique or near-unique focusing events “is deserving of further 
historical analysis” and may be “consciously historical” (p. 148). My study captures 
some aspects of the rapidly unfolding effects of a uniquely powerful event on a fluid 
policy environment, the responses of advocacy groups, and the experiences of 
individual international education administrators. The documentary analysis 
establishes a record of this, “leave[s] an account,” and the interviews provide 
eyewitness perspective within a time window of 20 months, while the respondents 
still recalled, and were in many ways still experiencing, the impact of emerging policy 
developments, preserving an aspect of the historical unfolding of the focusing event.
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The third attribute of case study method making it appropriate for my study is 
that it is useful and typical in informing policy study and public policy discussion 
(Majchrzak, 1984, p. 63; Majone, 1989, p. 64; Merriam, 1998, p. 41; Stake, 1994, p. 
245). The case study method and related designs using documentary analysis and 
interviews are commonly used to capture and describe the impact of policy activity, 
and to analyze, explain, and/or evaluate activities within public policy domains. 
Examples of studies which use the case study method and which have been 
undertaken to describe events, develop models, or expand concepts of the policy 
making process, including some accounting for focusing events, are below.
• Baumgartner & Jones (2002) use documentary review and tabulation to 
study agenda change in five policy domains (telecommunications, 
immigration, health care, science, and national security.)
•  Birkland (1997) analyzes the policy domains of natural disasters (oil 
spills, earthquakes) and theorizes how to establish their focal power. 
• Kingdon (1995) uses case studies and interviews in the health and 
transportation policy arenas to develop models of the policy process.
Particularly relevant to the study of focusing events and their role in the policy 
process, Birkland (1997, pp. 144 - 148), in his analysis of the focal power of crisis 
events, states that unique or near-unique, extremely rare or novel events should be 
studied using a qualitative approach, seeking understanding of what is unique to each 
case relative to the policies, debates, and discussions in the policy domain affected by 
the focusing event. 
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Case study research, such as in those cited above, on policy process topics at 
times use a model of the policy process around which to organize the study and the 
data. I have used Kingdon’s (1994) model of the policy process and Birkland’s (1997) 
model of focusing events to establish initial categories of data to describe my case, 
and following the presentation of the case and the themes and issues which have 
emerged, I discuss other concepts in the policy process when so doing helps to inform 
key issues. Case study research, and policy study, accommodates these uses of models 
without requiring an overall positivistic approach to research. Stake (1994), who 
affirms case study as having intrinsic value, includes in his typology of case studies a 
rationale for investigating a single case in order to “provide insight into an issue or 
refinement of theory” (p. 237). He suggests that in some situations it is appropriate to 
“arrive with an idea of what to look for” in the case or its context. Yin (1994) suggests 
that case study researchers establish a “descriptive theory;” such a framework does 
not mean a “theory” in the positivist sense. Yin defines his concept of the “descriptive 
theory” and its role in descriptive case study this way:
References to the use of “theory” usually involve the formation of hypotheses 
of cause-effect relationships. These theories would therefore be considered 
relevant to explanatory case studies. “Theories,” however, also can be 
important for descriptive case studies. A descriptive theory is not an 
expression of a cause-effect relationship. Rather, a descriptive theory covers 
the scope and depth of the object (case) being described. If you were to 
describe an individual, an organization, or some other possible subject of a 
case study, where should your description start, and where should it end?  
What should your description include, and what might be excluded? The 
criteria used to answer these questions would represent your “theory” of what 
needs to be described. This theory should be openly stated ahead of time, 
should be subject to review and debate, and will later serve as the “design” for 
a descriptive case study.  (p. 22)
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Stake (1994) takes an epistemological stance frankly supporting naturalistic inquiry 
while saying that in case study for Yin, “the main work is science” and emphasizing 
the value of the learning opportunity, rather than theory-building, available to the case 
study researcher:  "The bulk of case study work, however, is done by people who have 
intrinsic interests in the case. Their intrinsic case study designs draw the researcher 
toward understanding of what is important about that case within its own world, not 
so much the world of researchers and theorists, but developing its issues, contexts, and 
interpretations" (p. 242). In explaining how case study research serves learning, Stake 
affirms that the researcher may begin with foreshadowed questions and meanings, and 
cannot avoid generalizing “to happenings of their cases at times yet to come and in 
other situations” (p. 243).
In sum, in descriptive case study, models may be presented which establish the 
priorities for data collection, help limit the scope of the study and provide a design for 
the study (Bell, 1999; Merriam, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Stake, 1994; Yin, 
1994), but the focus remains on what can be learned from the particular case. Relative 
to my case study, I rely on Baumgartner & Jones (2002), Birkland (1997), and 
Kingdon (1995) for models of the policy process and focusing events which allow me 
to establish the “descriptive theory” of my case, foreshadow themes and ideas, and 
permit useful generalization when it supports the description of the case. 
The Case, Its Boundaries and Data Sources
To distinguish the case study method from among qualitative traditions, 
Creswell (1998) summarizes the features of the study:  “. . . a case study is an 
exploration of a 'bounded system' or a case (or multiple cases) over time through 
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detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information rich in 
context . . . " (p. 61). Merriam (1998) indicates that “the bounded system, or case, 
might be selected because it is an instance of some concern, issue, or hypothesis" and 
that the case “might be selected for its very uniqueness, for what it can reveal about a 
phenomenon, knowledge we would not otherwise have access to" (pp. 28, 33). 
Creswell (1998) indicates that “Deciding the ‘boundaries’ of a case – how it might be 
constrained in terms of time, events, and processes – may be challenging. Some case 
studies may not have clean beginning and ending points, and the researcher will need 
to work with contrived boundaries” (p. 64). 
The system for this case study is the policy domain within which the U.S. 
international student visa policy is developed and implemented. Birkland (1997) 
defines policy domain as “the substantive subject of policy over which participants of 
policy making compete and compromise” (p. 15). The policy domain includes (1)  the 
legal environment of the policy subject, including cases, statutes and regulations; (2) 
the political environment of the policy subject, including evidence of the “relationship 
of the relevant policy problem to the dominant political culture;” (3) descriptions of 
“the broader understanding of the nature of the problem, its causes, and the potential 
solutions to the problem;” and (4) the policy community, “which consists of those 
actors, usually individuals acting on behalf of groups . . . who are actively involved in 
policy making in a particular domain” (p. 15). The boundaries of the case may be 
drawn or refined by the data sources available or selected and by the researcher’s 
focus, as well as by time constraints or other decisions about what is essential (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994; Stake, 1994; Yin, 1994).
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Case studies of policy making processes and issues make frequent use of the 
policy domain as the bounded case; the researcher then establishes the data sets which 
will be collected and analyzed. Each data set has an established unit of analysis. See 
for example Baumgartner & Jones, 2002; Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Birkland, 
1997; Cobb & Ross, 1997; Kingdon, 1995; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; and Walker, 
1991. 
Data Sources
Case studies rely on multiple sources of data to provide the ample context and 
rich detail that characterize descriptive case studies particularly (Creswell, 1998; 
Merriam, 1998; Yin, 1994). Stake (1994) emphasizes that the researcher is responsible 
to select the data that will tell the story of the case most effectively. I identified four 
categories of data to comprise the features of the international education policy 
domain; three are documentary and one is interview-based. For each type of data, I 
selected a unit of analysis. The first document category is data is from the 
government/legislative environment, e.g. the federal statutes and rules/regulations 
affecting international student activities, public records of agency documents, and 
Congressional committee and subcommittee hearings. The second document category 
captures mass media reports from four nationally circulated daily newspapers plus 
The Chronicle of Higher Education. The third document category comprises public 
statements from the policy community’s advocacy groups. The fourth data category is 
information generated from responses to eight semi-structured interviews, each 
approximately one hour long, with active member advocates in the policy community 
that functions within this policy domain. Table 8 presents these categories of data and 
207
the unit of analysis for each. Beyond bounding the policy domain for the case, 
rationale for these choices is provided in the discussion of Design.
Table 8.  Data Sources and Units of Analysis.
Source Units of Analysis -
Documents
Number








Immigration and Naturalization 
Service                  (INS)
Bureau of Immigration Control 
and Services (BICS)
Bureau of Immigration Control 
and Enforcement (BICE)



















III.  Mass media 








Unit of Analysis -
Interviews
Practitioner / advocates Transcribed interview 8
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Research Questions
In establishing the questions that will guide the research for descriptive case 
study, the researcher must decide the scope and depth of the case and establish the 
boundaries (Yin, 1994, p. 22). Creswell (1998, pp. 99 - 101) recommends "reducing 
[the qualitative researcher's] entire question to a single, overarching question and 
several subquestions" that may be presented in two sets:  issue subquestions and 
topical subquestions. Topical subquestions anticipate information that will be needed 
to describe the case and may "foreshadow what the reader will find later in the study." 
Issue subquestions address the "major concerns and perplexities" of the case. I 
established a primary question and five subquestions, four of which are topical, 
reflecting my emphasis on description, and one which assembles components for 
discussion of key issues related to the case.
Primary Question:  In the 20 month period following the 9/11 attacks, what was the 
impact of the attacks on the international student visa policy domain?
Subquestion 1:  How did the governmental agenda change relative to student 
visa policy?
Subquestion 2:  What themes related to international student visa policy and 
regulation emerged in mass media newspapers during this period?
Subquestion 3:  What themes of response emerged from the policy 
community?
Subquestion 4:  How did international education practitioners experience and 
respond to these changes?
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Subquestion 5:  What policy constructs helped me understand these themes and 
responses?
Design
Merriam (1998) states that a researcher assesses the strengths and limitations 
of a research design and then selects “the most appropriate plan for addressing the 
research problem” (p. 41). This case study included the collection and analysis of 
documentary data and interview data identified in order to answer the research 
questions. In this section I describe the data categories, provide rationale for these 
choices, and describe how the data was analyzed. Table 8 summarizes data sources 
and elements.
Documents
I collected three categories of documents. All of the documentary categories 
are typically used in case studies of public policy domains, and have been used in the 
policy studies previously cited. Projects assessing government attention to policy 
issues generally include review and analysis of pertinent laws and regulations, 
Congressional and agency hearings, and other materials generated by the public policy 
process. Therefore, the first documentary category is written public records of 
government actions or intentions which concern the development, final production, 
and implementation of legislative and rule/regulation actions leading to the legislation 
or regulations. This category includes, for example, the texts of the USA PATRIOT
Act and the SEVIS rules, the Congressional committee and agency hearings, reports 
and other statements made by government or its officials such as executive 
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memoranda and agency notices. In addition to providing the content of policies, these 
documents give insight into what happened, demonstrate the intentions of policy 
makers, and illustrate agenda-density of the policy activity.
The second category comprised media reports from four mass circulation 
newspapers plus a weekly newspaper devoted to concerns of the higher education
community which included articles or commentary about international students, 
international student tracking and visa policy developments since 9/11. The four daily 
newspapers are The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times,
and USA Today; the weekly publication is The Chronicle for Higher Education. Since 
public awareness and interpretation of the policy failures blamed for focusing events 
are important factors in redefining the problem or changing the policy agenda, 
documents illuminating the role of mass media may also be a part of study of focusing 
events. For example, Baumgartner & Jones (2002), Birkland (1997) and Kingdon 
(1995) examined selected Congressional and national media activity and density in 
case studies of policy dynamics.
The third category included statements from non-governmental policy groups 
such as the American Council on Education (ACE), NAFSA: Association of 
International Educators (NAFSA), the Alliance for Educational and Cultural Exchange 
(the Alliance), American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions 
Officers (AACRAO), the Association of International Education Administrators 
(AIEA) and others. These documents include position statements, press releases, 
letters to government officials, and other advocacy materials, which can be used to 
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provide insight into the activities and responses of advocacy groups to the regulatory 
and legislative actions in the months following the attacks.
Interviews
To add thick description to the case study, capture additional perspective from 
the policy community, and to use as triangulation, I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with a purposive sample of eight active administrators within the advocacy 
community. Purposive (or purposeful) sampling is nonprobablistic; it is “well-known 
and widely used” in qualitative research (Merriam, 1998, p. 67) and is appropriate in 
case studies when the researcher seeks to understand and gain insight from a logically 
and consciously selected sample which will provide the most information about issues 
of most importance to the case (Ary, Jacobs & Razavieh, 1996; Creswell, 1998; Guba 
& Lincoln, 1981; Merriam, 1998). In purposive sampling, the respondents are selected 
for their specialized experience and competence, and the researcher must therefore 
identify the essential attributes necessary in the sample. Among the types of purposive 
sampling, I used the typical sample. Merriam (1998) describes the typical sample in 
which respondents are selected because they “reflect the average person, situation, or 
instance of the phenomenon of interest” and suggests that “the criteria you establish 
for purposeful sampling directly reflect the purpose of the study and guide in the 
identification of information-rich cases” (pp. 61 – 62). 
The three criteria I used to select the respondents in this study, and the reason 
for these criteria, are below.
1.  Each respondent had a minimum of the last 5 years in the field of advising 
international students and/or administering international student services on a US 
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university campus, and had responsibilities which include application of the student 
visa knowledge set. This ensured that the respondent had been involved in the student 
visa policy arena as a practitioner consistently both before and after 9/11, and would 
have had firsthand experiential knowledge of the regulatory context surrounding the 
SEVIS program. 
2.  Each respondent held membership in an organization which has a public policy 
focus or arm as part of its mission, such as AIEA or NAFSA. This ensured that the 
respondent had been receiving information on a regular basis to inform them about 
and help clarify the impact of the many legislative and regulatory developments which 
occurred after 9/11.
3.  Each was an active member of the policy community as confirmed by participation 
in advocacy events such as contact with state or federal legislators or staffers, service 
in an international education organization with a public policy division, or attendance 
at NAFSA: Association of International Educators Congressional Education Day. This 
criterion ensured that the respondent was aware of the development of issues and the 
range of argument in favor of and against the SEVIS program and other legislation 
and regulations which had an impact on international education since 9/11. The 
respondent may or may not have had a perspective on or knowledge of the policy 
process per se.
I solicited respondents through a letter of invitation posted to the listserv
maintained by the Association of International Education Administrators (AIEA). I 
obtained approval from the AIEA Secretariat prior to posting the letter. I received 10 
responses to the posting and arranged interviews with eight administrators in five 
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states. The interviews followed a semi-structured format, in which I guided the 
respondent with questions in broad categories. The questions represented a typical 
pattern for semi-structured interviews in qualitative investigation and were a mix of 
more- and less-structured questions, with the specific information needed from all 
respondents elicited by the more structured questions, and the descriptions, 
perceptions, and opinions of the respondents regarding what happened to student visa 
policy before and after 9/11 being open-ended and flexible (Merriam, 1998, p. 74). I 
conducted each interview in the respondent's office. I taped the interviews and 
assigned each respondent was assigned a number to ensure confidentiality in reporting 
findings; each respondent gave me written permission to quote verbatim from his/her 
interview provided all identifying information was deleted. Merriam (1998) describes 
two methods for capturing the interview data so that it can be analyzed, complete 
transcription and the interview log; I transcribed the interviews. All of my research 
actions, including the content of the letter of invitation and the interview schedule 
were approved by the University of Oklahoma's Institutional Review Board. The 
interview protocol documents are included in Appendix D.
Data Analysis
Broadly, in case study, analysis consists of making a detailed description of the 
case and its setting, and uses facts, direct interpretations, and patterns found in the 
documentary and interview data to elaborate the case and tell the story (Creswell, 
1998, pp. 153 - 154). The process I followed aligned with Creswell’s data analysis 
spiral, a series of process “loops” including data collection; data management such as 
creating files and note cards or computer files; reading and memoing the texts and 
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other materials; describing, classifying, and interpreting; and then representing or 
visualizing the account of the study (p. 142 - 143). These steps mirror Miles and 
Huberman’s (1994) data analysis process of data reduction, data display, and 
conclusion drawing and verification, which I also drew on. These three steps in 
organizing and making sense of data in qualitative studies are cumulative, but in 
process are recursive and interwoven, as in Creswell’s spiral, with initial 
understandings revised, transformed, or subsumed into larger patterns as more data is 
added to the analysis. In this process I accounted for foreshadowed themes and 
concepts, and then continually revised the data display and conclusions as facts, 
themes or patterns emerged (Merriam, 1994; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Stake, 1994), 
using data reduction as Miles & Huberman suggest, as a technique that “sharpens, 
sorts, focuses, discards, and organizes data in such a way that ‘final’ conclusions can 
be drawn and verified” (p. 11). Miles and Huberman (1994) illustrate a variety of 
methods and suggest tools for organizing and displaying data. Ultimately, I displayed 
findings in ways best suited to the aspect of the case being described; I present 
government legislation and regulatory activities chronologically. I present advocacy 
group responses by themes of action. I present individual administrator’s responses by 
clusters of response topics. I use media reports to supplement and enrich all reports 
and as triangulation, tying the story together across aspects.
Regarding data analysis that links to other cases or to models, Stake (1994) 
states that generalizability may have some value in some case studies and “can 
usefully be seen as a small step toward grand generalization,” but should not be 
emphasized in all case research, and notes that, “Damage occurs when the 
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commitment to generalize or create theory runs so strong that the researcher’s 
attention is drawn away from features important for understanding the case itself” (p. 
238). With this caution in mind, I linked description to patterns and policy models 
when useful to the description or discussion of key issues.
Trustworthiness of Data and Findings
In qualitative studies questions of internal validity, external validity, and 
reliability are not established by statistical checks and measures. Rather, the goal is 
understanding, development of description and explanation, and making sense of 
phenomena (Merriam, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Stake, 1994; Yin, 1994). 
Merriam (1998) sums up that qualitative study must address concerns about validity, 
but that the form of these assurances will be different than in quantitative research. 
All research is concerned with producing valid and reliable knowledge in an 
ethical manner. . . . But how can consumers of research know when research 
results are trustworthy? They are trustworthy to the extent that there has been 
some accounting for their validity and reliability, and the nature of qualitative 
research means that this accounting takes different forms than in more 
positivist, quantitative research. (p. 198)
The necessary and desirable tests for qualitative data and interpretation are consistency 
and dependability. “The question then is not whether findings will be found again but 
whether the results are consistent with the data collected” (Merriam, 1998, p. 206, 
emphasis in original).    
This research project develops and enhances trustworthiness and dependability 
of data and interpretation of findings through triangulation, establishing the 
investigator’s position at the outset, and creation of an audit trail. Regarding 
triangulation, the nature of the events and environment of the policy domain I studied 
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is multi-layered; the use of multiple sources of data adds to the richness of the 
description and allows me “to clarify meaning by identifying different ways the 
phenomenon is being seen” (Stake, 1994, p. 241). The redundancy in these multiple 
sources also permit cross-checking of content, where content is “factual” or recorded 
in documents – dates, provisions in law, number of visas issued, etc. Overall, 
triangulating data from multiple sources adds depth to the descriptiveness of the study 
(Merriam, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Stake, 1994). Reliability is enhanced when 
the investigator’s position is transparently established, which can be accomplished by 
stating any pre-existing structures embedded in the study at the outset and the “basis 
for selecting informants and a description of them” (Merriam, 1998, p. 207). Creswell
(1998, p. 186 - 187) recommends including a background statement early in the report 
of the study revealing the writer's position relative to the subject of the study and 
another statement in the concluding chapters of the study indicating how the study has 
affected the writer's perceptions and conclusions. I have incorporated these three 
recommendations into the study and the narrative report. Guba and Lincoln (1981), 
Merriam (1998), and others propose creating an audit trail to provide transparency and 
clarity of rationale at each phase of the study, describing in detail “how data were 
collected, how categories were derived, and how decisions were made throughout the 
inquiry” (p. 207). The prospectus, document files, interview transcripts, audit trail, and 
this report of my study provide this level of detail and rationale.
Structure of the Case Report
When discussing standard practice in case study, Merriam (1998) discusses the 
range of decisions a researcher must make when using this method:  “Nor are there 
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guidelines in constructing the final report, and only recently have there been 
discussions about how to analyze the data collected. The investigator is left to rely on 
his or her own instincts and abilities throughout most of this research effort” (p. 42). I 
have adhered to the pattern suggested by Creswell (1998) to organize and present this 
case study, adopting the broad strategy of “narrat[ing] the study through techniques 
such as a chronology of major events followed by an up-close or a detailed perspective 
about a few incidents” (p. 63). More specifically, I have chosen to generally follow the 
overall rhetorical structure Creswell lays out, in which the researcher 
opens with a vignette so that the reader can develop a vicarious experience to 
get the feel for the time and place of the study . . . identifies the issue, the 
purpose, and the method of the study so that the reader learns about how the 
study came to be, the background of the writer, and the issues surrounding the 
case . . . [provides] an extensive description of the case and its context . . . 
[presents] a few key issues, so that the reader can understand the complexity of 
the case . . . [and probes] several of the issues further . . . (pp. 186-187)
The report then makes any assertions about the case and presents a summary of what 
the researcher has learned about key issues. 
Conclusion
The 20 months following the 9/11 attacks included multiple, intersecting and 
overlapping events, actions, and effects which together impacted the international 
education community, particularly as regards international student visa policies. In 
retrospect, some threads of policy are now clear; the influence of one policy action 
over another and the value of one event or another is now somewhat understood. 
However, at the time these events were unfolding, it was not clear what the outcome 
would be, and the sheer volume and intensity of the flow of events was a significant 
part of the policy environment. Indeed, this kind of aftermath of a unique and 
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powerful focusing event needs to be captured. My goal, as represented in my primary 
research question, was to describe this situation, with some focus on the experiences 
of the administrators whom I interviewed, ultimately identifying key policy issues 
which inform the case. In order to capture such an environment and its impact on the 





CIPRIS:  Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating International Students
IIRIRA:   Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
INA:  Immigration and Nationality Act
IPASS:  Interagency Panel for Advanced Science and Security
ISEAS:  Interim Student and Exchange Authorization System
NSEERS:  National Security Entry-Exit Registration System
SEVIS:  Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
SEVP:  Student and Exchange Visa Program
Federal agencies
BICE:  Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
BCIS:  Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services
DHS:  Department of Homeland Security
INS:  Immigration and Naturalization Service
Visa categories
B visa:  Temporary visitor for business or pleasure
F visa:  Temporary visitor for study 
J visa:  Temporary visitor for exchange
M visa:  Temporary visitor for training 
Organizations
AACRAO:  American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers
AAIEP:  American Association of Intensive English Programs
AASCU:  American Association of State Colleges and Universities
AAU:  Association of American Universities
ACE:  American Council of Education
AIEA:  Association of International Education Administrators
Alliance:  Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange
CGS:  Council of Graduate Schools
IIE:  Institute for International Education
NACSULG:  National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges
NAFSA, also NAFSA: AIE:  NAFSA:  Association of International Educators




The following items were approved by the University of Oklahoma, Norman Campus, 
Institutional Review Board, permitting my use of human subjects in this study.  These 
include the Recruitment Letter sent to AIEA, the Interview Schedule, and the 
Informed Consent form.
Recruitment Letter
Recruitment Letter with Introduction of Informed Consent
Date
Dear ________________:
I am a graduate student under the direction of Professor J. Thomas Owens in the 
College of Education’s Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies at 
The University of Oklahoma-Norman Campus.  I invite you to participate in an 
interview as part of a research study I am conducting under the auspices of the 
University of Oklahoma Norman Campus entitled The 9/11 Attacks as a Focusing 
Event for International Student Visa Policy (OU Institutional Review Board #03-337).  
This study, the findings of which will be reported in my dissertation, will provide an 
analysis of several document categories plus international education administrators’ 
perceptions regarding how the 9/11 impacted student visa policy in the 20 months 
following the attacks and will provide information on how U.S. legislators and agency 
actors, the mass media, and the international education policy community have been 
viewed and how they have responded to, the 9/11 attacks, specifically in reference to 
student visa policy.  
Participants in the interviews must have been in a job for the last 5 years that includes 
responsibility for international student advising, been a member of an international 
education advocacy organization with a public policy arm for the last 5 years, and 
evidence of advocacy activities in support of international education in the last 2 
years.
Your participation will involve meeting me for an interview to respond to six 
questions. The interview will be audio-tape recorded and should only take about 30 –
45 minutes. There is no cost to you other than the time it takes for the interview.  Your 
involvement in the study is voluntary, and you may choose not to participate or to 
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withdraw at any time.  The results of this research study may be published, but your 
name, that of your institution, or other identifying factors will not be used. The tape of 
each interview will be summarized using an interview log.  Participants will be 
identified in the log only by an assigned number. The tapes, the log and the key 
linking participant identity to the log will be kept in a locked cabinet in my office; 
only I will have access to these items. The tapes and logs 
will be destroyed following completion of my study. Therefore, all information you 
provide will remain strictly confidential.  (I will ask you to sign an informed consent 
form prior to the interview.)
If you have any questions about this research project, please feel free to call me at 
(702) 294-4848 or by e-mail at mhreeves@aol.com, or to contact my faculty sponsor 
Professor J. Thomas Owens at (405) 325-2447 or jtowens@ou.edu . Questions about 
your rights as a research participant or concerns about the project should be directed to 
the Institutional Review Board at the University of Oklahoma-Norman Campus at 
(405) 325-8110 or irb@ou.edu.
Please let me know if you meet the criteria, are willing to participate in an interview, 
and will agree to sign an informed consent statement for audio-taping.  I will then 
work with you to arrange a convenient time and location.  






Thank you for agreeing to meet with me.  I’d like to ask you six questions.  I 
anticipate that this interview session will last approximately 30 - 45 minutes.
Your responses will be confidential.  The tape of each interview will be summarized 
using an interview log.  Participants will be identified in the log only by an assigned 
number. The tapes, the log, and the key linking participant identity to the log will be 
destroyed following completion of my study.
Structured questions:
About your role as a practitioner:
1.  Please describe your activities as an international education administrator relative 
to CIPRIS/SEVIS and any other student visa policy initiatives prior to 9/11.
2.  Please describe your activities as an international education administrator relative 
to student visa policy since 9/11.
About your role as an advocate:
3.  Please describe your activities and perspective as an advocate for international 
educational exchange prior to 9/11.
4.  Please describe your activities and perspective as an advocate for international 
educational exchange since 9/11.
Open-ended questions:
5.  What is your perception of the public policy environment surrounding 
CIPRIS/SEVIS and any other student visa policy initiatives prior to 9/11?
6.  What is your perception of the public policy environment surrounding international 
student visa policy since 9/11?
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Informed Consent
INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH BEING CONDUCTED UNDER THE 
AUSPICES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA-NORMAN CAMPUS
INTRODUCTION:   This study is entitled The 9/11 Attacks as a Focusing Event for International 
Student Visa Policy.  The person directing this project is Professor J. Thomas Owens in the College of 
Education’s Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies at The University of Oklahoma-
Norman Campus. This document defines the terms and conditions for consenting to participate in this 
study.
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY: This descriptive case study will result in a doctoral dissertation.  
The purpose of this study is to collect and evaluate documentary and interview data sets leading to a 
description of how international student visa policy was impacted by the 9/11 attacks, including 
identifying any policy mechanisms and patterns which may emerge.  In addition to providing a 
description of this unique event relative to international student visa policy, findings may inform 
policymaking practices in crisis settings.  Interview participants have been identified through purposeful 
sampling.  The interview data set will be collected through a taped semi-structured interview of each of 
12 participants; each participant will respond to six questions outlined in an interview schedule.
RISKS AND BENEFITS: No foreseeable risks, beyond those present in routine daily life, are 
anticipated in this study.  No benefits accrue to participants directly.  The study will result in a close 
description of a policy problem which has not been captured and analyzed and will provide an historical 
record of a major focusing event which has had pivotal influence on international student visa policy.  
This analysis may better inform international education advocates about how to accomplish public 
policy goals.
CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION:  Participation is voluntary.  Refusal to participate will involve 
no penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled.  Furthermore, the participant 
may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which the participant is 
otherwise entitled.  
CONFIDENTIALITY:  Findings will be presented in summary form with no identifying information to 
ensure confidentiality.   Direct quotations may be used in presenting findings, edited so that no 
identifying information is linked to the participant.  Participants have the right to refuse to allow use of 
quoted  statements.  (Participants who refuse to allow use of quoted statements will be interviewed and 
will be included in the study.)  Please select one of the following options.
[  ]  I consent to the quoting of my confidential statements in findings, with any identifying 
information eliminated. 
[  ]  I do not consent to the quoting of my confidential statements in findings, with any 
identifying information eliminated.
AUDIO TAPING OF STUDY ACTIVITIES:  To assist with accurate recording of participant 
responses, interviews may be recorded on an audio recording device.  The tapes will be kept in a locked 
cabinet in the researcher’s office; only the researcher will have access to the tapes and logs.  Tapes and 
interview logs will be destroyed at the conclusion of the study.  Participants have the right to refuse to 
allow such taping without penalty.  (Participants who refuse to allow taping will not be interviewed and 
will not be included in the study.)  Please select one of the following options.
[  ] I consent to the use of audio recording.
[  ] I do not consent to the use of audio recording.
CONTACTS FOR QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STUDY:  Participants may contact contact Mary 
Reeves (ph: 702.294.4848, e-mail:  mhreeves@aol.com); faculty sponsor Dr. Owens (ph: 405.325.2447, 
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e-mail: jtowens@ou.edu); or the Institutional Review Board at the University of Oklahoma-Norman 
Campus (ph:  405.325.8110, e-mail irb@ou.edu ). 
PARTICIPANT ASSURANCE:  I have read and understand the terms and conditions of this study and 
I hereby agree to participate in the above-described research study.  I understand my participation is 
voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time without penalty.
____________________________________________________  
____________________________
Signature of Participant Date
____________________________________________________
____________________________
Printed Name of Participant Researcher Signature
